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This thesis consist of two parts. The first deals with bike-sharing systems which
are now ubiquitous across the U.S.A. We have worked with Motivate, the opera-
tor of the systems in, for example, New York City, Chicago, and San Francisco, to
innovate a data-driven approach to managing both their day-to-day operations
and to provide insight on several central issues in the design of their systems.
This work required the development of a number of new optimization models,
characterizing their mathematical structure, and using this insight in designing
algorithms to solve them. Many of these projects have been fully implemented to
improve the design, rebalancing, and maintenance of Motivate’s systems across
the country.
In the second part, we study a queueing-theoretic model of on-demand trans-
portation systems (e.g., Uber/Lyft, Scoot, etc.) to derive approximately optimal
pricing, dispatch, and rebalancing policies. Though the resulting problems
are high-dimensional and non-convex, we develop a general approximation
framework, based on a novel convex relaxation. Our approach provides effi-
cient algorithms with rigorous approximation guarantees for a wide range of
objectives and controls.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The number of commuting options available to the people of San Francisco
has increased significantly in this decade. Aside from private vehicles, the
options used to be restricted to BART, Muni, taxis, and cable/street cars (as well
as some water transportation). Today, these have been complemented by ride-
sharing (Uber/Lyft), dock-based bike-sharing (Ford GoBike), free-floating car
sharing (Zipcar), station-based car sharing (Maven), electric scooter sharing with
large (Scoot) or small (Bird, Spin, LimeBike) scooters, and electric bicycles (JUMP).
We will refer to the collection of these services interchangeably as shared vehicle
or on-demand transportation systems. Though San Francisco may be extraordinary
with respect to the adoption rate of these systems, the increasing variety of
transportation options is ubiquitous in major cities around the world.
A common denominator of on-demand transportation systems is the users’
flexibility to enter and leave the system anywhere and anytime. This gives
the systems several characteristics (cf. Table 1.1) that distinguish them from
traditional mass transit. Thus, despite the study of mass transportation systems
being among the oldest research areas within operations research (OR), the
design and operation of shared vehicle systems require specialized models and
algorithms. Before summarizing the contributions in this thesis, we now describe
the distinctive features of shared vehicle systems and give an overview of the
different operational levers present.
1
1.1 Distinctive Features of Shared Vehicle Systems
Schedules & Routes. Traditional public transportation systems can be charac-
terized by customers entering and leaving vehicles (e.g., buses, trains) at fixed
stations, that the vehicles visit in fixed order, at fixed times. The contrast to
on-demand transportation systems, or bike-sharing as a special case thereof,
is well-described through a quote by Jay Walder [2016], CEO of Motivate, the
operator of several bike-sharing systems (BSS) across the world:
[...] Bike sharing creates a system for personal mobility. It is personal-
ized mass transit. You distance yourself from the idea of stations and
routes and schedules.[...]
Walder’s description points out the major difference between traditional
public transportation and on-demand transportation systems: customers do not
have to adhere to fixed schedules and routes. Instead, they engage vehicles at
their preferred time and take their preferred route to their destination.
Stations. Beyond the routes and schedules, Walder also mentions the
distancing from stations. Though the largest BSSs in the US are station-based
(resp., dock-based), these stations are quite different from public transit stations
in more than one way. First, given the flexibility with respect to schedules,
stations are not meant to be waited at (though customers may have to wait for a
stock-out to end, in order to rent/return a bike). Second, given the flexibility with
respect to routes, stations really can be thought of as part of a complete network, in
which any ride can go from any station to any other station. Third, setting up
bike-sharing stations happens on a different time-scale than traditional public
2
transit: as an extreme example, contrast the 48 stations Citi Bike added to the
Upper West and Upper East Sides of Manhattan during the summer of 2015 with
the 3 new subway stations along the planned Second Avenue Subway that were
constructed from 2011 to 2017.1 More generally speaking, shared vehicle systems
have expanded to new cities/service areas much faster than traditional public
transit.
Entering and Leaving the System. Just like on-demand transportation, pri-
vate vehicles also offer the flexibility for users to commute on their preferred
schedule and route. However, as pointed out by Chicago bike advocate Julie Sher-
man [2017], there are two significant differences when it comes to the beginning
and the end of a trip:
I like the flexibility of being able to usually find and grab a bike as
I make my way from point A to B, and then point F to G, without
worrying that my own bike is sitting out vulnerable to the elements,
vandalism, and theft.
Both differences pointed out by Sherman relate to the users’ responsibility for
the vehicle in shared vehicle systems: users enter and leave the system at the
beginning and end of each trip. As such, they hold no responsibility for the
vehicle after ending the trip. Also, they thereby gain the flexibility to begin trips
at locations other than the end location of the most recent trip.
Data and Real-time Decision-making. Different transportation systems
vary both with respect to the data they (can) collect and the extent to which data
is used operationally. This is true even for traditional public transportation: in
1Remarkably, the subway stations had first been proposed in 1919!
3
San Francisco, the BART system collects data reflecting the origin-destination
pairings of all trips, yet the Muni system does not. This is partially due to billing
requirements: BART prices depend on the destination, Muni prices do not. The
operational needs also explain the vast pools of data that shared vehicle systems
collect:
• Dispatch decisions by ride-sharing systems are made in almost real time
and require real-time data of which available drivers are nearby.
• Surge prices are set on a time-scale in the order of minutes and rely on
an accurate reflection of the local and global balance between supply and
demand.
• Routing decisions for rebalancing trucks in bike-sharing systems are made
a few times per hour and are based on an accurate reflection of the current
state of the system.
In contrast to the above real-time decisions, planning decisions like the following
rely on somewhat coarser data:
• Non-motorized rebalancing decisions in bike-sharing (cf. Section 1.2.2) are
made at most on a monthly time-scale.
• System design questions in bike-sharing systems, e.g., what stations to add
docks to or where to set up stations, are made no more frequently than on
an annual time-scale.
The operational decisions in public transportation systems, e.g., setting routes
and schedules, more closely reflect the latter set of decisions. In contrast to the
real-time decisions, these tend to not rely on pools of data as vast as those in
4
shared vehicle systems (cf. Section 1.4 for a summary of the kinds of data we
have used in our collaboration with Motivate).
Two-sidedness. Most of the challenges and solutions described in this thesis
deal with the need to balance demand and supply in on-demand transportation
systems. In today’s ride-sharing systems, this crucially requires ensuring that
sufficiently many drivers are driving to serve customers with sufficiently low
ETAs; in turn, having sufficiently many drivers relies on having enough riders
requesting rides at sufficiently high prices (to make driving worthwhile the
drivers’ time). This is a fundamental difference compared to both traditional
public transportation systems and to other shared vehicle systems in which the
supply is set explicitly by the platform. As a result, pricing and other decision-
making in these platforms must simultaneously consider the supply and demand
sides. In this regard, challenges faced by ride-sharing systems are more similar
to those in other two-sided markets, like Airbnb, Upwork, or Handy. However,
other challenges in ride-sharing are first and foremost based on its nature as an
on-demand transportation service. Throughout this thesis, the focus is on those
challenges, rather than on the two-sided nature of these systems.
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1.2 Challenges of Imbalance
Users’ flexibility in using on-demand transportation systems poses challenges
for platform operators unbeknownst to traditional mass transportation modes.
Fundamentally, these challenges are due to imbalance in the system. Though it
is true across modes of transportation that travel demand is strongly asymmetric
in each rush hour (cf. Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2), the consequences for users
vary across systems. Since buses and subways are scheduled to ride back and
forth along their routes, asymmetric demand in these systems only implies that
capacity in one direction is more utilized than in the other. Yet, capacity is still
available in both directions. In contrast, in bike-sharing and other shared vehicle
systems, the means of transportation themselves may not be available. This effect
is displayed in Figure 1.3, which shows for several stations the fraction of docks
filled with bikes over time; when the fraction of docks filled is 0 (or 1), i.e., when
stations are empty (or full), customers suffer out-of-stock events, meaning that
they cannot rent (return) bikes at (to) the station. This lack of availability has been
cited (Capital Bikeshare [2014]) as one of the major reasons for dissatisfaction
among users of bike-sharing systems. Similarly, ride-sharing systems compete on
lower pick up times (Banerjee et al. [2018]), which also increase due to imbalance
in the system. As such, alleviating the effects of imbalance is a major focus
of platform operators. However, the tools available to operators vary, as we
describe for different platforms below.
7
Figure 1.1: Asymmetric demand at 4 stations in the BART system. Solid
lines denote arrivals whereas dashed lines denote departures.
Figure 1.2: Number of Rentals originating at stations in the East Village
and the Financial District during a week in July 2017, bucketed
into one-hour intervals.
8
Figure 1.3: Average fraction of docks filled at stations over various times of
the day.
1.2.1 Levers to reduce imbalance in ride-sharing
Fundamentally, ride-sharing companies need to match drivers to passengers
who request rides and set prices for these rides. Most platforms, like Uber and
Lyft, set static prices per mile/minute, which are then adjusted via a surge price
that depends on real-time supply-demand imbalance. Dispatch, the decision
which driver to match, is of course always dependent on current conditions.
Though many trade-offs need to be considered in the context of dispatching (e.g.,
dispatching drivers from further away increases the odds of either the driver or
the passenger canceling the ride), imbalance within the system can in principle
be reduced by dispatching from high-supply to low-supply areas.
The effects of surge pricing on the balance between demand and supply
happen on at least three different levels: first, in the very near-term, surge prices
9
decrease demand in areas where they are are charged. Second, over a slightly
longer time-scale, they incentivize drivers to drive in areas more likely to have
surge prices, which give higher earnings to those drivers; as such, they can
increase supply locally over a slightly longer time-scale. Third, surge prices
increase average-earnings for drivers and thereby, over a longer time-scale,
increase the incentives for drivers to drive at all at a given time. Thus, surge
prices allow platforms to modulate the demand-side in the short-term as well
as increasing the local and global supply over longer time-scales. Beyond these
effects, surge prices can also be applied to change the distribution of drivers
within the system: by setting higher prices for rides to low-demand areas and
lower prices for rides to high-demand areas, operators may ensure that more
supply remains where it is most needed (cf. Section 9.3).
Though not (explicitly) applied by current ride-sharing platforms, it is also
conceivable for ride-sharing platforms to reduce imbalance by paying drivers to
relocate (cf. Section 10.1). In fact, when considering an autonomous system, in
which the platform operates vehicles, this is an appropriate way to think about
the cost induced by the relocation of vehicles.
1.2.2 Rebalancing in Bike-Sharing
In contrast to ride-sharing systems, bike-sharing systems have yet to start using
pricing to modulate demand. This is partly due to the public-private partnerships
via which these systems are set up and that enforce rules banning pricing from
being used for demand regulation. Instead, operators have focused on the
supply-side, having developed a range of different rebalancing solutions to
10
handle imbalance.
Most of the rebalancing in bike-sharing systems tends to be done via vans
and box-trucks that can move between around 20 and 60 bikes at a time within
the system – these are especially efficient when there is little congestion and
many bikes can be picked up at once. Beyond box-trucks, platforms also operate
so-called trikes: trailers pulled by a cyclist that can hold up to 18 bikes at a time.
However, given the physical difficulty of pulling the trailer, trikes tend to be used
over relatively short distances. Finally, some operators of dock-based systems
select specific stations at which the capacity is artificially increased through
so-called corrals. This is done by placing bikes in between the docks and thus
using all available physical space at the stations. To ensure that the bikes do not
get stolen, an employee looks after the bikes until, in the next rush hour when
the demand goes in the opposite direction, the corrals empty out again.
1.2.3 Free-floating Shared Vehicle Systems
Free-floating car, scooter, or bike-sharing systems all have in common the fact
that they do not apply, at the time of this writing, dynamic pricing to modu-
late demand. However, they do use rebalancing. In comparison to dock-based
bike-sharing systems, the operational challenges are somewhat different though.
Whereas a single employee with a box-truck can move up to 60 bikes within the
system, in a car-sharing system, each vehicle moved requires a single employee.
For free-floating bikes or scooters, it is not the limited capacity of vehicles moved
per employee, but rather the dispersed locations of vehicles (rather than in a sin-
gle station) that make it difficult to efficiently operate vans or trucks. Noticeably,
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in systems with electric vehicles, an additional requirement for the operator is to
ensure, that vehicles are charged, in addition to being rebalanced. At least two of
the platforms operating these systems experiment with crowdsourcing to tackle
both charging and rebalancing (LimeBike [2018], Bird [2018]).
1.3 Contributions
This thesis treats a range of optimization issues arising in the operation of shared
vehicle systems. Each chapter contains the results of a different project. Most
chapters include theoretical results and many involve the data analysis that
motivated the theory developed. Broadly speaking, Part I of this thesis deals
with dock-based bike-sharing systems, Part II with more general shared vehicle
systems.
The main methodological difference between the two parts is due to different
models of the system: the model in Part I treats the demand for rentals and
returns at each station as exogenously given and time-varying. This gives rise
to a tractable model for many different applications in practice, even though
it sacrifices subtleties due to effects within the network. In particular, treating
returns as exogeneously given implies that they need not be triggered by rentals
elsewhere. Though this may seem restrictive, we find in Chapter 3 that it captures
the most important characteristics of real data-sets. In contrast, in Part II, we
analyse queueing-theoretic models that capture such effects, treating both rentals
and returns as endogeneous. However, the model in Part II assumes that the
system is in a time-invariant steady-state. In contrast to the application-driven
focus of Part I, Part II aims to derive strong theoretical guarantees; these are
12
interesting from a stochastic control perspective, but also provide implementable
insights. Yet, for practical considerations the algorithms may rely on too many
parameters that would need to be estimated. Given the difference between the
two parts with respect to both modeling and the purpose of the results, we
separate the related work sections, providing one in each part.
Feasible Permutations. Most chapters in this thesis can be read indepen-
dently of each other. That being said, most chapters in Part I assume knowledge
of Chapter 3. Similarly, most results in Part II rely on Sections 9.2 and 9.3. Below,
we summarize the results of each chapter.
1.3.1 Results in Part I
The results in Part I apply an inventory management model introduced in the
groundbreaking work of Raviv and Kolka [2013]. The goal of the model is to
estimate, over a finite time-horizon, the number of out-of-stock events at a station
in a dock-based bike-sharing system as a function of the initial number of bikes.
For a fixed sequence of arrivals (rentals and returns), it is easy to compute the
updated number of bikes after each arrival as one fewer (rental) or one more
(return) than before the arrival; exceptions occur when the station is empty or full,
which is exactly the case in which a rental, respectively a return, experiences an
out-of-stock event (cf. Chapter 3 for details). Raviv and Kolka [2013] developed
this notion and extended it to exogeneously given stochastic arrival processes.
This sparked a line of work (cf. Chapter 2) that applies the inventory model in
routing models that aim to guide the dispatching of rebalancing trucks in bike-
share systems. Throughout Part I, we develop various use cases of variations
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of the model beyond the application in routing. We conclude the first part in
Chapter 8 with a discussion of real-world implementations of our work.
Capacity Allocation. In Chapter 4 we apply the inventory model to study
the sizing of stations within a bike-share system; that is, given the exogeneous
arrivals, we ask how many docks should be placed at each location within the
system. We model this question as an optimization problem, derive discrete
convex properties for it, and use those to develop a discrete gradient-descent
algorithm with running time linear in the number of docks in the system. Next,
we prove that the algorithm is amenable to scaling techniques to guarantee
convergence in time logarithmic in the number of docks. Using rich data-sets
from NYC, Boston, and Chicago, we derive suggestions on where within the
system docks should be added and taken away. Finally, based on changes to the
system implemented by Citi Bike in NYC, we develop a counterfactual analysis
to evaluate the improvement in the system due to the docks moved.
Incentive Design. In Chapter 5 we consider a data-set from Citi Bike’s
Bike Angel program. The program incentivizes users to return bikes to stations
where bikes are scarce and to rent bikes where empty docks are needed. When
originally set up, the program was based on fixed stations in each rush hour
at which rentals, respectively returns, were incentivized. We apply the user
dissatisfaction functions to study the tradeoffs between this static set of stations
and an incentive scheme that dynamically updates the set of incentivized stations
based on real-time data. We thereby characterize the improvements possible by
switching to a dynamic scheme.
Rebalancing. Chapter 6 contains three different applications of Raviv and
Kolka’s inventory model. We begin by describing the real-world implementa-
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tion of an integer-programing based decision aid to guide trucks for overnight
rebalancing. Though the integer program itself is similar to what is known in
the literature, to the best of our knowledge, ours was the first attempt to oper-
ationalize this methodology in practice. Thereafter, we consider two kinds of
rebalancing that are not truck-based: trikes and corrals. For trailers, we show
that, under appropriate assumptions, the user dissatisfaction functions at two
separate stations can be coupled via the trailer; this gives rise to a maximum-
matching formulation to identify the best pairs of fixed stations between which to
route trailers. For corrals, we design a maximum coverage integer programming
formulation to find the optimal placement of corrals within the system.
Maintenance Scheduling. Beyond rebalancing, service quality in bike-
sharing systems is also affected by maintenance decisions. Specifically, the docks
in stations sometimes break. In such cases, the capacity of the station is effectively
reduced by the number of defective docks. Similarly, each returned bike that is
labelled as defective reduces the effective capacity of the station. While bikes
are designated as broken when they are returned, defective docks need to be
inferred from data (cf. Figure 1.4). Combining the inference and the inventory
model, the operator can estimate (at each station) the impact of defective docks
on user experience; this in turn may inform the prioritization of locations in a
maintenance schedule. In Chapter 7 we model this problem as a budgeted (by
the length of a shift) prize-collecting traveling salesman problem where the prize
corresponds to the reduction in out-of-stock events. We design a polynomial-
time primal-dual algorithm for this problem with an approximation guarantee
of 2, improving upon the previously best-known guarantee of 2 +  in time O(n
1
 ).
As a corollary of our analysis, we also obtain an approximation guarantee of 2
for the budgeted prize-collecting minimum spanning tree problem, improving
15
Figure 1.4: Number of bikes (in blue) and capacity (in green) of a particular
bike-share station over the course of one day from 6AM to
12AM. Between 10AM and 8PM, a pattern persists wherein the
number of bikes continuously fluctuates between one below
capacity and at least two below capacity, but it never reaches
capacity. This strongly indicates that the last dock at the station
was defective at the time.
upon the previously best-known guarantee of 3.
1.3.2 Results in Part II
Throughout Part II we focus on variations of a simple closed queueing network
model of a shared vehicle system. In the simplest version of the model, we are
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given n locations with pairwise (Poisson) demand-rates and m vehicles. Cus-
tomers appear to travel from an origin location to a destination; each customer
has a value drawn from a known distribution. If no vehicles are present at the
origin, the customer disappears; else, we offer the customer a price. If the price
is higher than the customer’s value, then the customer declines and disappears.
Else, the customer accepts the price and instantaneously travels to the destina-
tion, i.e., the number of vehicles at the origin decreases by one and increases by
one at the destination. In that case, the platform receives a reward. Our goal
is to maximize the steady-state rate at which the platform collects the rewards.
In this simplest version, rewards are independent of the price offered, i.e., the
goal of the platform is to maximize ridership (throughput) and the dynamics are
completely characterized by the customers’ trips. We formally define this model
in Section 9.2.
Vanilla Case. Though the queueing dynamics are easily explained, maximiz-
ing steady-state rewards is a non-concave maximization problem. In Section 9.3
we provide an algorithm with strong provable guarantees for regimes of interest;
in particular, we show that it is possible to obtain prices that are independent
of the current configuration of vehicles, yet have a parametric guarantee that
linearly converges to optimality as the number of vehicles grows. Thereafter, we
extend our analysis far beyond the simple setting described above.
Objectives. In Section 9.3.3 we first extend the analysis to hold for objectives
like social welfare and revenue. Then, we show that our approach naturally
applies to multiobjective settings in which one objective (e.g., social welfare)
ought to be maximized subject to a lower bound on another (e.g., revenue).
For these settings we obtain bicriteria approximation algorithms with the same
17
guarantees.
Controls. In Section 10.1 we extend the results to controls other than prices.
Specifically, we study a dispatch mechanism and a rebalancing mechanism. The
former models the decision that a ridesharing platform makes when a ride
request is made and the platform decides which driver to dispatch for serving
the request. The latter corresponds to, depending on the exact system modeled,
incentives given to drivers to relocate, the control of autonomous vehicles, or (in
car-sharing or scooter-sharing) an explicit effort to rebalance to different locations
upon the end of a trip. We show that in some ways the two controls can actually
be viewed as mathematically equivalent and prove that the same guarantees
obtained for the basic setting hold, in fact, for any combination of the controls.
Travel-times. In Section 10.2 we extend the model to capture travel-times
inbetween stations. Though we prove that our analysis yields asymptotic op-
timality for this case as well, we also show that in heavy traffic, i.e., when we
obtain a solution in which induced demand exactly matches the available supply,
one cannot hope to attain the same rate of convergence obtained for the case
without travel times: even an optimal policy cannot achieve a rate of convergence
faster than the square-root of the number of vehicles. In a slightly lighter regime,
however, a linear rate of convergence to optimality is still achievable!
1.4 Impact on Industry
The availability of data and the complexity of the systems make shared vehicle
systems an attractive application for operations research. Though this is recog-
nized by the many papers published over the last five years (cf. Sections 2 and
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9.1), the impact on practice seems limited. In fact, a study by de Chardon et al.
[2016] found that in the space of bike-sharing, operators did not use optimization
to support their decision-making. Even worse, the study states that
[..] New York City is the sole operator we know using custom soft-
ware forecasting station demand and trip flows [..].
Many of the contributions in Part I overcome this limitation, as they have had
impact on the bike-sharing systems operated by Motivate International (incl.
New York City, Boston, San Francisco, and others). We summarize these industry
implementations at the end of Part I, in Chapter 8.
On availability of data. Most of the data we relied on is publicly available.
The demand-rates used to compute the inventory model in Part I are based on
historic ridership-data and a live-feed of the number of bikes at each station.2 The
observed real impact in Section 6.4 also rely on the latter. The data underlying
the pilots conducted for overnight rebalancing (cf. Section 6.2) as well as the data
underlying the Bike Angels analysis (cf. Section 5) are proprietary to NYCBS.
2https://www.citibikenyc.com/system-data
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CHAPTER 2
RELATED WORK
”We’re meant to keep doing better. We’re meant to keep discussing
and debating and we’re meant to read books by great historical schol-
ars and then talk about them” — J. Breckenridge
Over the past decade bike-sharing has become a prominent research topic
within areas such as data mining, machine learning, and optimization. In this
chapter, we provide an extensive literature review of this research area. We begin
by summarizing the literature on routing for rebalancing, then discuss existing
work on forecasting in bike-sharing systems, and finally describe related work
on the design of bike-sharing systems.
2.1 Routing
Much of the research on bike-sharing systems has focused on optimizing the
routes of rebalancing trucks employed by system operators. A particularly
influential paper in this context is Raviv and Kolka [2013] who define a user
dissatisfaction function to measure the number of out-of-stock events at an
individual station as a function of the number of bikes at the station. Different
ways of computing this cost function have been suggested by Schuijbroek et al.
[2017], O’Mahony et al. [2016], and Parikh and Ukkusuri [2014]. Subsequent work
by Raviv et al. [2013] defined a routing problem based on the user dissatisfaction
function: at first, a time bound is given in which trucks can be routed to move
bikes within the system; thereafter, no more decisions are made, and the objective
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is given by the expected number of out-of-stock events, given the configuration
of bikes resulting from the trucks’ rebalancing. Such routing problems, and
attempts to solve them to optimality for larger and larger instances, were further
investigated by Forma et al. [2015], Ho and Szeto [2014], and Szeto et al. [2016],
among others. Parts of our work in Section 6 are very much related to those
papers. Similarly, a line of work, starting with Rainer-Harbach et al. [2013]
and followed by Raidl et al. [2013] and Kloimu¨llner et al. [2014] investigated
greedy strategies for the rebalancing problem, though they considered a slight
variation (i.e., a fluid version) of the user dissatisfaction function. The work by
Kloimu¨llner et al. [2014] stands out in that regard in that it also applies to the
dynamic case, in which unsatisfied demand also occurs during the rebalancing
process. An orthogonal approach to rebalancing has been taken by Shu et al.
[2013], O’Mahony et al. [2016], and Jian and Henderson [2015]; all of these papers
aim to find the optimal configuration of bikes at the beginning of some period.
Shu et al. [2013] assume complete knowledge of the future and solve a flow
problem; O’Mahony et al. [2016] employs the user dissatisfaction function; Jian
and Henderson [2015] use a simulation-optimization based approach to capture
network effects. In these three versions, limited means for rebalancing (and thus,
the routing aspect of the problem) are disregarded since the focus is solely on
the optimal allocation of bikes. Contardo et al. [2012], Vogel et al. [2014], and
Nair et al. [2013] are similar to Shu et al. [2013] in that they solve particular
flow problems rather than routing problems. Nair et al. [2013] aims to obtain
certain service levels with at least some probability. Vogel et al. [2014] presents
an NP-hard flow model that also takes into consideration a rebalancing cost. All
of these assume that not only the rate of rentals and returns at each station is
known, but also the routing probability of each customer, i.e., the probability
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of a customer at a given station having a particular destination. An approach
similar to that of Jian and Henderson [2015] was pursued by Datner et al. [2017],
in which they also account for the cost of longer travel times due to out-of-stock
events rather than minimizing only the number of out-of-stock events.
A disjoint line of work has focused on minimizing the length of the route of
a single capacitated truck, or the combined length of routes for a fleet of such
trucks, that needs to visit nodes with given demand and supply. The paper
by Benchimol et al. [2011] is an early example of such work. They give an
approximation algorithm, a hardness result, and a polynomial-time algorithm
for instances, wherein the underlying graph is a tree. The same problem has
been studied by Chemla et al. [2013] and Dell’Amico et al. [2014] from a mixed-
integer programming perspective. Further works in the same spirit have been
pursued by Erdog˘an et al. [2014], Erdog˘an et al. [2015], and Bulho˜es et al. [2018].
Interestingly, Di Gaspero et al. [2013], in a sense, combines the approaches of
maximizing impact and minimizing travel time: given fixed targets for each
station, the authors aim to minimize a weighted combination of travel time and
absolute value distance (summed over all stations) between the targeted bike
allocation and the one resulting from rebalancing.
Some recent papers have taken different approaches based on robust optimiza-
tion. Ghosh et al. [2016] studies a repositioning appraoch based on an iterative
two-player game, in which the environment generates a demand scenario out of
feasible demand scenarios; they apply this approach to small systems with 20
stations. They also develop a simulation model, which Lowalekar et al. [2017]
uses to demonstrate the benefit of multi-stage stochastic optimization. Ghosh
et al. [2017] makes explicit the distinction between routing and repositioning with
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the former being about minimizing travel time and the latter being about finding
the best obtainable allocation.
In contrast to the work outlined on rebalancing with trucks, O’Mahony and
Shmoys [2015] also investigates the use of trailers in bikesharing systems; later
work by Freund et al. [2016] (cf. Section 6) also considers so-called corrals.
2.2 Forecasting
Separate from the literature on rebalancing, there is also a long line of literature
related to forecasting. Most of the forecasting relates to prediction of demand
based on historical data; examples include Li et al. [2015], Rudloff and Lackner
[2014], Salaken et al. [2015], O’Mahony and Shmoys [2015], and Riquelme et al.
[2017]. Several other forecasting questions have been studied as well: Kaspi et al.
[2016] tries to detect which bikes in a system are broken given the usage data
at each station, a question relevant for routing problems such as the budgeted
prize-collecting traveling salesman problem studied by Paul et al. [2017] (cf.
Section 7); Hsu et al. [2016] uses a discrete choice model to study the behavior
of users when faced with out-of-stock events; Zhang et al. [2016] predicts the
destination and destination time of customers given the origin, the time and
personal information about the user (gender/age); an approach to predicting
pairwise demand, rather than incoming/outgoing demand at individual stations,
can be found in Singhvi et al. [2015]; Chen et al. [2016] dynamically clusters
stations to predict which stations will run out of available bikes/docks.
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2.3 System Design
Finally, there is a line of work on the design of such systems. Kabra et al.
[2015] applies techniques from econometrics to study the density with which
stations should be placed. O’Mahony et al. [2016] defines an integer program to
investigate what allocation of docks, given a budget of docks, to existing stations
minimizes out-of-stock events (using the local user dissatisfaction function at
each station); Freund et al. [2017] (cf. Section 4) extends this question in various
ways and provides an efficient algorithm to solve it. Jian et al. [2016], using
simulation optimization in the same manner as Jian and Henderson [2015], aims
to find the optimal allocation of docks, though they allow for network effects
that cause non-convexities. All of these papers are based not on rebalancing but
on the question of what the result of optimal rebalancing would look like. A
similar approach is used by Saltzman and Bradford [2016], which investigate
the augmentation problem, that is, the problem of (optimally) adding docks
to existing stations. While Saltzman and Bradford [2016] uses simulation, this
question can also be approached using the methodology described in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3
USER DISSATISFACTION FUNCTION
Raviv and Kolka [2013] define a user dissatisfaction function (UDF) that uses
demand information to map the number of bikes at each station at the beginning
of a time interval to the expected number of customers over the course of the in-
terval that will not be able to rent/return because of the station being empty/full.
We begin this chapter by formally defining these UDFs.
3.1 Definition
We denote a sequence of s customers at a bike-share station by X = (X1, . . . , Xs) ∈
{±1}s. The sign of Xt identifies whether customer t arrives to rent or to return a
bike, i.e., if Xt = 1, then customer t wants to return a bike and if Xt = −1, then
customer t wants to rent a bike. The truncated sequence (X1, . . . , Xt) is written as
X(t). We denote throughout by d and b the number of open docks and available
bikes at a station before any customer has arrived. Notice that a station with d
open docks and b available bikes has d + b docks in total. Whenever a customer
arrives to return a bike at a station and there is an open dock, the customer
returns the bike, the number of available bikes increases by 1, and the number of
open docks decreases by 1. Similarly, a customer arriving to rent a bike when
one is available decreases the number of available bikes by 1 and increases the
number of open docks by 1. If instead a customer arrives to rent (return) a bike
when no bike (open dock) is available, then she disappears with an out-of-stock
event. We assume that only customers affect the inventory-level at a station, i.e.,
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no rebalancing occurs. It is useful then to write
δX(t)(d, b) := max{0,min{d + b, δX(t−1) − Xt}}; δX(0)(d, b) = d;
βX(t)(d, b) := max{0,min{d + b, βX(t−1) + Xt}}; βX(0)(d, b) = b;
as a shorthand for the number of open docks and available bikes after the first t
customers arrive.
Our objective is based on the number of out-of-stock events. In accordance
with the above-described model, customer t experiences an out-of-stock event if
and only if δX(t)(d, b) = δX(t−1)(d, b), that is, out-of-stock events occur if and only if
an arriving customer does not change the number of bikes at the station. Since
d + b = δX(t)(d, b) + βX(t)(d, b) for every t, this happens if and only if βX(t)(d, b) =
βX(t−1)(d, b). Since we are interested in the number of out-of-stock events as a
function of the initial number of open docks and available bikes, we can write
the objective as
cX(d, b) = |{τ : Xτ = 1, δX(τ−1)(d, b) = 0}| + |{τ : Xτ = −1, βX(τ−1)(d, b) = 0}|.
It is then easy to see that with cX(0)(d, b) = 0, cX(t)(d, b) fulfills the recursion
cX(t)(d, b) = cX(t−1)(d, b) + 1{βX(t)(d,b)=βX(t−1)(d,b)}.
Given, for each station i ∈ [n], a distribution pi over possible sequences
of arrivals {(±1)s, s ∈ N0}, which we call demand-profile, we can write ci(d, b) =
EX∼pi[cX(d, b)] for the expected number of out-of-stock events at station i and
c(~d, ~b) =
∑
i ci(di, bi).
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Figure 3.1: As a function of bikes for stations with capacity 39.
Figure 3.2: As a function of (d, b) at a single station.
Figure 3.3: Visualizations of user dissatisfaction functions based on real
data.
3.2 Discussion of Assumptions
The formulation of the UDFs is based on several key assumptions. Before delving
into the various applications of the UDFs, we discuss here these assumptions as
well as the advantages that come along with them.
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Seasonality and Frequency of Reallocations.
In contrast to bike rebalancing, the reallocation of docks (cf. Chapter 4) is a
strategic question that involves docks being moved at most on an annual level.
As such, one concern would be that the recommendations for a particular month
do not yield improvement for other times of the year. Of course, one way of
dealing with this would be to explicitly distinguish, in the demand profiles,
between different seasons, i.e., have k different distributions for k different types
of days and then consider the expectation over these as the objective. Though
the user dissatisfaction functions accommodate that approach, we find on real
data (cf. Section 4.4.3) that this is not actually necessary: the reallocations that
yield greatest impact for the summer months of one year also perform very well
for the winter months of another. This even held true in New York City, where
the system significantly expanded year-over-year: despite the number of stations
in the system more than doubling and total ridership increasing by around 70%
from 2015 to 2017, we find that the estimated improvement due to reallocated
docks is surprisingly stable across these different months.
Cost of Reallocations.
Throughout Chapter 4 we consider reallocations of docks as being bounded
by the number of docks that are being moved instead of associating it with an
explicit cost. Mathematically, this is equivalent to handling a fixed per-unit cost
for each dock reallocated. This is motivated mostly by the real-life operations
of our industry partner: the cost of physically reallocating capacity from one
location to another is negligible when compared to the administrative effort and
political implications associated with reallocating capacity. In particular, this
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implies that the tactical question of how to carry out the reallocations is of minor
importance in practice. Further, the cost of reallocating docks can be compared
to the cost of rebalancing bikes: while the (one-off) reallocation of a single dock
is about an order of magnitude more expensive than that of a single bike, the
reallocated dock has daily impact on improved service levels (in contrast to the
one-off impact of a rebalanced bike); thus, the cost amortizes extremely fast
(Motivate estimates in as little as 2 weeks). Finally, the cost to acquire a new dock
is 40-80 times higher than that of reallocating a dock. Thus, we focus our analysis
only on reallocating capacity, even though we show in Appendix 12.3 that the
algorithm also extends to capture the tradeoff between installing newly bought
and reallocating existing docks.
Bike Rebalancing.
The optimization problem in Chapter 4 assumes that the bikes are optimally
rebalanced initially, yet the user dissatisfaction functions assume that no rebal-
ancing takes place over the course of the time horizon in which out-of-stock
events are measured. The former is relaxed in Section 4.4.1 in which we consider
a regime that assumes that no rebalancing occurs at all. The latter is motivated
by the fact that rebalancing is quite concentrated (cf. Figure 3.4): in fact, in New
York City more than 60% of all rebalancing is concentrated at just 28 of 762 sta-
tions. Given this concentration, our justification distinguishes between stations
where very little rebalancing is done and stations where a lot of rebalancing is
done. At the former kind of station, we assume we may discount rebalancing
entirely. At the latter, having an allocation of bikes and docks with a lower user
dissatisfaction function value leads to a lesser need for rebalancing; either way,
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the user dissatisfaction function captures the operator’s priorities without even
taking into account rebalancing. Nevertheless, in Section 4.5, when analyzing the
impact of reallocated capacity, we do explicitly consider the effect of rebalancing.
Figure 3.4: Fraction of rebalancing actions (bikes being added or taken) at
stations within Citi Bike’s system. Most of it happens at a small
fraction of stations.
Out-of-stock Events and Demand Profiles.
In practice, we cannot observe attempted rentals at empty stations nor can we ob-
serve attempted returns at full stations. Worse still, given that most bike-sharing
systems have mobile apps that allow customers to see real-time information
about the current number of bikes and empty docks at each station, there might
be customers who want to rent a bike at a station, see on the app that the station
has only one bike available presently, and decide against going to the station out
of concern that by the time they get there, the bike has already been taken by
someone else — should such a case be considered an out-of-stock event (respec-
tively, an attempted rental)? The user dissatisfaction functions assume that such
events do not occur as the definition relies on out-of-stock events occurring only
when stations are either entirely empty or entirely full.
Further, in order to compute the user dissatisfaction functions, we need to be
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able to estimate the demand profiles: using only observed rentals and returns
is insufficient for this as it ignores latent demand at empty/full stations. To get
around this, we mostly adapt a combination of approaches by O’Mahony and
Shmoys [2015], O’Mahony et al. [2016], and Parikh and Ukkusuri [2014]: we
estimate Poisson arrival rates (independently for rentals and returns) for each
30 minute interval and use a formula developed by O’Mahony et al. [2016] to
compute, for any initial condition (in number of bikes and empty docks) the
expected number of out-of-stock events over the course of the interval. We plug
these into a stochastic recursion suggested by Parikh and Ukkusuri [2014] to
obtain the expected number of out-of-stock events over the course of a day as
a function of the number of bikes and empty docks at 6AM (in Chapter 5, we
apply the same method for different starting times). This is far from being the
only approach to compute user dissatisfaction functions; for example, in Section
4.5 we explicitly combine empirically observed arrivals with estimated rates for
times when rentals/returns are censored due to stations being empty/full.
Exogeneous Rentals and Returns.
The demand profiles assume that the sequences of arrivals are exogeneous, i.e.,
there is a fixed distribution that defines the sequence of rentals and returns.
Before justifying this assumption, it is worth considering a setting in which
it fails spectacularly: consider an allocation of bikes and docks that allocates
no bikes at all. Of course, this would imply that no attempted rental is ever
successful and therefore no returns ever occur. As such, the sequence of arrivals
of returns at one station are not independent of the allocations elsewhere.
The main justification for this assumption comes from orthogonal work by
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Jian et al. [2016]: this paper used a simulation optimization approach to find
the configuration of bikes and docks across the system that minimizes the num-
ber of out-of-stock events over the course of the day. In contrast to the user
dissatisfaction functions, decensoring the demand data for the simulation re-
quired additional modeling decisions. However, the simulation allowed for two
different kinds of endogeneity:
• A return at one station had to be triggered by rentals at another. In particu-
lar, each (successful) rental caused a later attempt for a bike to be returned.
• A failed return at a station (due to out-of-stock events, i.e., stations being
full) triggered a later attempt to return a bike at a station nearby.
While this still assumed that demand for rentals is exogeneous, it endogenized
returns, excluding (at least) the example suggested above. However, it causes the
resulting simulation optimization problem to be non-convex in an unbounded
fashion; that is, one can construct examples in which two initial conditions are
only two bikes away from each other (meaning they differ only by one station having
two bikes fewer, the other two more); yet, one of them has arbitrarily many out-
of-stock events fewer (in expectation), than the other. Even worse, both solutions
still have strictly better objectives than the solution in between (in which one
bike is moved). This level of sensitivity not only makes it harder to optimize,
but also makes solutions difficult to interpret. Jian et al. [2016] proposed a range
of different gradient-descent algorithms as heuristics to find good solutions,
including an adaptation of the algorithm we present and analyze in Section 4.2.
Despite the simulation adding key complexities to the system, the heuristics
gave only limited improvements of approximately 3% (to the expected total
number of out-of-stock events) when given the solution found by the algorithm
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in Section 4.2 as a starting point. We discuss additional advantages of the user
dissatisfaction functions below.
Advantages of User Dissatisfaction Functions.
The user dissatisfaction functions yield several advantages over a more compli-
cated model such as the simulation. First, they provide a computable metric
that can be used for several different operations: in Section 4.2 we show how to
optimize over them for reallocated capacity and in Section 4.5 we use them to
evaluate the improvement from already reallocated capacity. In Chapter 5 we
use them to study an incentive program operated by Citi Bike in New York City,
and they have been used extensively for motorized rebalancing (cf. Chapters
2 and 6). As such, the user dissatisfaction functions provide a single metric on
which to evaluate different operational efforts to improve service quality, which
adds value in itself. Second, for the particular example of reallocating dock
capacity that we study in Chapter 4, they yield a tractable optimization problem
which we prove in Section 4.2. Third, for the reallocation of dock capacity, the
discrete convexity properties we prove imply that a partial implementation of
the changes suggested by the optimization (cf. Section 4.4) is still guaranteed to
yield improvement. Finally, given a solution to the optimization problem, it is
easy to track the partial contribution to the objective from changed capacity at
each station, making solutions interpretable.
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CHAPTER 4
ALLOCATION OF DOCK CAPACITY
”The first step in solving any problem is recognizing there is one.”
— W. McAvoy
While similar in spirit to the literature on rebalancing (for which the UDF
was developed), in this chapter we use a different control to increase customer
satisfaction. Specifically, we answer the question how should bike-sharing systems
allocate dock capacity to stations within the system so as to minimize the number of
dissatisfied customers? To answer this question, we consider two optimization
models, both based on the underlying metric that system performance is captured
by the expected number of customers that do not receive service. In the first
model, we focus on planning for one day, say 6AM-midnight, where for each
station we determine its allocation of bikes and docks; this framework assumes
that there is sufficient rebalancing capacity to restore the desired bike allocation
by 6am the next morning. Since in practice this turns out to be quite difficult, the
second model considers a set-up induced by a long-run average that assumes that
no rebalancing is done overnight. Through extensive computational experiments
on real data-sets we found that there are dock allocations that simultaneously
perform well with respect to both models, yielding huge improvements to both
(in comparison to the current allocation). This section is based on a paper by
Freund, Henderson, and Shmoys 2017.
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Contribution
Our goal is to find an allocation of bikes and docks in the system that minimizes
the total expected number of out-of-stock events within a system of n stations, i.e.,∑n
i=1 ci(di, bi). Here, we assume that we are given the UDFs ci(·, ·) ∀i (cf. Section
3) to measure the expected number of out-of-stock events at an individual bike-
share station over the course of some time interval as a function of the initial
number of bikes and the capacity at the station. Since the number of bikes and
docks is limited, we need to accommodate a budget constraint B on the number
of bikes in the system and another on the number of docks D + B in the system.
Other constraints are often important, such as lower and upper bounds on the
allocation for a particular station; furthermore, through our collaboration with
Citi Bike in NYC, it also became apparent that operational constraints limit the
number of docks moved from the current system configuration. Thus, we aim
to minimize the objective among solutions that require at most some number of
docks moved. Via standard dynamic programming approaches, our methods
also generalize to other practically motivated constraints, such as lower bounds
on the allocation within particular neighborhoods (e.g., in Brooklyn).
We first design a discrete gradient-descent algorithm that provably solves the
minimization problem with O(n + B + D) oracle calls to evaluate cost functions
and an overhead of O((n + B + D) log(n)) elementary list operations (which, in
practice, is negligible). Using scaling techniques and a subtle extension of our
gradient-descent analysis, we improve the bound on oracle calls to O(n log(B+D)),
which still dominate an O(log(B+ D)(n log(n)) term for elementary list operations.
The primary motivation of this analysis is to investigate whether the number
of out-of-stock events in bike-sharing systems can be significantly reduced by a
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data-driven approach. In Section 4.4, we apply the algorithms to data-sets from
Boston, NYC, and Chicago to evaluate the impact on out-of-stock events. One
shortcoming of that optimization problem is its assumption that we can perfectly
restore the system overnight to the desired initial bike allocation. Through our
ongoing collaboration with the operators of systems across the country, it has
become evident that current rebalancing efforts overnight are vastly insufficient
to realize such an optimal (or even near-optimal) allocation of bikes for the
current allocation of docks. Thus, we consider in Section 4.4.1 the opposite
regime, in which no overnight rebalancing occurs at all. To model this, we define
an extension of the UDF under a long-run average regime. In this regime, the
assumed allocation of bikes at each station is a function of only the number of
docks and the estimated demand at that station. Interestingly, our empirical
results reveal that operators of bike-sharing systems can have their cake and eat it
too: optimizing dock allocations for one of the objectives (optimally rebalanced
or long-run average) yields most of the obtainable improvement for the other.
Changes implemented by operators based on our recommendations, allow
us to evaluate the impact of our analysis. In Section 4.5 we prove that observing
rentals and returns after capacity has been added provides a natural way to
estimate the reduction in out-of-stock events (due to dock capacity added) that
can be computed in a very simple manner. Applying that approach to a small set
of stations with added capacity in New York City, we derive estimates for the
impact that changes to the system design have had. We discuss the computational
efficiency of our algorithms in Section 4.6.
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Relation to Multimodularity
Our algorithms and analyses crucially exploit that the user dissatisfaction func-
tions ci(·, ·) at each station are multimodular (cf. Definition 1). This provides an
interesting connection to the literature on discrete convex analysis. In concurrent
work by Kaspi et al. [2017] it was shown that the number of out-of-stock events
F(b,U − d − b) at a bike-share station with fixed capacity U, b bikes, and U − d − b
unusable bikes is M-natural convex in b and U − d − b (see the book by Murota
[2003] and the references therein). Unusable bikes effectively reduce the capacity
at the station, since they are assumed to remain in the station over the entire time
horizon. A station with capacity U, b bikes, and U − b − d unusable bikes, must
then have d empty docks; hence, c(d, b) = F(b,U − d − b) for d + b ≤ U, which
parallels our result that c(·, ·) is multimodular. Though this would suggest that
algorithms to minimize M-convex functions could solve our problem optimally,
one can show that M-convexity is not preserved, even in the version with only
budget constraints.1 In fact, when including the operational constraints even dis-
crete midpoint convexity, a strict generalization of multimodularity (Moriguchi
et al. [2017]) which is in turn much weaker than M-natural convexity, breaks
down.2 Surprisingly, we are nevertheless able to design fast algorithms; these
exploit not only the multimodularity of each individual ci, but also the separa-
bility of the objective function (w.r.t. the stations); that is, the fact that each ci
is a function of only di and bi. This not only extends ideas from the realm of
unconstrained discrete convex minimization to the constrained setting, but also
yields algorithms that (for our special case) have significantly faster running
1In Appendix 12.1 we provide an example in which a M-convex function restricted to an
M-convex set is not M-convex; the example also shows that Murota’s algorithm for M-convex
function minimization can be suboptimal in our setting.
2In Appendix 12.2 we show that this holds true even in the simplest cases.
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times than those that would usually arise in the context of multimodular function
minization.
4.1 Notation
Recall from Section 3 that the user dissatisfaction function takes, for each station
i ∈ [n], a distribution, which we call demand-profile pi over {(±1)s, s ∈ N0}, to map
the number of docks and bikes to the expected number of out-of-stock events
at a station, i.e., we can write ci(d, b) = EX∼pi[cX(d, b)] for the expected number of
out-of-stock events at station i and c(~d, ~b) =
∑
i ci(di, bi). In this section, we want
to solve, given budgets B on the number of bikes and D + B on the number of
docks, a current allocation ( ~¯d, ~¯b), a constraint z on the number of docks that may
be moved, and lower/upper bounds li, ui on the capacity of each station i, the
following minimization problem
minimize(~d,~b) c(~d, ~b)
s.t.
∑
i di + bi ≤ D + B,∑
i bi ≤ B,∑
i |(d¯i + b¯i) − (di + bi)| ≤ 2z,
∀i ∈ [n] : li ≤ di + bi ≤ ui.
Here, the first constraint corresponds to a budget on the number of docks, the
second to a budget on the number of bikes, the third to the operational constraints
and the fourth to the lower and upper bound on the number of docks at each
station. We assume without loss of generality that there exists an optimal solution
in which the first two constraints hold with equality; to ensure this, we may
add a dummy (”depot”) stationD that has cD(·, ·) = 0, lD = uD = B, and run the
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algorithm with a dock-budget of D + 2B. Here, D may include docks that are
currently part of the system as well as inventory that is meant to be added to the
system. In fact, in Appendix 12.3 we show that we can also efficiently solve an
optimization problem that involves an additional trade-off between the value of
D and the value of z.
4.2 A Discrete Gradient-Descent Algorithm
We begin this section by proving that cX(·, ·) fulfills the following inequalities and
is thus multimodular; while we are motivated by the UDFs defined in the last
chapter, our algorithm only relies on these inequalities being satisfied.
Definition 1 (Hajek [1985], Altman et al. [2000]). A function f : N20 → R with
f (d + 1, b + 1) − f (d + 1, b) ≥ f (d, b + 1) − f (d, b); (1)
f (d − 1, b + 1) − f (d − 1, b) ≥ f (d, b) − f (d, b − 1); (2)
f (d + 1, b − 1) − f (d, b − 1) ≥ f (d, b) − f (d − 1, b); (2)
for all d, b such that all terms are well-defined, is called multimodular. For future
reference, we also define the following implied3 additional inequalities:
f (d + 2, b) − f (d + 1, b) ≥ f (d + 1, b) − f (d, b); (4)
f (d, b + 2) − f (d, b + 1) ≥ f (d, b + 1) − f (d, b); (5)
f (d + 1, b + 1) − f (d, b + 1) ≥ f (d + 1, b) − f (d, b). (6)
After proving that the user dissatisfaction functions are multimodular, we
define a natural neighborhood structure on the set of feasible allocations and
3(6) and (1) are equivalent, (1) and (2) imply (5), and (3) and (6) imply (4).
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define a discrete gradient-descent algorithm on this neighborhood structure.
We prove that solutions to the problem without operational constraints that
are locally optimal with respect to the neighborhood structure are also globally
optimal; since the algorithm only terminates when finding a local optimum, this
proves that it returns a globally optimal solution. Finally, we prove that the
algorithm takes z iterations to find the best allocation obtainable by moving at
most z docks; this not only proves that the gradient-descent algorithm solves
the minimization problem when including operational constraints, but also
guarantees that doing so requires at most O(D + B) iterations.
4.2.1 Multimodular
Lemma 2. The function cX(·, ·) is multimodular for all X.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction, showing that X(t) is multimodular
for all t. With t = 0, by definition, cX(t)(·, ·) = 0 and thus there is nothing to show.
Suppose that cX(0)(·, ·) through cX(t−1)(·, ·) are all multimodular. We prove that
cX(t)(·, ·) is then multimodular as well.
We begin by proving inequality (1). Notice first that if
max{cX(1)(d + 1, b + 1), cX(1)(d + 1, b), cX(1)(d, b + 1), cX(1)(d, b)} = 0,
we can use that inequality (1), by the inductive assumption, holds after t − 1
customers. Else, we use the inductive assumption on inequalities (4) and (5) to
prove inequality (1). If X1 = 1 (and d = 0), then both sides of the inequality are 0
and δX(1)(d + 1, b+ 1) = 0, δX(1)(d + 1, b) = 0, δX(1)(d, b+ 1) = 0, and δX(1)(d, b) = 0. In
that case, we may use the inductive assumption on inequality (5) applied to the
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remaining t − 1 customers. If instead X1 = −1 (and b = 0), then both sides of the
inequality are −1 and we have δX(1)(d+1, b+1) = d+b+2, δX(1)(d+1, b) = d+b+1,
δX(1)(d, b + 1) = d + b + 1, and δX(1)(d, b) = d + b, so we may apply inequality (4)
inductively to the remaining t − 1 customers.
It remains to prove inequalities (2) and (3). We restrict ourselves to inequality
(2) as the proof for inequality (3) is symmetric with each Xi replaced by −Xi and
the coordinates of each term exchanged. As before, if
max{cX(1)(d − 1, b + 1), cX(1)(d − 1, b), cX(1)(d, b), cX(1)(d, b − 1)} = 0,
the inductive assumption applies. If instead X1 = 1 and the maximum is positive,
then the LHS and the RHS are both 0 and we have δX(1)(d − 1, b + 1) = 0, δX(1)(d −
1, b) = 0, δX(1)(d, b) = 0, δX(1)(d, b − 1) = 0. In that case, both sides of the inequality
are subsequently coupled and the inequality holds with equality.
In contrast, if X1 = −1 and the maximum is positive, then b = 1, the RHS is
-1, and the LHS is 0. In this case we have δX(1)(d − 1, b + 1) = d, δX(1)(d − 1, b) = d,
δX(1)(d, b) = d + 1, δX(1)(d, b − 1) = d. Let tˆ denote the next customer such that one
of the four terms changes.
If Xtˆ = 1, then both terms on the LHS increase by 1, so it remains 0, whereas
only the negative term on the RHS increases, so the inequality holds with 0 ≥ −2.
Moreover, since δX(tˆ)(d−1, b+1) = δX(tˆ)(d, b) = 0, and δX(tˆ)(d−1, b) = δX(tˆ)(d, b−1) = 0;
subsequently both sides of the inequality are again coupled.
Finally, if Xtˆ = −1, then both terms on the RHS, but only the negative term
on the LHS, increase by 1 with customer tˆ. Thus, thereafter both sides are again
equal. In this case as well, both sides remain coupled thereafter since we have
δX(tˆ)(d − 1, b + 1) = δX(tˆ)(d, b) = d + b, and δX(tˆ)(d − 1, b) = δX(tˆ)(d, b − 1) = d + b − 1.
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Corollary 3. The user dissatisfaction function ci(·, ·) is multimodular for any demand-
profile pi.
Proof. The proof is immediate from Lemma 2 and linearity of expectation.
4.2.2 Algorithm
We now present our algorithm before analyzing it for settings without the opera-
tional constraints. Intuitively, in each iteration the algorithm picks one dock and
at most one bike within the system and moves them from one station to another.
It chooses the dock, and the bike so as to maximize the reduction in objective
value. To formalize this notion, we define the movement of a dock via the following
transformations.
Definition 4. We shall use the notation (~v−i, vˆi) := (v1 . . . vi−1, vˆi, vi+1 . . . vn). Similarly,
(~v−i,− j, vˆi, vˆ j) := (v1 . . . vˆi . . . vˆ j . . . vn). Then a dock-move from i to j corresponds to one
of the following transformations of feasible solutions:
1. oi j(~d, ~b) =
(
(~d−i,− j, di − 1, d j + 1), ~b) – Moving one open dock from i to j;
2. ei j
(~d, ~b) = (~d, (~b−i,− j, bi − 1, b j + 1)) – Moving a dock & a bike from i to j;
3. Ei jh(~d, ~b) =
(
(~d−i,−h, di − 1, dh + 1), (~b− j,−h, b j + 1, bh − 1)) – Moving a dock from i
to j and one bike from h to j;
4. Oi jh(~d, ~b) =
(
(~d− j,−h, d j + 1, dh − 1), (~b−i,−h, bi − 1, bh + 1)) – Moving one bike from
i to h and one open dock from i to j (equivalently, one full dock from i to j).
Further, we define the neighborhood N(~d, ~b) of (~d, ~b) as the set of allocations that are one
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dock-move away from (~d, ~b). Formally,
N(~d, ~b) := {oi j(~d, ~b), ei j(~d, ~b), Ei jh(~d, ~b),Oi jh(~d, ~b) : i, j, h ∈ [n]}.
Finally, define the dock-move distance between (~d, ~b) and (~d′, ~b′) as
∑
i |(di + bi)− (d′i +
b′i)|.
This gives rise to a very simple algorithm: we first find the optimal allocation
of bikes for the current allocation of docks; the convexity of each ci in the number
of bikes, with fixed number of docks, implies that this can be done greedily by
taking out all the bikes and then adding them one by one. Then, while there
exists a dock-move that improves the objective, we find the best possible such
dock-move and update the allocation accordingly. Once no improving move
exists, we return the current solution.
REMARK. A fast implementation of the above algorithm involves six binary
heaps for the six possible ways in which the objective at each station can be
affected by a dock-move: an added bike, a removed bike, an added empty dock,
a removed empty dock, an added full dock, or a removed full dock. In each
iteration, we use the heaps to find the best-possible move (in O(1) time) and up-
date only the values in the heaps that correspond to stations involved. The latter
requires a constant number of oracle calls to evaluate the cost functions locally as
well as heap-operations that can be implemented in amortized O(n log(n)) time.
4.2.3 Optimality without Operational Constraints
We prove that the algorithm returns an optimal solution by showing that an
allocation (~d, ~b) that is locally optimal with respect to N(·, ·) must also be globally
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optimal. Thus, when the algorithm terminates, the solution output is optimal.
Before we prove Lemma 7 to establish this, we first define an allocation of bikes
and docks as bike-optimal if it minimizes the objective among allocations with
the same number of docks at each station and prove that bike-optimality is an
invariant of the algorithm.
Definition 5. Define an allocation (~d, ~b) as bike-optimal if
(~d, ~b) ∈ arg min
( ~ˆd,~ˆb):∀i,di+bi=dˆi+bˆi, ∑i bˆi=B{c(
~ˆd, ~ˆb)}.
Lemma 6. Suppose (~d, ~b) is bike-optimal. Given i and j, one of the possible dock-moves
from i to j, i.e., ei j(~d, ~b), oi j(~d, ~b), Ei jh(~d, ~b), or Oi jh(~d, ~b), is bike-optimal. Equivalently,
when moving a dock from i to j, one has to move at most one bike within the system to
maintain bike-optimality.
Proof. It is known that multimodular functions fulfill certain convexity
properties (see e.g., Murota [2003], Raviv and Kolka [2013]); in particular, for
fixed d and b it is known that ci(k, d+b−k) is a convex function of k ∈ {0, . . . , d+b}.
Thus, if the best allocation out of ei j(~d, ~b), oi j(~d, ~b), Ei jh(~d, ~b), and Oi jh(~d, ~b), was not
bike-optimal, there would have to be two stations such that moving a bike from
one to the other improves the objective. By the bike-optimality of (~d, ~b), at least
one of these two stations must have been involved in the move. We prove that the
result holds if ei j was the best of the set of possible moves {ei j, oi j, Ei jh,Oi, j,h}i, j,h∈[n]
– the other three cases are essentially symmetric. Let ` denote a generic third
station. Then a bike improving the objective could correspond to one being
moved from ` to j, from i to j, from i to `, from ` to i, from j to ` or from j to
i. In this case, moves from ` to j, i to j and i to ` yield the allocations Ei j`(~d, ~b),
oi j(~d, ~b) and Oi j`(~d, ~b), respectively. Since ei j is assumed to be the minimizer
among the possible dock-moves, none of these have objective smaller than that
45
of ei j(~d, ~b). It remains to show that moving a bike from ` to i, j to ` or j to
i yields no improvement. These all follow from bike-optimality of (~d, ~b) and
the multimodular inequalities. Specifically, an additional bike at i yields less
improvement and a bike fewer at j has greater cost in ei j(~d, ~b) than in (~d, ~b), since
ci(di − 1, bi) − ci(di − 2, bi + 1) ≤ ci(di, bi) − ci(di − 1, bi + 1)
c j(d j + 2, b j − 1) − c j(d j + 1, b j) ≥ c j(d j + 1, b j − 1) − c j(d j, b j).
Both of the above inequalities follow from inequality (3).
By Lemma 6, to prove optimality of the algorithm, it now suffices to prove
that bike-optimal solutions that are locally optimal w.r.t. our neighborhood
structure are also global optimal.
Lemma 7. Suppose (~d, ~b) is bike-optimal, but does not minimize c(·, ·) subject to budget
constraints. Let (~d?, ~b?) denote a better (feasible) solution at minimum dock-distance
from (~d, ~b). Since (~d, ~b) is bike-optimal, there exist j and k such that b j + d j < b?j + d
?
j
and bk + dk > b?k + d
?
k . Pick any such j and k; then either there exists a dock-move to j or
one from k that improves the objective.
Proof. The proof of the lemma follows a a case-by-case analysis, each of which
resembles the same idea: (~d?, ~b?) minimizes the dock-move distance to (~d, ~b)
among solutions with lower function value than (~d, ~b), i.e., among all (~d?, ~b?)
such that
∑
i di + bi =
∑
i d?i + b
?
i ,
∑
i bi =
∑
i b?i , and c(~d
?, ~b?) < c(~d, ~b), (~d?, ~b?) has
minimum dock-move distance to (~d, ~b). We show that with j and k as in the
statement of the lemma, either there exists a dock-move to j, or one from k that
improves the objective, or there exists a solution (~d??, ~b??) with objective value
lower than (~d, ~b),
∑
i di + bi =
∑
i d??i + b
??
i , and
∑
i bi =
∑
i b??i , such that (~d
??, ~b??)
has smaller dock-move distance to (~d, ~b). Since the latter contradicts our choice
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of (~d?, ~b?), this proves, that in (~d, ~b) there must be a dock-move to j or one from k
that yields a lower objective. We distinguish among the following cases:
1. d j < d?j and dk > d
?
k ;
2. b j < b?j and bk > b
?
k ;
3. d j < d?j , bk > b
?
k , and b j ≥ b?j
(a) and there exists ` with dl + bl ≥ d?l + b?l , bl < b?l ;
(b) and there exists ` with dl + bl < d?l + b
?
l , bl < b
?
l ;
(c) for all ` < { j, k}, we have bl ≥ b?l , so
∑
i bi >
∑
i b?i ;
4. b j < b?j , d j ≥ d?j , bk ≤ b?k and dk > d?k ,
(a) and there exists ` with d` + b` > d?` + b
?
` and b` > b
?
` ;
(b) and there exists ` with d` + b` ≤ d?` + b?` and b` > b?` ;
(c) for all ` < { j, k}, we have b` ≤ b?` , so
∑
i bi <
∑
i b?i .
We show that in case (1) a move from k to j yields improvement. The proof for
case (2) is symmetric. Thus, in cases (3a) and (4a) there exists a move from k to `,
respectively from ` to j, that yields improvement. Since the proofs for cases (3b)
and (4b) are also symmetric, we present only the proofs for (3b). Cases (3c) and
(4c) contradict our assumption that
∑
i bi =
∑
i b?i and can thus be excluded. For
case (1), we define (~d??, ~b??) = e jk(~d?, ~b?), so
c(( ~d??, ~b??)) − c((~d?, ~b?)) = (c j(d?j − 1, b?j ) − c j(d?j , b?j ) + ck(d?k + 1, b?k ) − ck(d?k , b?k ).
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Given that
∑
i |di − d?i | + |bi − b?i | >
∑
i |di − d??i | + |bi − b??i |, the definition of (~d?, ~b?)
implies that this difference must be positive. Setting (~d′, ~b′) = ek j(~d, ~b), we bound
c((~d, ~b)) − c((~d′, ~b′)) =
(
c j(d j, b j) − c j(d j + 1, b j)
)
+
(
ck(dk, bk) − ck(dk − 1, bk)
)
≥
(
c j(d?j − 1, b?j ) − c j(d?j , b?j )
)
+
(
ck(d?k + 1, b
?
k ) − ck(d?k , b?k )
)
= c(~d??, ~b??) − c(~d?, ~b?) > 0.
We prove the inequality between the second and third expression by first showing
that c j(d j, b j) − c j(d j + 1, b j) ≥ c j(d?j − 1, b?j ) − c j(d?j , b?j ).
Applying inequality (3) given in the definition of multimodularity, t times (where
t ≥ 0) allows us to bound the RHS by c j(d?j − 1− t, b?j + t)− c j(d?j − t, b?j + t). Setting
t = d?j − d j − 1 ≥ 0, we then find that the RHS is bounded above by
c j(d j, b?j + d
?
j − d j − 1) − c j(d j + 1, b?j + d?j − d j − 1).
On the other hand, applying inequality (6) repeatedly to the LHS shows that
∀s ≥ 0, the LHS is at least c j(d j, b j + s) − c j(d j + 1, b j + s). Hence, by setting
s = b?j + d
?
j − d j − b j − 1, which is non-negative since b j + d j < b?j + d?j , we bound
the LHS from below by
c j(d j, b j + b?j + d
?
j − d j − b j − 1) − c j(d j + 1, b j + b?j + d?j − d j − b j − 1).
This equals the upper bound on the RHS and thus proves the desired inequality.
Similarly, to show
ck(dk − 1, bk) − ck(dk, bk) ≤ ck(d?k , b?k ) − ck(d?k + 1, b?k ), (4.1)
we apply inequality (3) dk − d?k − 1 times to bound the LHS in (4.1) by ck(d?k , bk +
dk − d?k + 1) − ck(d?k + 1, bk + dk − d?k + 1). Thereafter, we apply inequality (5)
bk + dk − d′k + 1 − b′k ≥ 0 times to obtain the desired bound.
In case (3b), we define (~d??, ~b??) = E jk`(~d?, ~b?) and (~d′, ~b′) = Ok j`(~d, ~b). As in
the first case, we need to show that c((~d, ~b)) − c((~d′, ~b′)) ≥ c(~d??, ~b??) − c(~d?, ~b?).
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Since all terms not involving j, k, and ` cancel out and the terms involving j and
k can be bounded the same way as before, deriving that
c`(d`, b`) − c`(d` − 1, b` + 1) ≥ c`(d?` + 1, b?` − 1) − c`(d?` , b?` )
suffices. We obtain this by repeatedly applying inequalities (3) and (4) to the
LHS.
4.2.4 Operational Constraints & Running Time
In this section, we show that the allocation algorithm is optimal for the oper-
ational constraints introduced in Section 4.1 by proving that in z iterations it
finds the best allocation obtainable by moving at most z docks. We thereby also
provide an upper bound on the running-time of the algorithm, since any two
feasible dock-allocations can be at most D + B dock-moves apart. We begin by
first formally defining the set of feasible solutions with respect to the operational
constraints.
Definition 8. Define the z-ball S z(~d, ~b) around (~d, ~b) as the set of allocations with
dock-move distance at most 2z, i.e., S 0(~d, ~b) = {(~d, ~b)} and
S z(~d, ~b) = S z−1(~d, ~b) ∪ ( ⋃
(~d′,~b′)∈S z−1(~d,~b)
N(~d′, ~b′)}).
We now want to prove that Lemma 7 continues to hold in the constrained
setting; in particular, we show that with the operational constraints as well, local
optima are global optima.
Lemma 9. With ( ~d+, ~b+) ∈ S z(~d, ~b) \ S z−1(~d, ~b) bike-optimal and c(~d?, ~b?) < c( ~d+, ~b+)
for some (~d?, ~b?) ∈ S z(~d, ~b) \ S z−1(~d, ~b), there exists (~d′, ~b′) ∈ S z(~d, ~b) ∩ N( ~d+, ~b+) such
that c(~d′, ~b′) < c( ~d+, ~b+).
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Proof. Notice that this lemma closely resembles Lemma 7: the sole difference
lies in Lemma 7 not enforcing the dock-move to maintain a bound on the distance
to some allocation (~d, ~b).
Define (~d?, ~b?) as in Lemma 7 with the additional restriction that (~d?, ~b?) be
in S z(~d, ~b), i.e., pick a solution in S z(~d, ~b) that minimizes the dock-move distance
to ( ~d+, ~b+) among solutions with strictly smaller objective value. We argue again
that bike-optimality of ( ~d+, ~b+) implies that there exist j and k, such that d+j + b
+
j <
d?j + b
?
j , and d
+
k + b
+
k > d
?
k + b
?
k . Further, for any such j and k, we can apply the
proof of Lemma 7 to find a move involving at least one of the two that decreases
both the objective value and the dock-move distance to (~d?, ~b?).
We aim to find j and k such that the move identified, say from ` to m, is
guaranteed to remain within S z(~d, ~b). Notice that |{ j} ∩ {m}| + |{k} ∩ {`}| ≥ 1. We
know that d?m + b?m > d+m + b+m and d?` + b
?
` < d
+
` + b
+
` . Suppose the move from `
to m yields a solution outside of S z(~d, ~b). It follows that d+m + b+m ≥ dm + bm and
d+` + b
+
` ≤ d` + b`, so in particular either d+j + b+j ≥ d j + b j or d+k + b+k ≤ dk + bk.
Thus, if we can identify j and k such that those two inequalities do not hold,
we are guaranteed that the identified move remains within S z(~d, ~b). Define
k := argmaxi{d+i + b+i −max{di + bi, d?i + b?i }}. We can then write
max
i
{
d+i + b
+
i −max{di + bi, d?i + b?i }
} ≥ mini {1,maxi:d+i +b+i >di+bi{(d+i + b+i ) − (d?i + b?i )}}.
The minimum is at least 1 unless it is the case for all i that if d+i + b
+
i > di + bi then
d+i + b
+
i ≤ d?i + b?i . Thus, unless the above condition fails, we have identified a k
with the required properties. Suppose the condition does fail. Then
∑
i di + bi =∑
i d?i + b
?
i =
∑
i d+i + b
+
i and
2z =
∑
i
|(di + bi) − (d?i + b?i )| =
∑
i
|(di + bi) − (d+i + b+i )|
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imply that for all i with max{d+i + b+i , d?i + b?i } > di + bi, we have d+i + b+i = d?i + b?i .
Thus, it must be the case that m fulfills d+m + b+m < dm + bm. The argument for j is
symmetric.
By Lemma 9, it suffices to show that the solution found in the zth iteration is
locally optimal among solutions in S z(~d, ~b) to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Starting with a bike-optimal allocation (~d, ~b), in the z-th iteration, the
discrete gradient-descent algorithm finds an optimal allocation among those in S z(~d, ~b).
Hence, the discrete gradient-descent algorithm terminates in at most D + B iterations.
Proof. We prove the theorem by induction on z. The base-case z = 0 holds
trivially. Suppose in the zth iteration, the discrete gradient-descent algorithm has
found the allocation (~dz, ~bz) ∈ argmin(~d?,~b?)∈S z(~d,~b) c(~d?, ~b?). We need to show that
(~dz+1, ~bz+1) minimizes the objective among solutions in S z+1(~d, ~b), where
(~dz+1, ~bz+1) := arg min
(~dz+1,~bz+1)∈N(~dz,~bz))
{c(~dz+1, ~bz+1)}.
We first observe that by Lemma 9, it suffices to show that there is no better
solution in S z+1(~d, ~b) that is just one dock-move away from (~dz+1, ~bz+1). Further,
by Lemma 6 and the choice of dock-moves in the discrete gradient-descent
algorithm we know that (~dz+1, ~bz+1) must be bike-optimal. Let i be the station
from which a dock was moved and let j be the station to which it was moved in
the z + 1st iteration. We denote a third station by h if the z + 1st move involved a
third one (recall that a dock-move from i to j can take an additional bike from i
to a third station h or take one from h to j). We can then immediately exclude the
following cases:
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1. Any dock-move in which i receives a dock from some station `, including
possibly ` = j or ` = h, can be excluded since the discrete gradient-descent
algorithm could have chosen to take a dock from ` instead of i and found a
bike-optimal allocation (by Lemma 6).
2. The same holds for any dock-move in which a dock is taken from j.
3. A dock-move not involving either of i, j, and h yields the same improve-
ment as it would have prior to the z + 1st iteration. Furthermore, if such
a dock-move yields a solution within S z+1(~d, ~b), then prior to the z + 1st
iteration it would have yielded a solution within S z(~d, ~b). Hence, by the
induction assumption, it cannot yield any improvement.
4. A dock-move from station i (or to j), as is implied by the fourth, fifth, and
sixth inequality in the definition of multimodularity increases the objective
at i more (decreases the objective at j less) than it would have prior to the
z + 1st iteration.
We are left with dock-moves either from or to h as well as dock-moves that
involve one of the three stations only via a bike being moved. Suppose that the
dock-move in iteration z + 1 was Ei jh; the case of Oi jh is symmetric. In this case,
by inequality (2), a subsequent move of a dock and a bike from h, i.e., oh` or Oh`m
for some m, increases the objective at h by at least as much as it did before and
can thus be excluded. The same holds for the move of an empty dock to h (by
inequality (3)).
However, subsequent moves of an empty dock from h (or a full dock to h)
have a lower cost (greater improvement) and require a more careful argument.
Suppose eh` yielded an improvement – the cases for Eh`m, o`h, and E`hm are similar.
Notice first that if it were the case that dzh + b
z
h > dh + bh and d
z
` + b
z
` < d` +
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b`, then eh`(Ei jh(~dz, ~bz)) ∈ S z(~d, ~b) and has a lower objective than (~dz, ~bz) which
contradicts the inductive assumption. Furthermore, since it must be the case
that eh`(Ei jh(~dz, ~bz)) is an element of S z+1(~d, ~b) but not of S z(~d, ~b), it must also follow
that either
1. dzh + b
z
h > dh + bh and d
z
` + b
z
` ≥ d` + b` or
2. dzh + b
z
h ≤ dh + bh and dz` + bz` < d` + b`,
since otherwise a dock-move from h to ` would either yield a solution in S z
or one not in S z+1. Notice further that the inductive assumption implies that
(~dz+1, ~bz+1) < S z(~d, ~b). Thus, we know that dz+1i +b
z+1
i < di+bi and d
z+1
j +b
z+1
j < d j+b j.
We can thus argue in the following way about
c(eh`(~dz+1, ~bz+1)) − c(~dz+1, ~bz+1) = ch(dzh, bzh − 1) − ch(dzh + 1, bzh − 1) + cl(dz` + 1, bz`) − cl(dz`, bz`).
In the first case, since oh`(~dz, ~bz) ∈ S z(~d, ~b), the inductive assumption implies
that ch(dzh, b
z
h − 1)+ c j(dzj, bzj + 1) ≥ ch(dzh, bzh)+ c j(dzj, bzj). Further, by the choice of the
discrete gradient-descent algorithm, an additional empty dock at ` has no more
improvement than an additional dock and an additional bike at j minus the cost
of taking the bike from h; otherwise, the discrete gradient-descent algorithm
would have moved an empty dock from h to ` in the z + 1st iteration. Thus,
c`(dz` + 1, b
z
`) − c`(dz`, bz`) ≤ c j(dzj, bzj) − c j(dzj, bzj + 1) − ch(dzh + 1, bzh − 1) + ch(dzh, bzh)
≤ ch(dzh, bzh − 1) − ch(dzh, bzh) − ch(dzh + 1, bzh − 1) + ch(dzh, bzh) ≤ ch(dzh, bzh − 1) − ch(dzh + 1, bzh − 1),
implying that c(eh`(~dz+1, ~bz+1)) − c(~dz+1, ~bz+1) ≥ 0.
In the second case, since we know that ei`(~dz, ~bz) ∈ S z(~d, ~b), the inductive
assumption implies c`(dz` + 1, b
z
`) + ci(d
z
i − 1, bzi ) ≥ c`(dz`, bz`) + ci(dzi , bzi ). Further, the
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choice of the discrete gradient-descent algorithm to take the dock from i, not h,
implies that ci(dzi , b
z
i ) − ci(dzi − 1, bzi ) ≤ ch(dzh, bzh − 1) − ch(dzh + 1, bzh − 1). Combining
these two inequalities again, we again see that eh` does not yield an improvement.
The remaining cases are ones in which a move involves only i, j, or h as the
third station that a bike is taken from/added to. Suppose that the transformation
in iteration z + 1 was Ei jh – the other cases are similar. A subsequent move of a
bike to i (by inequality (3)) or j (by inequality (2)) yields at most the improvement
that it would have had prior to iteration z + 1. The same holds for taking a bike
from h (by combining inequalities (2) and (3)). Thus, the remaining cases are
those in which a bike is taken from i or j as well as the ones in which a bike is
added to h.
For a bike taken from i, notice that the algorithm’s choice was to take a bike
from h rather than from i, so the increase in objective in taking it from i now
is at least what it was at h in the z + 1st iteration. Similarly, since the discrete
gradient-descent algorithm chose Ei jh over ei j, taking the bike from j has cost
at least the cost it had prior to the z + 1st iteration at h. But since E`mh, for some
` and m for which it was feasible before the z + 1st iteration, did not yield an
improvement then, it follows that E`mi and E`mj do not yield an improvement
after the z + 1st iteration.
For a bike added to h, the argument is similar to the one about a dock taken
from h after a bike was taken from h. For O`mh to be feasible, for some `,m within
S z+1, it must be the case that either dzm + bzm < dm + bm or d
z
` + b
z
` > d` + b`.
In the former case, eim(~dz, ~bz) ∈ S z(~d, ~b), so the inductive assumption implies
that the increase in cost of taking a dock from i in the z + 1st iteration is at least
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the decrease realized by moving a dock to m. But the increase in objective in
taking a dock and a bike from ` is at least the increase at i and h in the z + 1st
iteration, since otherwise the discrete gradient-descent algorithm would have
taken the bike and dock from `. Hence, the decrease in objective at h and at m is
bounded above by the increase in objective at `.
In the latter case, the inductive assumption implies that an increase in objec-
tive at ` due to O`mh is bounded below by the increase in objective prior to the
z + 1st iteration due to o` j (since o` j(~dz, ~bz) ∈ S z(~d, ~b)). That improvement however
is greater than or equal to the decrease O`mh yields at m and at h combined by the
choice of the discrete gradient-descent algorithm in iteration z + 1. Thus, O`mh
cannot yield an improvement.
4.3 Scaling Algorithm
We now extend our analysis in Section 4.2 to adapt our algorithm to a scaling
algorithm that finds the optimal allocation of bikes and docks in O
(
n log(B + D)
)
iterations. The idea underlying the scaling algorithm is to proceed in blog2(B +
D)c + 1 phases, where in the kth phase each move involves αk = 2blog2(B+D)c+1−k
bikes/docks rather than just one. The kth phase begins by finding the bike-
optimal allocation of bikes (given the constraints of only moving αk bikes at a
time) and terminates when no move of αk docks yields improvement. Notice
first that the multimodularity of c(d, b) implies multimodularity of c(αkd, αkb) for
all k. Thus, our analysis in the last two sections implies that in the kth phase, the
scaling algorithm finds the optimal allocation among all that differ in a multiple
of αk in each coordinate from ( ~¯d, ~¯b). Further, since αblog2(B+D)c+1 = 1, it finds the
55
globally optimal allocation in phase blog2(B+ D)c + 1. What remains to be shown,
is a bound on the number of iterations in each phase. Lemma 12 shows that that
number is bounded by O(n) and thus proves Theorem 11.
Theorem 11. The scaling algorithm finds an optimal allocation in O
(
n log(B + D)
)
iterations.
Lemma 12. The number of iterations in each phase is no more than 5n.
Proof. By Theorem 10, the number of dock-moves required in each iteration
is the minimum number of dock-moves with which an optimal allocation (for
that phase) could be obtained. We argue that the dock-move distance between
optimal allocations in two subsequent phases cannot be too large. Notice first
that if a phase requires L > 4n dock-moves, then the pigeonhole principle implies
that there must exist a sequence of dock-moves of length L that leads to the same
allocation and involves the exact same dock-move twice. For example, if the
moves ei j, ek j and ei` occur, then the moves ei j, ei j, and ek` yield the same changes,
but involve ei j twice. The same argument holds for the other kinds of moves. By
Theorem 10, carrying out all of the L moves except for the two ei j cannot yield
the optimal objective for this phase. Thus, beginning the phase with all but those
two moves, we find a suboptimal allocation such that doing the ei j does yield an
optimal allocation; this implies in particular that the ei j yield improvement at that
point. Now, notice that beginning the phase (before moving to a bike-optimal
allocation) with the two ei j moves cannot yield improvement since it gives an
allocation that would have been feasible in the previous phase.
We now want to bound the improvement of the two moves at the end in
terms of the improvement at the beginning. While multimodularity implies
diminishing returns in each iteration of the gradient-descent algorithm, this relies
56
on the allocations being bike-optimal. Though the allocation at the beginning
of the phase might not be bike-optimal (for the permitted number of bikes to be
moved in each iteration of this phase), it cannot be more than n bike-moves away
from being bike-optimal. This allows us to count each dock-move occurring in
that phase as either one of the at most 4n moves with no duplicates or as one of
the at most n moves before improvements of subsequent moves are at most what
they were prior to moving to bike-optimal. Combining the two bounds, we can
derive a contradiction from L > 5n and thus prove the lemma.
4.4 Case Studies
In this Section we present the results of case studies based on data from three
different bike-sharing systems: Citi Bike in NYC, Hubway in Boston, and Divvy
in Chicago. Some of our results are based on an extension of the user dissatisfac-
tion function which we first define in Section 4.4.1. Thereafter, in Section 4.4.2
we describe the data-sets underlying our computation. Finally, in Section 4.4.3
we describe the insights obtained from our analysis.
4.4.1 Long-Run-Average Cost
A topic that has come up repeatedly in discussions with operators of bike-share
systems is the fact that their means to rebalance overnight does not usually
suffice to begin the day with the bike-optimal allocation. In some cities, like
Boston, no rebalancing at all happens overnight. As such, it is desirable to
optimize for reallocations that are robust with respect to the amount of overnight
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rebalancing. To capture such an objective, we define the long-run average of the
user dissatisfaction function. Rather than mapping an initial condition in bikes
and empty docks to the expected number of out-of-stock events over the course
of one day, the long-run average maps to the average number of out-of-stock
events over the course of infinitely many days. Formally, denoting by X ⊕ Y the
concatenation of arrival sequences X and Y , i.e., (X1, . . . , Xt,Y1, . . . ,Ys), we define
the long-run average of a station i with demand profile pi as follows.
Definition 13. The long-run-average of the user dissatisfaction function at station i
with demand profile pi is
cpii (d, b) = limT→∞
EY j∼pi[cY1⊕Y2⊕...⊕YT (d, b)]
T
.
We can compute cpi(d, b) by computing, for a given demand profile pi, the
transition probabilities ρxy :=
∑
X pi(X)1δX(di+bi−x,x)=y; in other words, ρxy is the
probability of station i having y bikes at the end of a day, given that it had x at
the beginning, and given that each sequence of arrivals X occurs with probability
pi(X). Given the resulting transition probabilities, we define a discrete Markov
chain on {0, . . . , di + bi} and denote its stationary distribution by pidi+bipi . This
permits us to compute cpi(d, b) =
∑d+b
k=0 pi
d+b
pi (k)ci(d + b − k, k). Furthermore, from
the definition of cpi(·, ·) it is immediately clear that cpi(·, ·) is also multimodular; as
such, all results proven in the previous sections about c(·, ·) also extend to cpi(·, ·).
In fact, we observe that cpi(·, ·) depends only on the sum of its two arguments
but not on the value of each. Before comparing the results of optimizing over
cpi(·, ·) and over c(·, ·), we now give some intuition for why the long-run average
provides a contrasting regime.
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Intuition for the Long-run Average.
It is instructive to consider examples to illustrate where optimizing over the long-
run average deviates from optimizing over a single day. To simplify manners,
we restrict ourselves to demand profiles that only have point mass for a single
sequence of arrivals. A station at which the sequence of arrivals consists of k
rentals followed by k returns has the long-run average of its user dissatisfaction
decrease by 2 for each of the first k docks allocated; similarly, the user dissatis-
faction function over a single day decreases by 2 for each full dock added (and
by 1 for each empty dock added). At a station at which only k rentals occur, the
user dissatisfaction function also decreases by 1 for each of the first k full docks
added; however, its long-run average remains unchanged: no matter how many
docks and bikes are added, the long-run average of the station is to be empty at
the beginning of the day and therefore all k customers experience out-of-stock
events.
Two lessons can be derived from these examples. First, stations at which
demand is antipodal (rentals in the morning, returns in the afternoon or vice-
versa) tend to make better use of additional capacity in the long-run average
regime. Second, optimizing over one regime can, in principle, return solutions
that are very bad in the other.
4.4.2 Data Sets
We use data-sets from the bike-sharing systems of three major American cities to
investigate the effect different allocations of docks might have in each city. The
three cities, New York City, Boston, and Chicago, vary widely in the sizes of their
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systems. When the data was collected (summer 2016), Boston had 1300 bikes and
2700 docks across 160 stations, Chicago had 4700 bikes and 9500 docks across 582
stations, and NYC had 6750 bikes and 14840 docks across 447 stations.4
For each station (in each system), we compute piece-wise constant Poisson
arrival rates to inform our demand profiles. To be precise, we take all weeekday
rentals/returns in the month of June 2016, bucket them in the 30-minute interval
of the day at which they occur, and divide the number of rentals/returns at
each station within each half-hour interval by the number of minutes at which
the station was non-empty/non-full. We compute the user dissatisfaction func-
tions assuming that the demand profiles stem from these Poisson arrivals (cf.
O’Mahony et al. [2016] and Parikh and Ukkusuri [2014]). Some of our results in
this section rely on the same procedure with data collected from other months.
Given that (in practice) we do not usually know the lower and upper bounds
on the size of each station, we set the lower bound to be the current minimum
capacity within the system and the upper bound to be the maximum one. Fur-
thermore, we assume that D + B is equal to the current allocated capacity in the
system, i.e., we only reallocate existing docks.
4.4.3 Impact on Objective.
We summarize our results in Table 4.1. The columns Present, OPT, and 150-
moved compare the objective with (i) the allocation before any docks were
moved, (ii) the optimal allocation of bikes and docks, and (iii) the best allocation
4We remark that these numbers were obtained using the respective JSON feed of each system
and do not necessarily capture the entire fleet size, e.g., in New York City a significant number of
bikes is kept in depots over night.
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of bikes and docks that can be achieved by moving at most 150 docks from the
current allocation. The columns headed c contain the bike-optimal objective for a
given allocation of docks, the columns headed cpi the long-run-average objective
(for the same allocation). Two interesting observations can be made. First, though
the optimizations are done over bike-optimal allocations without regard to the
long-run average, the latter improves significantly in all cases. Second, in each of
the cities, moving 150 docks yields a significant portion of the total improvement
feasible to obtain the optimum. This stands in contrast to the large number of
moves needed to find the actual optimum (displayed in the column Moves to
OPT) and is due to the diminishing returns of the moves.
Present OPT 150-moved Moves to OPT
City c cpi c cpi c cpi
Boston 854 1118 640 943 700 984 407
Chicago 1460 2340 759 1846 1224 2123 1553
NYC 6416 9475 4829 8180 6150 9192 2721
Table 4.1: Summary of main computational results with c denoting bike-
optimal, cpi the long-run-average cost.
A more complete picture of these insights is given in Figure 4.1. The x-axis
shows the number of docks moved starting from the present allocation, the y-axis
shows the improvement in objective, i.e., the difference between the initial objective
and the objective after moving x docks. Each of the solid lines corresponds to
different demand estimates being used to evaluate the same allocation of docks.
The dotted lines (in the same colors) represent the maximum improvement, for
each of the demand estimates, that can be achieved by reallocating docks; while
these are not achieved through the dock moves suggested by the estimates based
on June 2016 data, significant improvement is made towards them in every case.
In particular, the initial moves yield approximately the same improvement for
the different objectives/demand estimates. Thereafter, the various improvements
61
diverge, especially for the NYC data from August 2016. This may be partially
due to the system expansion in NYC that occurred in the summer of 2016, but
does not contradict that all allocations corresponding to values on the x-axis are
optimal in the sense of Theorem 10.
Figure 4.1: Improvement in objective for moves to bike-optimal allocation
for June ’16 data.
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June 2016 March 2017 November 2017
New York City 358.7 260.3 294.6
Table 4.2: Improvement of 200 docks moved based on long-run average
evaluated with demand estimates June 2016, evaluated with
demand estimates from 2017.
Seasonal Effects.
As we mentioned in Section 4.1 we also consider the impact of seasonal effects. In
Table 4.2 we show the improvement in objective when optimizing the movement
of 200 docks in New York City based on demand estimates in June 2016 and
evaluate the objective with the long-run average based on demand estimates
based on March and November 2017. The estimated improvements show that
optimizing with respect to any one season yields significant improvement with
respect to any other.
Operational Considerations.
We conclude this part of our analysis with two remarks to contextualize the oper-
ational impact our suggestions can have. First, it is instructive to compare the
estimated improvement realized through reallocating docks to the estimated im-
provement realized through current rebalancing efforts: according to its monthly
report, Citi Bike rebalanced an average 3,452 bikes per day in June 2016 (monthly
report, NYCBS [2016]). A simple coupling argument implies that a single bike
yields at most a change of 1 in the user dissatisfaction function; thus, rebalanc-
ing reduced out-of-stock events by at most 3,452 per day (assuming that each
rebalanced bike actually has that much impact is extremely conservative). Con-
trasting that to the estimated impact of strategically moving, for example, 500
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docks diminishes the estimated number of out-of-stock events by about as much
as a fifth of Citi Bike’s (daily) rebalancing efforts.
Second, discussions with operators uncovered an additional operational
constraint that can arise due to the physical design of the docks. Since these
usually come in triples or quadruples, the exact moves suggested may not be
feasible; e.g., it may be necessary to move docks in multiples of 4. By running
the scaling algorithm without the last two iterations, we can find an allocation in
which docks are only moved in multiples of 4. With that allocation, the objective
of the bike-optimal allocation is 673, 847, and 4896 in Boston, Chicago, and NYC
respectively, showing that despite this additional constraint almost all of the
improvements can be realized.
4.5 A Posteriori Evaluation of Impact
In this section we apply the user dissatisfaction function to estimate the impact
implemented changes in the system have had on out-of-stock events. One way to
do so would be to estimate new demand rates after docks have been reallocated,
compute new user dissatisfaction functions for stations with added (decreased)
capacity, and evaluate for those stations and the new demand rates the decrease
(increase) between the old and the new number of docks. A drawback of such
an approach is the heavy reliance on the assumed underlying stochastic process.
Instead, we present here a data-driven approach with only little reliance on
assumed underlying demand profiles.
Throughout this section, we denote by d and b the number of empty docks
and bikes at a station after docks were reallocated, whereas d′ and b′ denote the
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respective numbers before docks were reallocated. Notice that while d + b and
d′ + b′ are known (capacity before and after docks were moved) and b can be
found on any given morning (number of bikes in the station at 6AM), we rely on
some assumed value for b′ — for that, in our implementation, we picked both
min{d′ + b′, b} and b × (d′+b′)d+b , that is, either the same number of bikes (unless that
would be larger than the old capacity before docks were added) or the same
proportion of docks filled with bikes.
4.5.1 Arrivals at Stations with Increased Capacity
In earlier sections, we assumed a known distribution for the sequence of arrivals
based on which we compute the user dissatisfaction functions. In contrast, in this
section we rely exclusively on observed arrivals (without any assumed knowl-
edge of the underlying stochastic process) to analyze stations with increased
capacity. This is motivated by a rigorous argument to justify that censoring
need not be taken care of explicitly in this case. To formalize our argument, we
need to introduce some additional notation for the arrival sequences. Recall
from Section 4.1 that a sequence of customers arriving at a bike-share station to
either rent or return a bike was denoted by X = (X1, . . . , XS ) and that X included
failed rentals and returns, which in practice would not be observed because
they are censored. Which Xi are censored, of course, depends on the (initial)
number of bikes and docks at the station. Let us denote by Xˆ(d,b) the subsequence
of X that only includes those customers whose rentals/returns are successful
(hence, non-censored) at a station initialized with d empty docks and b bikes, i.e.,
the ones that do not experience out-of-stock events. Given the notation cX(·, ·)
used in Section 4.1 for a particular sequence for arrivals, we can then compute
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cXˆ
(d,b)
(·, ·). In particular, denoting the number of empty docks and bikes without
the added capacity by d′, b′, we may compute cXˆ(d,b)(d′, b′). The following proposi-
tion then motivates the notion that censoring may be ignored at stations with
added capacity.
Proposition 14. For any X, d′ ≤ d and b′ ≤ b, we have
cX(d′, b′) − cX(d, b) = cXˆ(d,b)(d′, b′) − cXˆ(d,b)(d, b) = cXˆ(d,b)(d′, b′).
Proof. The proof of the second equality follows immediately from Xˆ(d,b)
including exactly those customers among X that are not censored, when a station
is initialized with d empty docks and b bikes, so cXˆ(d,b)(d, b) = 0. Now, on the
left-hand side, we can inductively go through all customers among X that are
out-of-stock events when the station is initialized with d empty docks and b bikes.
Since d ≥ d′ and b ≥ b′, each one of those increases both terms in the difference
by 1. Thus, taking them out of X does not affect the value of the difference. But
then, we are left with only Xˆ(d,b).
Extension to Rebalancing
Based on our reasoning in Section 3.2, our analysis of the user dissatisfaction
functions and the resulting dock allocation optimization problems (cf. Sections
4.1 and 4.2) did not consider the rebalancing of bikes. In contrast, in the a posteriori
analysis, we are able to take rebalancing into account.
To simplify the exposition, we restrict ourselves here to rebalancing that adds
bikes to a station, though the reasoning extends to rebalancing that removes bikes.
The simplest approach to treat bikes added through rebalancing is to treat them
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simply as returns and thus include them (as virtual customers) in the sequence
of arrivals X. However, this may cause an unreasonable increase to the value
of cX(d,b)(d′, b′) (when the number of bikes added is greater than the number of
empty docks would have been at that point in time if the station had initially had
d′ empty docks). In that case, the virtual customers (corresponding to rebalanced
bikes) would incur out-of-stock events and thereby increase the value of the user
dissatisfaction function. A more optimistic way that also treats rebalanced bikes
as virtual customers would be to redefine the user dissatisfaction function in such
a way so that out-of-stock events are only incurred by returns that correspond
to non-rebalanced bikes. This, in essence, decouples the user dissatisfaction
functions into subsequences, each of which is evaluated independently.
Extension to Stations with Decreased Capacity.
Theorem 14 does not apply to stations with decreased capacity: suppose d <
d′ and b = b′; once the station (initialized with d empty docks and b bikes)
becomes full, Xˆ(d,b) observe no further returns even though these would be part
of Xˆ(d′,b′). To account for out-of-stock events occurring in that way, we fill in
the censored periods with demand estimates. Noticeably, this does not usually
require knowledge of the full demand-profile; for example, for a station that is
non-empty and non-full over the course of the day, no estimates are needed at all.
Further, for periods of time in which the station is full, we only need to estimate
the number of intended returns – rentals over that period of time would not be
censored.
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4.5.2 Measured Impact
We consider 3 stations at which capacity was increased and 3 stations at which it
was decreased based on our recommendations. For two of the stations at which
capacity was increased 12 docks were added, for one of them the capacity was
increased by 10; the decreases were by the same amounts, so in total this involved
reallocating 34 docks. In Figure 4.2 we present the impact for each weekday
in April 2018 (without the extension to rebalancing). For stations with added
capacity we set d and b according to the number of bikes at 6AM. We evaluated
Figure 4.2: Evaluation of impact at stations with increased and decreased
capacity.
cXˆ
(d,b)
(d′, b′) for stations with docks added (cf. Proposition 14) using the observed
arrivals Xˆ(d,b) for each day. For the stations with docks taken away we estimated
Xˆ by assuming a fluid number of rentals (returns) whenever the station was
empty (full), where the rate is based on decensored estimated demand from the
same month. We use that to compute cXˆ(d,b)(d′, b′) − cXˆ(d,b)(d, b) for these stations.
The resulting values for different implementations are summarized in Table 4.3;
aggregated over the entire month, the net reduction in out-of-stock events varies
between 831 and 1062.
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4.6 Running Time
Even though the reallocation of docks is a strategic question, the time to solve
the associated optimization models is not irrelevant for practical considerations.
Given the expensive computation of each user dissatisfaction value, an early
approach to compute the LP-relaxation of the optimization problem took a whole
weekend to solve — noticeably, this was due to the time to set up the LP; once it
was set up, the LP could be solved quickly. While this is acceptable for a one-off
analysis, in practice system operators care about regularly running different
analyses that include different demand patterns, different bounds on number
of docks moved, and even different bounds on station sizes. Having a fast
algorithm allows system operators to run the analysis without our support: we
provided them with a Jupyter notebook (Kluyver et al. [2016]) that includes the
entire workflow from estimating the demand profiles to computing the user
dissatisfaction functions to running the optimization problem to creating map-
based visualizations of the resulting solutions (cf. Figure 4.3) and does not rely on
specialized optimization software like Gurobi or CPLEX. Crucially, this workflow
happens in a matter of minutes rather than hours or days (cf. Table 4.4).
To complete our analysis, we now compare the measured running times of
the algorithm with and without scaling techniques. Given that the running-
time of each algorithm is dominated by the computational effort to compute
values of the user dissatisfaction functions (the effort for which grows as a cubic
function of the capacity), we only computed values that the respective algorithm
needed. In Figure 4.4, we plot the number of user dissatisfaction functions that
are computed by each algorithm. It is noticeable in Chicago that the scaling
algorithm created unnecessary overhead by requiring values for large capacities
70
Figure 4.3: Visualization of docks moved by optimal solution for z ∈
{500, 1500}; red circles correspond to docks being taken, blue
circles to docks being added.
at many stations that were not required without scaling. This illustrates why
the algorithm without scaling outperforms the scaling algorithm in both Boston
and Chicago (cf. Table 4.1). In NYC on the other hand, the scaling algorithm
performed significantly better. Motivated by this contrast, we implemented a
hybrid algorithm that only iterates over 8, 4, and 1, rather than all powers of
2. The hybrid outperforms both the algorithm without scaling and the scaling
algorithm on all three data-sets. All three algorithms vastly outperform the linear
programming based approach that needs to evaluate every value of the user
dissatisfaction functions at all stations before solving.
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Running Time (Minutes)
No scaling Hybrid Scaling
New York City 18.08 14.02 12.27
Chicago 7.03 5.67 8.78
Boston 1.44 1.37 1.83
Table 4.4: Comparison of the running times of each of the three algorithms
in each of the three cities
Figure 4.4: Number of UDF evaluations by each algorithm in each city.
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CHAPTER 5
TRADEOFFS FOR INCENTIVES IN NEW YORK’S CITI BIKE SYSTEM
”Never Doubt That A Small Group Of Thoughtful Committed Citi-
zens Can Change The World.” – President Bartlet
In this chapter, based on Chung, Freund, and Shmoys [2018], we study the
impact of Bike Angels, an incentive program we set up with New York City’s Citi
Bike system in 2015 to crowdsource some of the operational challenges related to
imbalance. We develop a performance metric for both online- and offline-policies
to set incentives within the system; our results indicate that though Citi Bike’s
original offline policy performed well in a regime in which incentives given to
customers are not associated to costs, there is ample space for improvement
when the costs of the incentives are taken into consideration. Motivated by
these findings, we develop several online- and offline- policies to investigate
the trade-offs between real-time and offline decision-making; one of our online
policies has since been adopted by Citi Bike.
When the Bike Angels incentive scheme was first set up, we identified pairs
of stations that (i) were close to each other, and (ii) had asymmetric demand
patterns: we chose pairs of stations that were nearby to each other but over a
certain time interval had the property that one station (A) overwhelmingly had
bikes returned whereas the other (B) overwhelmingly had bikes rented. We then
invited users that often used one of the two and asked them to switch to the
other, i.e., we asked a small number of customers likely to return bikes at A in
such intervals to become Bike Angels by instead returning bikes at B.
While the pilot showed that customer behavior could be significantly affected
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through gamification (Bikeshare [2016]), it also posed questions about how to
optimally design such an incentive scheme, in particular with respect to when
and where to incentivize. A second version of Bike Angels, at a much larger scale,
statically incentivized a sizeable fraction of stations within the system either
to enourage rentals or returns throughout each rush hour. This program was
viewed as a great success, in spite of the fact that the pre-determined incentives
made no use of the vast amounts of historic and real-time data available. At
worst, this sometimes led to incentives encouraging customers to rent (return)
bikes at empty (full) stations.
In this chapter, we evaluate the efficiency of this incentive scheme with
regard to its goal to reduce out-of-stock events. We apply the user dissatisfaction
functions to evaluate, for every rental/return rewarded by the program, an
estimate of its reduction in future out-of-stock events. Further, we design a range
of different policies, dictating the times at which each station is incentivized. The
design of these policies involves trade-offs between their efficiency and simplicity.
Below, we explain what we mean by those two terms:
Efficiency. The main goal of Bike Angels is to help rebalance the system, i.e., to
reduce the number of out-of-stock events. We explain in this chapter how the user
dissatisfaction functions introduced by Raviv and Kolka [2013] (cf. Chapter 3) can
be used to evaluate the impact of each individual rental/return on the expected
number of future out-of-stock events. Combining these with a cost for each
point awarded in the incentive scheme, we obtain a score for each incentivized
rental/return that can be interpreted as an offline evaluation of the efficiency
of the incentive. In that sense, a perfectly efficient scheme would incentivize
exactly those rentals/returns that net a positive score when accounting for both
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the impact on out-of-stock events and the cost of incentives.
Simplicity. Perfect efficiency, with respect to the score described above, is
attainable in such an incentive scheme, but it requires the operator to decide in
real-time whether or not to incentivize at each location. This is undesirable from
the users’ perspective as it reduces predictability on where incentives will be
given in the future, i.e., when customers prepare their trip, they do not know
whether or not their origin and, even more so, their destination has rentals and
respectively, returns, incentivized. This raises the bar for participation. Further,
from an operator’s perspective, the IT set-up for a dynamic scheme requires
more maintenance than, say, the completely static version.
We show that even though there exist natural trade-offs between simplicity
and efficiency, there are a variety of incentive policies that span the continuum
from maximally efficient and maximally dynamic to less efficient and entirely
static. Our results employ a data-driven methodology to design such policies,
one of which is now in place at Citi Bike.
5.1 The Incentive Scheme
Before outlining the structure of our exposition, it is worthwhile to give a high-
level description of the Bike Angel program.
Bike angels accrue points by doing rides that benefit the balance of the system.
Although the way in which stations are chosen for incentives has changed over
time, the following accounting has been the guiding principle since the original
pilot ended: the program awards 1 point for a trip from an incentivized rental
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station to a neutral station or from a neutral station to an incentivized return
station and 2 points for a trip from an incentivized rental to an incentivized return
station. The exact reward structure of the incentive scheme has also changed
over time, yet the basic idea that more points translate into higher rewards has
remained the same. For example, in February 2018, the program rewarded users
as follows NYCBS [2018]:
• For 10 points accrued, bike angels receive a 24-hour day pass;
• For every 20 points, up to 80, bike angels receive a free membership exten-
sion of 1 week;
• For every 10 points above 80, bike angels receive $1 as a gift card;
• The 5 angels with the most points receive gift cards worth $100, $75, $50,
$25, and $25 respectively.
It is worthwhile to mention that bike angels occasionally get bonuses for
beneficial trips on days with special conditions (e.g., due to weather); however,
since our analysis mostly focuses on the choice of stations/times to incentivize,
we ignore such bonuses.
We present our results as follows: in the next section we describe the data-
sets used in our analysis and formally define the models developed to evaluate
the incentive scheme. Thereafter, we define the various policies before giving
a detailed comparison of the different policies, analyzing the inherent trade-
offs between simplicity and efficiency. Finally, we conclude by reporting on
the changes Citi Bike implemented for the Bike Angel program based on our
analysis.
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5.2 Data Analysis and Definitions
In this section, we describe the data-sets at our disposal, the system parameters
we derive from them, and the models by which we evaluate the different policies
for the incentive scheme.
Data-Sets
Our analysis relies on three different data-sets. First, we have a list of all trips in
the system with origin location, destination location, and respective times of the
start and the end of the trip (from NYCBS [2017a]). Second, we have a list that
indicates which of the above trips were rewarded with points by the existing
offline incentive policy (from Bikeshare [2016]); the list also indicates for each
trip whether the point was awarded for the rental, the return, or both. Finally,
for each minute and each station in the system, we have the number of bikes
reported to be at the station at that time as well as the total number of docks
available (from NYCBS [2017b]).
We use data collected over three different time periods in 2016 in our analysis:
04/01–05/13 (base), 10/03–10/30 (training) and 10/31–12/14 (testing). The base
and training periods are used to help calculate the system parameters, such as
the rental/return rates and the stochastic interpretation of the incentives’ effect
explained later in this section, and also serve as the training period for some
of our incentive policy algorithms. The testing period is used to evaluate and
compare our suite of policies.
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Data Censoring
In our data, censoring proves to be a challenge, since the data does not accurately
reflect the true demand within the system. For example, a rider wanting to
rent or return a bike to a station, with all docks empty or full respectively,
cannot do so; thus, the corresponding demand would not be reflected in our
data sets. To account for this problem of demand-censoring, when estimating
average rental/return demand, we follow the methodology of O’Mahony and
Shmoys [2015] and examine station behavior on a minute-by-minute basis, only
considering ”active rental/return minutes”, that is, minutes when a station has
non-empty or non-full docks, respectively.
Rental and Return Rates
Our analysis relies on three types of rental and return rates: regular-angel,
incentive-angel, and non-angel rates. Regular-angel rates are the natural
rental/return rates into a station for all angel riders combined, when no in-
centive is provided. The incentive-angel rates are the rates for the same set of
customers when incentives are given. The non-angel rates are the rates for all
other customers and are assumed to be unaffected by the incentive program. In
our calculation of rates, we follow the work by O’Mahony and Shmoys [2015]
in assuming that the rates are independent across stations and calculate rates
for every half-hour interval of the day starting from 12AM in the units bikes per
minute.
To calculate the incentive-angel and non-angel rates, we take the data for a
station’s previous q weekdays, and divide the total number of all rentals/returns
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by the specified riders by the total ”active rental/return minutes” for each half-
hour interval. In the results we present, q is set to 20.
Formally, for each day d, station s, and time index t, let (m−d,s,t, m
+
d,s,t) denote the
active rental/return minutes, (ra,+d,s,t,r
a,−
d,s,t), (r
n,+
d,s,t, r
n,−
d,s,t) the number of returns/rentals
for angel and non-angel riders respectively, and D(d) be the set of the preceding
q weekdays before day d. Then the incentive-angel return rates λi,+d,s,t for day d,
station s and time index t, where t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., 47} for the 48 half-hour intervals
of the day (e.g. t=12 is 6 a.m.) are calculated as the rate per minute normalized
to account for only active minutes, as follows (similar for rental rates λi,−d,s,t and
non-angel return/rental rates λn,+d,s,t and λ
n,−
d,s,t):
λi,+d,s,t =
1
q
∑
d′∈D(d) r
a,+
d′,s,t∑
d′∈D(d)m+d′,s,t
(5.1)
To estimate the regular-angel rates, we used data from the base period when
no incentive program was offered. The regular-angel rates are assumed to be
identical across days, and are calculated by dividing the angel rider’s total
number of all rentals/returns by the total ”active minutes” in the base period for
each half-hour interval, and applying a correction factor. The correction factor
accounts for any general change in system usage from the base time period to our
testing time period. The correction factor is calculated by dividing the average
daily total number of trips by non-angel riders during the training period by
their average daily total number of trips during the base time period. Finally, to
reflect our prior beliefs that incentivization actually helps our system, we capped
the regular-angel rates to be at most the incentive-angel rates. If we define D to
be the set of weekdays in the base time period, the regular-angel return rates are
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calculated as follows (similarly for rental rates):
λr,+d,s,t = min(
U
|D|
∑
d′∈D r
a,+
d′,s,t∑
d′∈Dm+d′,s,t
, λi,+d,s,t) (5.2)
Stochastic View of Incentives
Our analysis also relies on the probability that an incentivized rental/return
would not have occurred if it had not been for the incentive; in particular, the
rebalancing due to a rental/return that happens regardless of the incentives
should not be attributed to the incentive scheme. We compute these probabilities
for each day, station and half-hour interval by dividing the difference of the
incentive-angel and regular-angel rates by the incentive-angel rate. Formally,
with p+d,s,t denoting the probability that a rental was triggered by the incentives,
we compute this probabilities as
p+d,s,t =
λi,+d,s,t − λr,+d,s,t
λi,+d,s,t
. (5.3)
The probability of a return having been triggered by incentives is defined sym-
metrically and denoted as p−d,s,t.
User Dissatisfaction Function
Given the non-angel rental and return rates, we can compute, for a given station
s with ` bikes at time-index t, the user dissatisfaction function for an interval
starting at time t, which is the expected number of intended returns when the
station is at capacity plus the expected number of intended rentals when the
station is empty. We denote this expectation by cs,t(`) (cf. Chapter 3).
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Figure 5.1: On the left-hand side, we display the user dissatisfaction func-
tion for four stations with different demand patterns as in Figure
3.1. On the right-hand side, we show the respective discrete
derivatives.
Performance Metrics and Policies
For each incentivized return, we can estimate the reduction in out-of-stock events
by computing the discrete derivative of the user dissatisfaction function with
respect to one additional bike, evaluated as a function of the number of bikes
present in the station before the arrival. Similarly, for incentivized rentals, the
estimated reduction in out-of-stock events equals the difference in the value
of the user dissatisfaction function evaluated with one bike less and the actual
number of bikes in the station. In Figure 5.1, we display the respective user
dissatisfaction functions and the value of the derivatives for three different
stations at 6AM. Evaluating the user dissatisfaction functions for every half-
hour interval, we estimate the impact of each rental/return on future out-of-
stock events by evaluating the derivative of the user dissatisfaction function
for that time-interval at the number of bikes present at the time of the return
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(and similarly for rentals). If we let δr denote the estimated reduction on future
out-of-stock events for trip r, let ` denote the bike-level at the station before the
trip completed, and let s and t denote the station and time-index associated with
the trip, we find that we may compute δr for a return as follows (and similarly
for rentals):
δr = cs,t(`) − cs,t(` + 1) (5.4)
Although δr captures the impact of a return (rental) on the estimated number
of out-of-stock events, it lacks two important aspects for our analysis. First, it
lacks the cost associated with the incentive itself. To capture the operator’s cost of
the incentive scheme in the form of electronic gift cards, membership extensions,
and other rewards (cf. NYCBS [2018]), we include a constant cost parameter β
for every point awarded by an incentive scheme. Second, for every incentivized
rental (return), we can incorporate the probability pd,s,t that the rental (return)
would not have occurred without an incentive given; here, d, s, t is the date,
station and time index respectively in which the rental (return) occurred. This
gives a stochastic perspective of the causal effects of incentives, in contrast to the
deterministic assumption that incentivized rentals (returns) are always caused
by the incentive. Using the above, we can define for every single incentivized
return (rental) the performance of incentivizing it with both the deterministic
and the stochastic perspective as
∆r =

δr − β if deterministic
δr · pd,s,t − β if stochastic.
(5.5)
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Given ∆r as a performance measure for incentivizing a single return (rental)
r, we define the performance of a policy as the sum of all ∆r corresponding to
incentivized rentals (returns) r. Formally, denoting by τ the set of all rentals
(returns) in the testing period, we define a policy P as a function P : τ → {0, 1}
identifying for each rental (return) r whether or not P incentivizes it. Then, to
compute the overall performance H(P) of a policy P we compute
H(P) =
∑
r∈τ
P(r) · ∆r (5.6)
5.3 Policies
In this section, we define a number of incentive policies and identify the funda-
mental differences between offline and online policies. During the time periods
from which our data is drawn, two 6-hour time periods were incentivized in
the Citi Bike system: 6AM-12PM and 4PM-10PM – we refer to them as the AM
and PM periods, respectively. Since all of the incentivized trip data comes from
only these two periods (cf. Figure 5.2), we test/apply our policies only for these
periods. Furthermore, each policy treats the two time periods independently,
and calculates an incentive scheme for each time period and station. From the
figure, we see a generally equal distribution of rental/returns in the PM period,
but a return-skewed distribution in the AM period.
Offline Policies
We first describe the offline policies. Offline policies are characterized by the
fact that the decision, for each AM/PM period, as to which interval will be
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Figure 5.2: Total number of incentivized rentals/returns in the test period.
incentivized for each station is made (irrevocably) at the beginning of that time
interval (6AM and 4PM for AM and PM, respectively); in doing so, these policies
have access to past data and the number of bikes at that time, i.e., 6AM and 4PM,
respectively. (Note that this use of term offline is different from its use in other
contexts, where offline often means that the algorithm has access to all of the
data for the input to be optimized before needing to commit to any decision.)
Static
The Static model is the simplest offline policy and was also the policy employed
in Citi Bike at the time that this research project initiated. This policy determines
a subset of stations to incentivize for which the entire AM period is incentivized
on every day, and similar subset is determined for the PM period. This model
serves as a baseline against which all other policies are compared.
84
Static Hindsight
The Static Hindsight model is an offline policy that chooses, for each station,
the optimal continuous incentive period when looking back in hindsight for
the past q′ weekdays. More precisely, the model assumes an incentive interval
can start/stop every 30-minutes, starting from the beginning of the time period
(e.g., 06:00 – 07:30 or 07:00 – 12:00 for the AM period), and chooses the incentive
interval that achieves the highest performance when constrained on the past q′
weekdays of trip data. Throughout, we will use the term incentive interval to
refer to such a continuous time period with these discrete start/end times. In
our results, q′ is set to be 10. Thus, we let D(d) denote the set of dates which are
q′ days in hindsight; we let τ(D(d), s) denote the possible morning incentive trips
belonging to those dates and station s, and let Id,s to be the incentive interval
for station s on day d. Furthermore, let us say trip r ∈ I if and only if the trip
occurred during the interval I. The interval I?d,s chosen by Static Hindsight for
the morning period is
arg max
I
∑
r∈τ(D(d),s)
∆r · 1r∈I , (5.7)
where the notation 1r∈I means the indicator function that is equal to 1 if r ∈ I, and
is 0, otherwise.
Cluster Hindsight
This offline policy uses a clustering of the stations to help make incentive deci-
sions. As we describe in more detail below, the model first groups the stations
by station dock-capacity, clusters each group by bike-level behavior, and finally
chooses the optimal incentive interval for each cluster when looking back in
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hindsight (similar to Static Hindsight).
We compute groups of stations by sorting them from smallest to largest
capacity, and dividing them into g roughly equal-size groups. The intuition for
the grouping is our prior belief that station activity level is highly correlated
with station capacity size and it is unwise, for example, to compare stations
with bike-capacity 5 with stations of bike-capacity 60. The actual data-points
used to cluster are 12-dimensional vectors consisting of the 12 half-hour interval
bike-level percentages (bike-level divided by station dock capacity) for a station
and date. The data points were obtained from our training data period, and
bike-level percentages, rather than absolute values, were used to normalize the
data points. To cluster each group of stations, we run the k-means clustering
algorithm (k-centroids) with the objective of minimizing the distortion, which is
defined to be the sum of the squared Euclidean distances between each vector
and its centroid. Finally, our model uses a hard labeling system to associate
each station with a single cluster (since for each station we have multiple points
corresponding to distinct dates), and labels a station as belonging to the cluster
for which its data points are most prevalent.
To calculate the actual incentive intervals for each cluster, the model finds the
optimal single, continuous incentive interval when looking back in hindsight
of q′ weekdays for the stations in the cluster. Then let us define C(s) to be the
cluster of stations which s belongs to. The interval that the model chooses is as
follows:
I?d,s = arg maxI
∑
s′∈C(s)
∑
r∈τ(D(d),s′)
∆r · 1r∈I (5.8)
The number of groups and the number of clusters are hyper-parameters of
the model. To fit these parameters and avoid high bias/variance problems, k-fold
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cross-validation was used with our training data, and the parameters with the
best average scores were chosen. Due to the temporal aspect of the data (e.g.,
weather plays a big role in system behavior) the k-folds were also divided to
maintain the temporal order. The final parameters used in our results are g = 10,
k = 3 and q′ = 10.
Fluid Model
A natural way to use the incentive-angel and non-angel rates to define an offline
policy is by defining a so-called fluid model, in which it is assumed that exactly
the expected number of rentals and returns occurs continuously per unit of time.
Within such a model, it is easy to find the interval during which incentivizing
minimizes the (fluid) number of out-of-stock events. In fact, one can show that
under mild assumptions on the data, it is guaranteed that incentivizing over a
single interval is optimal in such a model.
Though fluid models have successfully been applied to operational questions
in bike-sharing, e.g., in Jian et al. [2016], we found in our analysis that the fluid
model was vastly dominated by all other models; thus, we omit both its formal
definition here and its performance in the results section.
Offline Benchmark
Offline policies are constrained in two ways: first, by the fact that we allow
them to incentivize only during subintervals, as opposed to incentivizing, say,
from 6-8AM and then again from 9-10AM but not in between; second, since the
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decision is based solely on the number of bikes at each station at 6AM, they
lack information about demand later in the course of the rush hour period. To
distinguish between the lack of information and the constraint of incentivizing
only during a subinterval, we define the following static optimal benchmark that
has access to full information, but is constrained to incentivize only during a
subinterval.
Static Optimal
The static optimal model is not a feasible policy since it assumes future knowl-
edge that is not given in practice; instead, it is a model built in hindsight to
benchmark offline policies. More specifically, for each week, station and AM/PM
period, the Static Optimal model considers in hindsight, with complete knowl-
edge, the best possible single continuous incentive period in which to incentivize.
Online Policies
In contrast to the offline policies described above, online policies gain information
over the course of the rush hour period and thus are able to adopt whether or
not to incentivize at a given station at a given time. We define only a very simple
set of online policies.
Dynamic
The Dynamic model is a completely online policy that chooses in real-time for
each trip whether or not it is incentivized which immediately implies perfect
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efficiency. Formally, the model incentivizes all trips with ∆r > 0 (cf. Equation
5), i.e., the performance is exactly the sum of all trips that contribute positively
to the objective. This policy serves as an upper-bound on what any policy can
possibly achieve within our analysis.
Dynamic CC (X)
Beyond the fully dynamic model, we define a parameterized family of policies,
wherein each policy breaks up the incentive period into intervals and the param-
eter X dictates the length of the intervals. For a given X, Dynamic CC starts at
the beginning of each AM/PM period and decides every X minutes whether or
not to incentivize trips for the next X minutes. To decide whether to incentivize
the next X minutes, the model simulates the occurrence of one incentivized trip
with the current number of bikes and empty docks at the station. If the simulated
value of ∆r is positive, Dynamic CC chooses to incentivize trips at the station
for the next X minutes. For example, the Dynamic CC 15 policy at 6 AM will
check the station’s current number of available bikes and docks, and simulate
an incentivized trip for that user dissatisfaction function and that number of
bikes and docks available. If the ∆r value for this trip is positive, it will choose to
incentivize the station from 06:00–06:15. Then, at 06:15 it simulates a new trip,
based on updated information, to determine whether or not to incentivize from
06:15–06:30.
We consider the Dynamic CC policy for X ∈ {15, 30, 60, 120}. Furthermore,
one could also view the Dynamic model as Dynamic CC with X = 0.
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5.4 Results
In this section, we present the performance of a number of policies when run
with varying cost-parameter for both the AM and PM periods. The data-set for
the test period, on which our analysis relies, consists of a total of 4944 trips in the
AM and 2800 trips in the PM, across 147 stations. We focus our analysis on the
deterministic regime in which we assume that an incentivized rental/return is
always triggered by the incentive given and would not have occurred otherwise.
Thereafter, we contrast those results with the ones in the stochastic regime. The
scores for the former are displayed in Table 5.1 and for the latter in Table 5.2. All
scores are given as the fraction of improvement of the optimal dynamic policy
(i.e., each policy’s absolute score is divided by the dynamic policy’s absolute
score). We begin by giving a high-level summary of our most interesting findings
before providing more details for each of them.
Key Observations of Deterministic Results
Considering the rows indexed by Static for both AM and PM periods and both
tables, it is noticeable that the static policy performs quite well, especially in
the regime with low cost parameters, which is strong evidence of the operator’s
domain expertise in the initial choice of incentivized stations. Next, we observe
the near-optimal performance of the Static Optimal benchmark across all cost
parameters; this supports our decision to restrict the offline policies to incentivize
each rush hour only over one sub-interval tailored for that station. For the
dynamic policies, we observe a smooth decrease in performance as we transition
from the maximally dynamic to more static policies, which highlights the trade-
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Time Policies Cost Parameter0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
AM
Dynamic 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Stat. Opt. 0.985 0.981 0.976 0.97 0.961
Static 0.939 0.911 0.870 0.809 0.715
Stat. HS 0.960 0.947 0.929 0.905 0.873
Clus. HS 0.961 0.944 0.918 0.887 0.845
Dyn 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Dyn 30 0.995 0.994 0.993 0.992 0.990
Dyn 60 0.989 0.984 0.980 0.977 0.969
Dyn 120 0.967 0.953 0.944 0.940 0.924
PM
Dynamic 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Stat. Opt. 0.980 0.977 0.974 0.972 0.967
Static 0.844 0.777 0.680 0.538 0.318
Stat. HS 0.943 0.934 0.917 0.891 0.858
Clus. HS 0.932 0.917 0.897 0.866 0.830
Dyn 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Dyn 30 0.986 0.984 0.982 0.983 0.980
Dyn 60 0.975 0.965 0.956 0.958 0.951
Dyn 120 0.949 0.926 0.909 0.919 0.904
Table 5.1: Relative performances of each policy during AM and PM periods
compared to the completely online policy under the deterministic
performance evaluation.
offs between efficiency and simplicity in the policies. Noticeably, none of the
offline policies handle high cost-parameters well. Finally, we observe a general
decrease in performance from the AM to PM period, indicating that the system
behavior is more erratic in the afternoon.
Static Performance
At first glance, the strong performance of the Static policy in Table 5.1 (0.939
in the AM without costs) may seem surprising. It is explained, however, by
the operator’s domain expertise when deciding which stations to include in the
incentive scheme. Its degrading performance with increased costs is explained by
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Period Policies Cost Parameter0.0 0.01 0.1 0.2
AM
Dynamic 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Stat. Opt. 0.979 0.973 0.945 0.912
Static 0.928 0.916 0.771 0.479
Static HS 0.957 0.944 0.878 0.796
Clus. HS 0.958 0.931 0.831 0.699
Dyn 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Dyn 30 0.995 0.995 0.993 0.991
Dyn 60 0.985 0.870 0.832 0.773
Dyn 120 0.966 0.68 0.612 0.514
PM
Dynamic 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Stat. Opt. 0.978 0.971 0.943 0.917
Static 0.923 0.903 0.646 0.15
Stat. HS 0.967 0.948 0.883 0.784
Clus. HS 0.958 0.935 0.839 0.682
Dyn 15 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Dyn 30 0.992 0.990 0.992 0.99
Dyn 60 0.982 0.889 0.850 0.807
Dyn 120 0.960 0.823 0.756 0.702
Table 5.2: Relative performance of each policy during AM and PM periods
compared to the completely online policy under the probabilistic
performance evaluation.
the fact that the policy does not adapt to the shrinking set of trips with positive
impact as costs increase.
Despite its reasonable performance in the AM in the regime without costs,
the Static policy is still dominated by all policies across all cost parameters.
This is especially prominent in the PM period, where differences range from 9%
(Stat. HS) up to 15% (Dyn 15) even without cost parameters; the differences are
even higher when accounting for costs. All of the incentivized trips in the PM,
grouped by their improvement on the objective, δr, are visualized in Figure 5.3.
Though the vast majority of incentivized trips have positive-impact, the other
policies are able to accurately exclude those trips that do not, thus achieving
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Figure 5.3: Static Policy’s total number of incentivized trips, grouped by
impact on objective (δr) for the PM period.
better performance. These results exemplify the importance of a data-driven
approach to improve the Bike Angels program. For example, even a rather
simple policy with minimal overhead, such as Static Hindsight, significantly
improves the efficiency of the incentives.
Static Optimal Benchmark Performance
The online policies have two advantages over the offline policies: the flexibility
to adapt decisions with updated information and the flexibility to incentivize
over periods that are not sub-intervals. Comparing the performance of the
Static Optimal to the Dynamic policy helps us distinguish between these two
effects. More specifically, the benchmark operates with perfect information but
is constrained to only incentivize over sub-intervals.
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In Table 5.1 we do indeed observe Static Opt achieving a near optimal score
of 0.98, which only slightly degrades with increased costs. This supports our
assumption that it suffices to incentivize over a single sub-interval. However,
Static Opt assumes perfect knowledge and still only matches the performance of
Dynamic CC (60). In that sense, it also demonstrates the limitations of the best
feasible offline policies.
Online to Offline Policies
Unsurprisingly, we find that the online policies outperform offline policies. As
we transition from the maximally dynamic and online policy to the entirely static
and offline policy, the decrease in performance occurs in a somewhat smooth
way.
An interesting result in this context is the performance of the Dynamic CC (15)
policy in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, as it achieves optimal scores for all sets of parameters;
this demonstrates that making decisions completely online/in real time is not
necessary to obtain perfect efficiency.
On the other end of the spectrum from online to offline, the results of Table
5.1 demonstrate that the offline policies Static Hindsight and Cluster Hindsight
perform almost on par with the online Dynamic CC (120) policy, especially in
the regime with low cost parameters; this points to the limited advantage of the
simple online policies as the cost parameter increases.
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The Cost Parameter
In considering the relative performance change of policies with increasing cost
parameters, we find that the offline policies are comparatively much worse at
handling high cost parameters than the online policies. Intuitively, it might seem
that the interval incentive restrictions of offline policies leads to this result. For
example, imagine taking the original incentive interval with no cost parameter,
and changing some of the positive-impact trips within the interval to become
negative-impact trips (due to increase in cost). Then unless these trips all exist at
the outer limits of the interval, these trips will ”shatter” the incentive interval:
either the offline policies give up on the positive-impact trips at the beginning or
they give up on the positive-impact trips at the end or they include the negative-
impact trips in the middle. Online policies on the other hand can avoid this
conundrum since they are not restricted to a single sub-interval.
However, the performance of the Static Optimal benchmark in Table 5.1 does
not significantly degrade with high cost parameters. Thus, despite the interval
restriction, the offline policies still have room to have better predictions yield
improved performance.
In contrast, Figure 5.4 displays for the Dynamic CC (60) all incentivized trips
with their time of day, their expected impact on future out-of-stock events, and
for each one, the decision whether or not it is incentivized when run with 2
different cost parameters.The cost parameter is specified in each plot by the
y-value of the horizontal line dividing the positive-impact trips (above the line)
and negative-impact trips (below the line). As the cost parameter increases from
0.0 to 0.3, the policy excludes most trips having a δr value between that range,
that it had previously included. Thereby, it manages to retain its near-optimal
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performance.
AM and PM Periods
Comparing the policy performances from the AM to PM period, we find there
is a significant performance difference (i.e., all policies perform worse in the
PM). However, in light of the results in Table 1, we see the relative performance
order of the policies with each other is consistent. This indicates that the system
behavior of Citi Bike is fundamentally more erratic in the afternoon, leading to
all policies having a harder time predicting when to incentivize.
Stochastic Evaluation
In this section we highlight four noticeable differences between the results in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Limiting Cost Parameters
When evaluating stochastic performances we limit the cost parameters to only go
as high as 0.2. This is because when incorporating the likelihood of trips into the
δr calculations, the expected impact of a trip before subtracting the cost is much
lower; in particular, it is easy to show that the impact of a single incentivized
rental/return is at best a reduction of 1 in the number of out-of-stock events. But
then, if for example the probability of a particular rental having been triggered
by an incentive was 0.5, then even with an impact of 0.8, there would be no
improvement with cost parameter 0.4.
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Figure 5.4: Scatter plots of incentivized trips indicating which trips are
included/excluded in Dynamic CC (60) incentivization policy,
when cost parameter is 0.0 (top) and 0.3 (bottom).
97
Relative Order
The results in Table 5.2 show that the same general trends in relative performance
order (most dynamic to most static) that hold for the deterministic results, also
hold for the stochastic results. Likewise, the results indicate that the Static
Optimal benchmark still performs near optimally in the stochastic setting.
A key difference between the deterministic and stochastic results is the sen-
sitivity to cost parameters. In particular, except for the Dynamic CC policies
parameterized with 15 and 30, all policies decrease significantly in performance
with even small increases in the cost parameter. Intuitively, due to the newly
introduced stochasticity, the expected impacts of all rides are reduced, and small
changes in cost are still large, relative to the reduced impacts.
Advantage of Hindsight Policies
Another interesting difference found between the deterministic and stochastic
results is the relative performances of the Dynamic CC 60 and 120 policies com-
pared to the Static Hindsight and Cluster Hindsight policies. Without stochastic-
ity, the online policies dominated the offline policies in performance. However,
when introducing stochasticity and for higher cost parameter regimes, the oppo-
site seems to be true. Intuitively this makes sense. The Dynamic CC X policies
consider only the status of the station at the beginning of each X-minute interval,
which includes the probability of an incentivized rental/return having occurred
due to the incentive at that time (thus ignoring the differing probabilities existing
within the X-minute interval). In contrast, the Static Hindsight and Cluster Hind-
sight policies actually incorporate all probabilities when computing the optimal
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incentive intervals retrospectively.
Static Policy
Finally, from the stochastic results we see an even greater difference in perfor-
mance between the baseline Static policy and all other policies (especially with
increasing costs). The large differences again underline the performance im-
provements that can be obtained by transitioning from the Static policy to a
data-driven policy.
5.5 Conclusion
We have proposed a number of data-driven policies to guide incentives for rebal-
ancing in bike-sharing systems via crowdsourcing. While our analysis clearly
displays the performance differences between these policies, the superior perfor-
mance of the more dynamic policies comes with the cost of greater complexity
for users and operators alike.
There are other important considerations beyond their simplicity and perfor-
mance. For example, when comparing the performance of the Static and Cluster
Hindsight policies, it seems unclear at first glance what additional value the
Cluster Hindsight policy provides, given that it relies on heavier machinery –
after all, they perform very similarly. However, the Static Hindsight policy can
only be defined for stations for which the Static policy had been in place, whereas
the Cluster Hindsight policy can be defined for other stations as well. Thus, in a
way, each of the policies presented has its own advantage.
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Most importantly, our analysis shows that slightly limiting the online fashion
of decision-making only causes limited decreases in performance. This adds a
data-driven analysis to a recent stream of literature in operations management
that compares dynamic and static decision-making in similar applications.
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CHAPTER 6
REBALANCING
”No, I make nerds look good.” — S. Sabbith
In this chapter, we report on a collaborative effort with Citi Bike to develop
and implement data-driven tools to guide their rebalancing efforts. In particular,
we provide new models to guide truck routing for overnight rebalancing and
new optimization problems for non-motorized rebalancing efforts during the day.
Finally, we evaluate how our practical methods have had an impact on Citi Bike’s
rebalancing in New York City. The chapter is based on [Freund, Norouzi-Fard,
Paul, Henderson, and Shmoys, 2016].
6.1 Motivation
In the past few years, bike-share systems have developed different approaches
to rebalancing. The most common approach employs trucks to move bikes
to high-demand areas (cf. Chapter 2). This is particularly effective overnight,
when both traffic and demand are low. During the day, vehicular traffic impairs
these efforts, and operators supplement their motorized rebalancing through
non-motorized rebalancing means such as trikes and corrals. A trike is a trailer
that typically holds at most eighteen bikes and is towed by a cyclist to relocate
bikes between a station A, with high supply, and a station B, with low supply
(cf. Figure 6.1). A corral, on the other hand, artificially increases the capacity of a
popular station by having an employee store bikes in between docks, thereby
using all of the available space (cf. Figure 6.1).
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This section is based on work by Freund, Norouzi-Fard, Paul, Henderson,
and Shmoys 2016; we provide data-driven methods to help New York City Bike-
share (NYCBS) improve overall utilization of their system and reduce customer
dissatisfaction. We formulate and attack the underlying optimization problems
that arise in truck-based rebalancing overnight, trike-based rebalancing during
the day, and the placement of a limited number of seasonal corrals. For each of
these settings we describe the methods developed and their impact for NYCBS.
First, we consider optimally routing trucks to relocate bikes overnight. This
is called the overnight rebalancing problem. Our objective in this problem is to
minimize expected customer dissatisfaction over the next day as measured by
the user dissatisfaction function (cf. Chapter 3). We present an integer program
(IP) that constructs routes for a given number of trucks and show how to find
good solutions when given limited computation time in practice. Next, we
consider the mid-rush rebalancing problem, studying how to optimally assign trikes
to circulate between pairs of stations. Here, we use a maximum-weight k-edge
matching to assign trike routes and maximize the impact on customer satisfaction.
Finally, we consider how to optimally place corrals at stations where our goal
is to minimize the number of customers who cannot find an open dock within
a quarter mile of their preferred destination. We model this question as as a
maximum coverage problem that we solve within seconds using a simple integer
programming formulation.
The methods in this chapter made it to different stages of development at Citi
Bike. We have completed trial runs using our overnight rebalancing schedules,
routing three to four of their trucks over an eight-hour period. In the trials that
we ran, our routes were able to improve the efficiency of NYCBS’s truck fleet, as
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measured by reduction in the user dissatisfaction function, by 12% on average –
offline, the improvement we found was as high as 20%. NYCBS has also used
our proposed placement of corrals during the 2016 summer season. Further, our
method to match trikes to stations have suggested station pairs that inform their
operational schedule.
This chapter thus summarizes our methodological contributions and their
impact on day-to-day operations in New York City. The work described dis-
tinguishes itself from the existing literature in that it was conducted in close
cooperation with NYCBS and already impacts their day-to-day operations. This
stands in contrast to the findings of de Chardon et al. [2016], which conclude
that very little of the existing work on rebalancing has had an impact in practice.
Additionally, while there has been extensive work on overnight rebalancing, very
little research has been conducted on non-motorized rebalancing efforts, which
form a crucial part of NYCBS’s operations. One such work is O’Mahony et al.
[2016], which studies the routing of trikes; this paper partitions the set of stations
into producers, which are stations likely to fill up, and consumers, likely to empty
out. In investigating the problem of setting trike routes, the model proposed in
O’Mahony et al. [2016] aims to minimize the distance of any consumer (producer)
to another consumer (producer) that is rebalanced by one of the trikes. While
our work on trikes is driven by the same application, our objective is again to
minimize the user dissatisfaction function.
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Figure 6.1: Pictures of a corral and a trike being used in NYC.
6.2 Overnight Rebalancing
Similar to the earlier work on overnight rebalancing, we use an IP formulation
to model this optimization problem. The main distinguishing feature of our
approach is that we greedily partition the problem into subproblems, thereby
controlling the size of the IP. In particular, we find routes for subintervals of the
entire time horizon, subsets of trucks, and subsets of stations. Our choice of
stations is based on carefully weighing the potential benefits of rebalancing at
each station and the distance of the station from the location of the truck at the
beginning of the interval.
Integer Programming Formulation
We begin by introducing our integer program. The formulation is time-indexed,
and we assume the given time for overnight rebalancing has been broken into
T identical time steps. In each time step, a truck will either pick up/drop off
bikes or move to an adjacent station. In that way, the edges between the stations
are unweighted and traversing any edge takes one time step. In order to make
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Figure 6.2: Truck routes for three trucks on August 8, 2016. Each circle
corresponds to a station at which at least one of the trucks stops.
A white outer circle corresponds to a pick-up, a black outer
circle to a drop-off. Initially, all trucks start at a NYCBS depot in
the East Village.
this assumption reasonable, we add dummy stations to break long distances into
individual time steps. More precisely, if the travel time between two stations s1
and s2 is ` time steps, we add a path of `−1 (dummy) stations between them, that
allows us to move between such two stations in exactly ` time steps by traversing
one edge in each step. This technique significantly reduces the dimension of the
IP and distinguishes our formulation previous ones.
Notation.
After adding all dummy stations, let S be the set of stations, T be the number
of time steps, and K be the number of trucks. For s ∈ S , t ∈ [T ], and k ∈ [K], the
variable xstk represents whether or not truck k is at station s at time t. Similarly,
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the variable ystk represents the number of bikes at station s at time t to which
truck k has access. This prevents multiple trucks from moving the same bikes.
Lastly, the variable btk represents the number of bikes in truck k at time t.
We use the following notation:
• N(s) denotes the neighborhood of s, that is, the stations to which a truck
can move from s in a single time step.
• γ is the number of bikes that can be picked up or dropped off in one time
step.
• start(s) is the number of bikes in station s at time t = 1.
• min(s) is the minimizer of the user dissatisfaction function at station s. That
is, the number of bikes at station s that minimizes the expected number of
dissatisfied customers.
• cs = cs(start(s))−cs(min(s))|start(s)−min(s)| is a linear approximation of the slope of cs and gives
the improvement per bike moved at s (see Figure 6.3, Chapter 3).
• S + is the set of stations s for which start(s) > min(s). For example, the state
in Figure 6.3 is in S +.
• S − is the set of stations s for which start(s) ≤ min(s).
For ease of presentation, we state here only the main constraints of the IP before
we explain the effect of each. The reader is advised to read the IP in parallel with
the explanations below.
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maximize x,y,b
∑
s∈S ,k∈[K]
(ys1k − ysTk)cs
subject to:
xstk ≤ xs(t−1)k +
∑
s′:s∈N(s′)
xs′(t−1)k, ∀s, t, k; (6.1)
∑
s∈S
xstk = 1, ∀t, k; (6.2)∑
k∈[K]
ys1k = start(s), ∀s; (6.3)
start(s) ≤
∑
k∈[K]
ystk ≤ min(s), ∀s ∈ S −, t; (6.4)
min(s) ≤
∑
k∈[K]
ystk ≤ start(s), ∀s ∈ S +, t; (6.5)
∑
s∈S
ystk + btk =
∑
s∈S
ys1k + b1k, ∀t, k (6.6)
|ystk − ys(t−1)k| ≤ γxstk, ∀s, t, k; (6.7)
|ystk − ys(t−1)k| + γ|xstk − xs(t−1)k| ≤ γ, ∀s, t, k. (6.8)
Below we explain the function of each part of the IP.
• The objective function is the summation of changes in the linearized user
dissatisfaction functions at each station, i.e. the reduction in expected
number of dissatisfied customers due to the relocation of bikes.
• Constraint (6.1) allows each truck to move only to a station adjacent to the
one at which it currently is.
• Constraint (6.2) indicates that at each time step, each truck must be in
exactly one station.
• Constraint (6.3) initiates the number of bikes at every station. Notice that
at this point already, the bikes are distributed among the K trucks.
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• Constraints (6.4) and (6.5) guarantee that the number of bikes in each sta-
tion s remains between start(s) and the minimizer min(s). In other words, we
enforce that moving a bike only improves the setup (cf. Pareto Constraints
and Optimal Fleet Size).
• Constraint (6.6) enforces that the total number of bikes in the system does
not change over time.
• Constraint (6.7) makes sure that we pick/drop bikes at a station from a
truck only if the truck is at that station and that the number of bikes moved
is bounded by γ, the number of bikes rebalancers are able to move within
one period.
• Constraint (6.8) ensures the truck either moves or picks/drops bikes in one
time step but not both. In most of the previous works, researchers have
omitted this constraint. This constraint makes the IP significantly harder
to solve but makes the resulting path viable in practice. Notice that the
absolute values in the constraints can be linearized.
Moreover, we add capacities to the truck by bounding btk. In practice, we extend
this IP to fix the starting/finishing stations for each truck, as well as the number
of bikes in each truck at the beginning of the night.
Pareto Constraints and Optimal Fleet Size
Notice that the extension of the linearization of cs(·) beyond the point min(s) does
not capture the actual behavior of the UDF. In particular, at that point the latter
sees more dissatisfied customers while the former sees fewer. This, however, is
not the reason we impose the Pareto constraints (6.4) and (6.5), since optimizing
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min(s) start(s)
x
y
cs(x)
Figure 6.3: Linearization of cs(·).
over the linear envelope of cs(·) is not significantly harder than over the lineariza-
tion; instead, the constraints are imposed to ensure that service for customers at
one station is not sacrificed for improved service for customers elsewhere. This is
particularly true when, as is the case in NYC,
∑
s start(s) <<
∑
smin(s). At the time
we started the pilots, the bike fleet size was about 7.000 whereas the minimizers
summed to about 10.000. In such a setting, not having fairness constraints can
yield undesirable outcomes. For instance, without fairness constraints we might
find solutions in which bikes can be picked up from a station far away that has
more bikes than needed but are instead picked up from a station nearby that has
fewer than needed. While this may lead to fewer dissatisfied customers in total,
NYCBS aims for rebalancing to be a Pareto improvement to the system (i.e., no
station is worse off, some are improved); thus, we include constraints (6.4) and
(6.5).
Solution Methods
As presented, state-of-the-art IP solvers are too slow to solve this formulation
within the limited time window between when the operator receives the data
and when the trucks must start their routes a few minutes later. The follow-
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ing heuristic methods help decrease the computation time to solve this IP and
improve the quality of the solution returned.
Reducing the number of edges. To avoid adding too many dummy stations
and inflating the size of the IP, we choose a threshold d on the distance
between two stations and only add a path between stations s1 and s2 if they
are at most d time steps apart.
Dividing T into smaller time intervals. At the start of the rebalancing period,
there is little time (typically about 20 minutes) between the time all the
data (state of the system, number of bikes on each truck, etc.) becomes
available and the time when trucks are meant to begin their routes. To
gain computation time, we break T into smaller intervals and only route
trucks for the first few hours of the route. While this part of the route is
being executed, we then use the time to solve for the next interval. This
segmentation of the computation time greatly improved the quality of our
overall routes.
Greedily selecting stations. For each time interval, we further reduce the size
of the IP by removing stations where the room for improvement is low. We
rank stations based on a combination of cs, the potential benefit of each bike
picked or dropped, and |min(s)− start(s)|, the number of available/required
bikes, and run the IP with roughly 40 stations, further refined by excluding
stations too far away from the starting point of the truck.
Splitting trucks. Instead of solving one IP for all K trucks, we break the com-
putation time into K equal pieces and solve for the route of the first truck,
then the second truck, and so forth. For example, if we have two trucks
and two hours of computation time, we would solve for the route of each
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truck in one hour.
To further decrease the size of the IP, we only add stations in reasonable
proximity to the current position of the truck. We then compute the path over
one time interval and update the set of stations. On the one hand, our IP can
find very good solutions for the smaller instances on which we solve. On the
other hand, by picking stations in the described greedy fashion, we ensure that
the combination of the solutions to the small instances has objective close to the
global optimum. The routes we construct for each truck and time interval are
compatible in that they can be pieced together to form one coherent route. We
show in our results that these heuristics still yield good solutions to the original
IP.
Results
In this section, we summarize our results. First, we report the gap between
the solution we return using the techniques above and an optimal solution of
a valid LP relaxation. Second, we compare our solutions to the current routes
employed by NYCBS, as guided by tools based on our earlier work. On average,
our solutions reduce customer dissatisfaction by 20% compared to this previous
computationally informed approach. All results were produced using Gurobi
v6.5 on a machine with 8GB RAM and an Intel i7-2600 processor with 3.4GHZ.
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IP gap
360 Stations
# of Trucks Avg Objective Function Avg Gap
1 148 28.1%
2 232 22.1%
3 301 12.3%
4 330 9.5%
Figure 6.4: A posteriori optimization for overnight truck rebalancing in Man-
hattan.
When solving the IP, we assume the number of time steps is 60, each time step
corresponds to 6 minutes, and that workers can load/unload up to 7 bikes in each
time step. These numbers are based on discussions with NYCBS. To evaluate
the performance of our IP, we used our IP to route various numbers of trucks
in Manhattan, which has around 360 stations. As inputs for start(s), we used the
number of bikes at each station at midnight over the course of a week. In Figure
6.4, we report the average impact on the number of dissatisfied customers and
the average integrality gap over the week. The worst integrality gap occurred
Sunday night when the distribution of bikes was furthest from the commuter
demand during the week. We emphasize that this gap is computed with respect
to the LP-relaxation on all 360 stations, all trucks, and all time-steps, i.e. the LP-
relaxation of the provided integer program; hence, it includes the gap between
the solution we find for the smaller problem instances (on 30-40 stations) and the
optimum of these smaller instances.
The average integrality gap decreases as the number of trucks grows. This
seems to be a consequence of the Pareto constraints, since there are fewer bikes
available to be moved (per truck). With more trucks, it is easier to achieve the
best possible solution. We remark that a much smaller integrality gap can be
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obtained without constraints (6.7) and (6.8) as has been done in Raviv et al. [2013],
Ho and Szeto [2014], and Forma et al. [2015]. The solutions obtained this way,
however, allow for as many stops (with loading/unloading of few bikes at each)
as there are time periods; in discussions with NYCBS we found that in many
cases that the time required to find a place to park the truck is not sufficiently
dominated by driving/(un)loading time that it could be ignored. We thus had to
add these constraints, even though it makes the IP much harder to solve.
Practical Results
Dispatchers at NYCBS currently use a myopic decision aid to route trucks. This
aid is based on user dissatisfaction functions and was developed in close coop-
eration with our group. While this decision aid shows dispatchers the optimal
fill level at stations and indicates stations where rebalancing could yield large
improvements, it does not provide optimized routes. In contrast, our IP solutions
look to globally optimize routes. We formulated our model with feedback from
NYCBS; their expertise led, for example, to the refinement that in each time step a
truck can either move or pick/drop bikes but not both. Over the course of a week
in July 2016, we then compared our proposed routes with the manual routes
executed by the dispatchers at NYCBS. On average our results showed objectives
about 20% higher. Together with the NYCBS management, we reviewed our
proposed routes and are now running pilots to route between 2 and 5 of their
trucks overnight.
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Pilot Experiences
Despite the improvements, the pilots conducted with NYCBS proved to be more
difficult than expected, as we quickly describe here.
Unknown constraints. In an aborted first attempt at a pilot, we routed a truck
into a narrow street, in which it did not fit. While this is a rare event, it
can happen and significantly complicates the routing problem. To deal
with this problem, we included in subsequent pilots alternative stations
(non-optimized) at which each truck could stop without interfering with
the routes of the other trucks.
Cost of solving offline. Solving the system offline can have detrimental conse-
quences when unexpected demand occurs late at night. While the system
significantly slows down at night, we have encountered cases where our
route dictated picking up some number of bikes from a station and by
the time the truck had arrived there, fewer than that were left. Similarly,
it may occur that the Pareto constraint is violated in the execution of the
route because the number of bikes at a station changes between the time
we solve and the time the truck arrives. To avoid this occurring regularly,
we excluded certain areas that tend to slow down later than others (e.g.,
East Village) in the first part of the route.
Evaluating results. In evaluating our results, we found that certain system
conditions greatly influence the efficiency of rebalancing. On nights when
the system is in great imbalance, it is not uncommon for each truck to move
enough bikes to reduce the expected number of dissatisfied customers by
> 100 users. In contrast, on nights where the system is already reasonably
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balanced, it is often not feasible for a truck to move bikes to reduce the
objective by > 50.
Although the final point indicates that evaluating results is difficult, the
improvements through rebalancing on the nights during which we ran this pilot
were on average 12% higher than in the rest of that month.
6.3 Trikes
In this section, we study the impact of trikes on the expected number of dissatis-
fied users and solve a corresponding optimization problem. Recall that a trike is
a trailer towed by a cyclist that holds at most 18 bikes at a time (cf. Figure 6.1),
though, when we did this work with Citi Bike they could hold at most 5. Citi
Bike uses trikes between fixed pairs of stations to move bikes from high-demand,
low-supply stations to low-demand, high-supply stations. NYCBS considers
trikes a preferred choice of rebalancing during rush hour when trucks are slowed
down by traffic. We first assume that every station may have only one trike route
incident to it. In this regime, the problem of finding the optimal m trike routes
can be formulated as a bipartite maximum m-edge matching, where the weight of
an edge between two stations corresponds to the reduction in user dissatisfaction
with a trike added between them. Next, we generalize these ideas to the case
where a station can utilize multiple trikes. With a slight variation, we show that
this as well as can be formulated as a matching problem and efficiently solved.
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Model
Similar to the user dissatisfaction function defined in Chapter 3, we model the
user dissatisfaction function with a trike between stations A and B as follows: Poisson
processes with rates λA, µA, λB, µB correspond to arrivals and departures of users
at station A and B, respectively. We use the random variable Ys(t) ∈ {0, . . . , ks}
to represent the number of bikes at station s ∈ {A, B} at time t, where ks is the
capacity of station s ∈ {A, B}. As before, a dissatisfied customer at s corresponds
to an arrival (resp. departure) when s is full (resp. empty), i.e., Ys(t) = ks (resp.
Ys(t) = 0).
In addition to arrivals and departures of users, we also have a trike with
capacity kR that moves as many bikes as possible from A to B. We assume that at
times t1, . . . , tr the trike stops at one of the stations. Without loss of generality, the
stop at ti is at A if i is odd and at B if it is even. In other words, the trike cycles
back and forth between A and B. When the trike arrives at station A it picks up as
many bikes as possible given the number of bikes at A and the number of bikes
already in the trike; similarly, when the trike arrives at station B it drops off as
many bikes as possible given the number of available docks at B and the number
of bikes already in the trike. We use the random variable YR(t) ∈ {0, . . . , kR} to
represent the number of bikes in the trike at time t.
We are interested in the expected number of dissatisfied users at A and B over
the time horizon from t0 to tr+1. We can write the expected number of dissatisfied
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users at stations A and B as follows:
cA→B =
r∑
i=0
kA∑
j=0
Pr(YA(t+i ) = j)c
i
A( j)
+
r∑
i=0
kB∑
j=0
Pr(YB(t+i ) = j)c
i
B( j)
The two terms correspond to the expected number of dissatisfied users at each
station; to obtain them, notice that at the beginning of time-interval i with
probability Pr(Ys(t+i ) = j) there are j bikes at station s and in that case an expected
cis( j) users will be dissatisfied in that interval. Thus, we need to find Pr(Ys(t+i ) =
j) ∀s, i, j. For ease of notation, we denote Pr(YA(t+i ) = α, XB(t+i ) = β, XR(t+i ) = ρ) as
pii(α, β, ρ) and remark that by setting YR(t+0 ) = 0 with probability 1 and assuming
that XA(t0), XB(t0) are independent we obtain:
pi0(α, β, ρ) =

0, if ρ > 0
Pr(XA(t+0 ) = α) · Pr(XB(t+0 ) = β), else.
This will represent the base case to recursively compute FA→B.
To calculate pii(α, β, ρ) in general we need to analyze the system changes in
each time interval. Specifically, given the Poisson process rates and the current
number of bikes x at a station s ∈ {A, B}, we can compute the expected number of
dissatisfied customers cis(·) in an interval (ti, ti+1). In doing so, we also obtain the
probability that there are y bikes in station s at the start of the next time interval.
More precisely, ∀s ∈ {A, B}, x, y ∈ {0, . . . , ks}we let
Ps,ix,y := Pr(Ys(t
−
i+1) = y|Ys(t+i ) = x),
where Ys(t+) := lim→0+ Ys(t + ), i.e., Ys(t+i ) is the number of bikes at s just after the
trailer has stopped at the station and Ys(t−) := lim→0+ Ys(t − ) is the number of
bikes at s just before the trailer has stopped at the station.
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Thus, for even i, we have pii+1(α, β, ρ) = 0 if α > 0 and ρ < kR, as otherwise the
trike would pick up more bikes. Otherwise, we obtain
pii+1(α, β, ρ) =
kA∑
x=0
kB∑
y=0
ρ∑
z=0
pii(x, y, z)PA,ix,α+ρ−zP
B,i
y,β,
where we define Ps,ix,y = 0 for y < {0, . . . , ks}. This is because, with YR(t+i ) = z, the
event that {YA(t+i+1) = α and YR(t+i+1) = ρ} happens if and only if the number of
bikes at A before the pick-up at ti+1 is α + ρ − z.
Similarly, for odd i, we have pii+1(α, β, ρ) = 0 if β < kB and ρ > 0. Otherwise,
pii+1(α, β, ρ) =
kA∑
x=0
kB∑
y=0
kR∑
z=ρ
pii(x, y, z)PA,ix,αP
B,i
y,β+ρ−z.
Recognizing that
Pr(YA(t+i ) = j) =
∑kB
y=0
∑kR
z=0 pi
i( j, y, z) and
Pr(YB(t+i ) = j) =
∑kA
x=0
∑kR
z=0 pi
i(x, j, z),
we can now compute all Pr(Ys(t+i ) = j) and pi
i(α, β, ρ) recursively starting with the
base cases for i = 0 and incrementing i. Thus, we can efficiently compute cA→B.
Given cA→B for each pair of stations, we use these values to assign the trike
routes. To formulate the problem as a maximum m-edge matching problem, we
create a bipartite graph G = (X ∪ Y, E) where X = Y is the set of stations. We
set the weight of edge (A, B) equal to the difference of the expected number of
dissatisfied users at stations A and B without the trike, given by
kA∑
j=0
Pr(YA(t0) = j)FA( j) +
kB∑
j=0
Pr(YB(t0) = j)FB( j),
and the expected number with the trike, FA→B. Thus, the weight of any matching
is equal to the reduction in the expected number of dissatisfied customers from
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the corresponding trike routes and vice versa. Further, there is a well-known and
efficient algorithm for finding the maximum m-edge matching for any bipartite
graph.
Relaxed Assumptions
If we allowed more than one trike incident to a particular station, the dimension-
ality of the dynamic program explodes, yielding it infeasible. A slight variation
of the model, however, allows us to model this problem as a maximum-weight
matching as well. Instead of coupling the random variables of numerous stations
and trikes, we estimate for each station how many bikes trikes can pick up/drop
off bikes over the time horizon in which they operate. To find a solution for k
trikes we then create for each station s nodes s1, . . . sk and create an edge (Ai, B j)
with weight set to be the improvement at station A through the ith additional
trike and at B through the jth additional trike. Notice that, in contrast to the
earlier formulation, this does not incorporate the chance that a trike incident
to station A does not have an effect because there are no bikes to pick up at the
adjacent station B.
Results
Setting kR = 5 and eight trike stops between 7:30 AM and 9:15 AM (thus moving
a total of at most 20 bikes per station pair), we use the above dynamic program
to compute the weight of the maximum matchings of various sizes; in Figure
6.5 we display the maximum matching of size 8, in Figure 6.6 the weight of all
maximum matchings of size 1 through 20. Notice that for up to 5 trailers, there is
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Figure 6.5: Trike routes identified by the maximum-weight matching for-
mulation. Red lines indicate trikes that pick up bikes at white
circles and drop them off at black ones. (Map data: Google
Maps)
an improvement of about 20 (fewer dissatisfied customers). While these numbers
can be viewed in comparison to the numbers in Figure 6.4, the costs of operating
a truck are significantly higher than those of a trailer. The relative cost of trucks
and trailers thus affect which of the two (truck/trailer/both) is more efficient to
improve service quality.
6.4 Corrals
Our work on corrals is motivated by studies on the correlation between distance
to transportation modes and willingness to use these modes. A study in Regional
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Figure 6.6: Total improvement (red) of trikes and corresponding diminish-
ing returns (blue).
Plan Association [1997], for example, claims that commuters are much more
likely to use public transportation when living within a quarter mile of a station
than when further away. Furthermore, Kabra et al. [2015] shows that shorter
distances to available stations correlates with increased demand for bike-share
systems.
Model
Based on the findings described before, we say a station has a shortage if no
station within a quarter mile has at least 15% of its docks available. In other
words, a station is in shortage if a user intending to end their trip at that station
will likely have to search more than a quarter mile away to find an available
dock. Thus, stations in shortage significantly impact customer utilization.
We define a shortage measure for the system given by the total time stations
are in shortage. Formally, let N(s) ⊆ S be the set of neighboring stations within
a quarter mile of s, including s itself, and let As,t the indicator of the event that
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station s has at least 15% of its docks available at time t. For a set of stations S
and a set of points in time T , we define the shortage measure as
w(S ,T ) =
∑
s∈S
∑
t∈T
max{0, 1 −
∑
j∈N(s)
A j,t}.
It is possible to extend this measure to a weighted version that associates a
time-dependent coefficient based on dock demand to each station. Since the
unweighted version was the one that informed decision-making for NYCBS, we
restrict ourselves to that.
By placing a corral at a station s, the amount of time that stations in N(s) are
in shortage is significantly reduced. Given a budget B, the goal is to place at
most B corrals to minimize the shortage measure. For a set of past time points in
T ′, let
ws =
∑
t∈T ′
max{0, 1 −
∑
j∈N(s)
A j,t}.
This represents the amount of time that station s is in shortage and is equivalent
to the reduction in the shortage measure for s if a station in N(s) is assigned
a corral. It is then natural to model corral placement as a maximum coverage
problem via the following IP:
maximize x,y
∑
s∈S
wsxs
subject to: xs ≤
∑
s′∈N(s)
ys′ ∀s
∑
s∈S
ys ≤ B
xs, ys ∈ {0, 1} ∀s.
In the given IP, the variable ys represents whether or not a corral is placed at
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station s and the variable xs represents whether or not there is a corral placed
within a quarter mile from station s. The first constraint sets xs to be 0 if no corral
is assigned in N(s), and the second constraint corresponds to the constraint that
we can assign at most B corrals.
Results
The evaluation of our work in this section is two-fold. Given the real implemen-
tation of our suggested corrals by Citi Bike, we are able to observe the change in
shortages from 2015 (without corrals) to 2016 (with corrals). However, we cannot
be certain this corresponds 1-to-1 with a decrease in unsatisfied customers. Since
the presence/absence of these is in general difficult to measure, we also use
a discrete-event simulation to estimate the reduction in dissatisfied customers
through our choice of corrals.
Our discrete-event simulation is based on Poisson arrivals with fixed destina-
tions at each station. In contrast to the user dissatisfaction function described
in Chapter 3, the discrete-event simulation captures interdependencies between
stations. For instance, customers who do not find a dock at a particular station,
roam around to nearby stations until eventually they do. For details of the im-
plementation, we refer the reader to Jian et al. [2016] and O’Mahony [2015]; we
use the same simulation with the addition of allowing for some stations to have
temporarily increased capacity between 7.30AM and 5.30PM.
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Simulated Impact on Unsatisfied Customers
To compare the performance of our coverage formulation, we consider several
allocations of corrals (cf. Figure 6.7):
1. coverage ’15/’16 are the allocations of corrals obtained by solving the cover-
age problem using data from 10 days in June 2015, and June 2016 respec-
tively.
2. k-median is based only on the biking distance between separate stations.
Using the Google Maps API, we obtained pairwise distances and then
solved the resulting k-median instance.
3. max minutes relies only on the number of minutes a station had no docks
available in the month of May 2016.
4. None allocates no corrals at all.
Our results are visualized in Figure 6.7. Based on data from June 2016, we simu-
lated 40 realizations of demand and computed, using common random numbers,
for each realization and each allocation of corrals, the number of unsatisfied
customers. Notice first that adding corrals generally improves the objective
(though corrals can also increase the expected number of dissatisfied customers
and sometimes do, as the plot shows). Moreover, the solutions obtained from the
coverage formulation (run both with data from 2015 and with more current data
from 2016) outperforms the solutions that are based only on geography (k-median)
or only on the number of full minutes (max minutes): on average the two coverage
solutions observe 304 and 162 fewer unsatisfied customers, compared to just 4
fewer for the k-median solution.; the max minutes solutions ranks in the middle
with an average reduction of 77.
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Figure 6.7: Results of 40 simulated days with different sets of corrals; ×
denotes the average performance.
Observed Real Impact
Six corrals identified by the maximum coverage formulation (see Figure 6.8)
with B = 6 have been in place for most of Summer 2016. To evaluate the benefit
of these corrals, we first consider the value of the shortage measure in July
2016 (with the corrals) and in July 2015 (without). As the size of the system
has expanded significantly, we restricted the shortage measure to include only
stations S in Manhattan that were in use for most of July 2015 and July 2016. For
reference, |S | = 277. We find a 31.6% reduction in the time that stations were in
shortage. Further, to show that the majority of the improvement is indeed due
to the effects of the corrals, we also calculate the shortage measure in July 2015
and July 2016 for S¯ which excludes the stations with corrals from S . This should
give an idea as to how much the shortage measure has decreased through other
rebalancing efforts. Here, we only find a 14.6% improvement which shows that
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the majority of the improvement was due to the added corrals. Results of these
analyses are summarized in Figure 6.9.
Figure 6.8: Corral stations in NYC with 14-mile radius (Map data: Google
Maps).
S S¯
July 2015 49435 56989
July 2016 33804 48657
Percent Reduction 31.6% 14.6%
Figure 6.9: Shortage measure for July 2015 and July 2016.
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CHAPTER 7
SCHEDULING MAINTENANCE
Nina: Now you seem lonely and broken to me.
Will: I do?
Nina: But don’t worry I can fix you.
Most modern bike-sharing systems have mobile apps that allow users to observe
the current system state, i.e., number of bikes and number of available empty
docks, at each station. The information on these apps, however, can be mislead-
ing when maintenance issues arise. In particular, empty docks are sometimes
reported as available even though, in fact, maintenance issues cause them to
be unavailable. This can cause great customer dissatisfaction when all empty
dock(s) at a station are not usable. For example, Figure 7.1 displays a station
with one available dock – if that dock was broken, arriving customers would not
be able to return their bikes, despite the app reporting that a dock is available.1
The effect of a broken dock is thus amplified at a station where it is particularly
likely that this dock would be the last empty dock at the station. It is thus
natural to ask two questions to improve the operations of bike-sharing systems:
first, can we identify which docks are broken and second, how should the
operator schedule maintenance given knowledge of the location of broken docks.
We answered the first question by implementing a system for New York City
Bikeshare that automatically identifies broken docks based on data, similar to
Kaspi et al. [2016]. In response to the second question, we consider in this chapter
1The data at that station on that day, clearly indicates that the dock was not in fact broken, as
it saw repeated use.
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[h]
Figure 7.1: Screenshot from the Citi Bike app, taken on December 19th,
2017, indicating that the station at E 33 St & 5 Ave had one
empty dock available at the time.
a stylized version that models the routing question as a variation of the traveling
salesman problem. In this version, the goal is to maximize the reduction in
dissatisfied customers caused by broken docks by appropriately scheduling a
repairman over a finite time horizon to fix docks. The work in this chapter
appeared as part of a paper by Paul, Freund, Ferber, Shmoys, and Williamson
[2017].
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7.1 Problem Definition
In the classical traveling salesman problem, we are given an undirected graph
G = (V, E) with an edge cost ce ≥ 0 for each e ∈ E. The goal is to construct a tour
visiting each vertex in the graph while minimizing the cost of edges in the tour.
If, however, we are given a bound on the cost of the tour, then we might not be
able to visit all vertices. In particular, suppose that we are given a budget D ≥ 0
and a weight wv for each v ∈ V . In the budgeted prize-collecting traveling salesman
problem, a valid tour is a multiset of edges F such that (a) F specifies a tour on a
subset S ⊆ V and (b) the cost of the edges in F is at most D. The goal is to find
a valid tour F that maximizes
∑
v∈S wv, the weight of all vertices visited. Here,
we do not require the graph to be complete and allow a tour to visit nodes more
than once. Similarly, in the budgeted prize-collecting minimum spanning tree problem,
a valid tree is a set of edges T such that (a) T specifies a spanning tree on a subset
S ⊆ V and (b) the cost of the edges in T is at most D. Again, the goal is to find a
valid tree T that maximizes
∑
v∈S wv.
The budgeted version of the traveling salesman problem arises naturally in
many routing problems that have a distance or time constraint. For example, in
the maintenance application we consider here, D corresponds to the duration
of the repairman’s shift, whereas wv corresponds to the decrease in out-of-stock
events due to a dock being repaired. For example, a natural such weight would
correspond to the increase in the long-run average cost at the station when the
station size is reduced by 1. Throughout most of this chapter, we focus on the
tour version in a setting in which wv = 1 for all v ∈ V . In Section 7.6 we extend
our algorithm to handle settings in which vertices have weights and the goal is
to maximize the weight of vertices visited; in that section we also explain how
129
the analysis extends to the tree version. In Section 7.7, we apply our algorithm to
instances using Citi Bike data in New York City.
Our algorithm provides a 2-approximation guarantee for both problems. It
is based on a primal-dual subroutine which uses a linear programming relax-
ation of this problem. First, we search for a “good” value for the dual variable
corresponding to the budget constraint in the primal. Having set this variable,
we can then increase the other dual variables and form a forest of edges whose
corresponding dual constraint is tight. For the tour problem, we then choose a
tree in this forest and carefully prune it so that doubling this tree forms a tour
that will be just within budget. For the tree problem, we prune edges such that
the tree itself is just within budget. Lastly, we show that either our constructed
tour/tree is within a factor of 2 of optimal or we can identify a subgraph that
contains the optimal solution and that we can recurse on.
Literature Review
Before we delve into the technical details of this section, we give a brief overview
of the existing work in combinatorial optimization related to the budgeted prize-
collecting minimum spanning tree/tour problems. Many prize-collecting vari-
ants of both the traveling salesman problem (TSP) and the minimum spanning
tree problem (MST) seek to balance the number of vertices in the tree or tour with
the cost of edges used. Johnson et al. [2000] characterize four main variants of
prize-collecting MST problems: the Goemans-Williamson Minimization problem
that minimizes the cost of edges plus a penalty for vertices not in the tree, the Net
Worth Maximization problem that maximizes the weight of vertices in the tree
minus the cost of used edges, the Quota problem that minimizes the cost of a tree
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containing at least Q vertices, and, finally, the Budget problem that maximizes
the number of vertices in the tree subject to the cost of the tree being at most D.
All of the variants above can be extended to a corresponding TSP version that
constructs a tour rather than a tree.
Our algorithm is most similar to that of Garg [2005], who presents a 2-
approximation algorithm for the Quota problem for MST, improving upon the
previous results of Garg [1996], Arya and Ramesh [1998], and Blum et al. [1996].
Johnson et al. [2000] observe that a 2-approximation algorithm to the Quota
problem yields a (3 + )-approximation algorithm to the corresponding Budget
problem. To our knowledge this was the previously best-known guarantee for
the MST variant. Prior to this result, Levin [2004] proved a (4 + )-approximation
algorithm. Our 2-approximation algorithm for the budgeted prize-collecting
MST thus improves upon the best known approximation ratio. While our algo-
rithm is similar to that of Garg [2005], our analysis differs in how we find the
threshold value for the dual variable; further, our overall proof relies on more
precise accounting.
For the Goemans-Williamson Minimization problem for MST, Archer et al.
[2011] obtain a (2 − )-approximation guarantee, improving upon the long-
standing bound of 2 obtained by Goemans and Williamson [1995]. Further,
Archer et al. [2011] successfully applied this algorithm to telecommunication
network problems. Lastly, Feigenbaum et al. [2001] show the Net Worth Maxi-
mization problem for MST is NP-hard to approximate within any constant.
To the best of our knowledge, the previous best approximation guarantee
for the budgeted prize-collecting TSP arises from a special case of a result by
Chekuri et al. [2012]. Their work provides a (2 + )-approximation algorithm for
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the more general orienteering problem, where the goal is to find an s − t path,
where s and t are given, with bounded cost that maximizes the number of vertices
visited on the path. By setting s = t and iterating over all vertices, this yields
a (2 + )-approximation algorithm for the budgeted prize-collecting TSP. The
orienteering problem itself has attracted much attention within the combinatorial
optimization community, with other variants studied by Vidyarthi and Shukla
[2015], Chekuri and Korula [2007], Chen and Har-Peled [2006], Chekuri and Pal
[2005], and Gupta et al. [2012].
There exist other adaptations of prize-collecting problems not discussed
above. Specifically, Ausiello et al. [2004] present a 2-approximation algorithm for
an on-line variant of the Quota problem for the TSP. Frederickson and Wittman
[2012] study the so-called traveling repairmen problem, in which each vertex can
only be visited within a specific time window and the goal is to either maximize
the number of vertices visited within a certain time period or to minimize the
time visiting all vertices; they give constant-factor approximation algorithms
for both variations of this problem. Lastly, Nagarajan and Ravi [2012] study the
problem of minimizing the number of tours to cover all vertices subject to each
tour having bounded distance. They give a 2-approximation algorithm for tree
metric distances.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 7.2, we
present the linear programming (LP) relaxation for the budgeted prize-collecting
traveling salesman problem. In Section 7.3, we use this LP to develop the primal-
dual subroutine that will inform our decisions. In Section 7.4, we use this sub-
routine to present an outline of the entire parameterized primal-dual algorithm
and the proof of its approximation ratio, providing some intuition behind what
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types of tours will be near optimal. In Section 7.5, we prove an upper bound
on the size of an optimal solution. Next, we show how to set the dual variable
corresponding to the budget constraint and how to construct our proposed tour
that is within a factor of 2 of optimal. For ease of presentation, we present these
results for the budgeted prize-collecting traveling salesman problem with unit
weights and show how the analysis extends to the weighted case and the MST
version in Section 7.6. Last, we present computational experiments in Section 7.7.
7.2 LP Formulation
For each S ⊆ V , we denote by δ(S ) the edges in the cut of S and by zS ∈ {0, 1} a
variable representing whether or not the vertices in S are the ones on which the
tour is constructed; for each edge e ∈ E, we let xe ∈ Z+ be a variable representing
how many copies of e to include in the tour. Then, the following is a linear
programming relaxation for the budgeted prize-collecting traveling salesman
problem.
maximize
∑
S⊆V
|S |zS
subject to
∑
e:e∈δ(S )
xe ≥ 2
∑
T :S(T
zT ∀S ( V
∑
e∈E
cexe ≤ D∑
S⊆V
zS ≤ 1
zS , xe ≥ 0
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The first constraint states that if the tour visits the vertices in a subset T and
S ( T then we must have at least two edges across the cut S . The dual of this
linear program is given by the following.
minimize Λ1D + Λ2
subject to (2
∑
T :T(S
yT ) + Λ2 ≥ |S | ∀S ⊆ V
∑
S :e∈δ(S )
yS ≤ Λ1ce ∀e ∈ E
Λ1,Λ2, yS ≥ 0
In order to construct a tour, we rely on a primal-dual subroutine. We first note
that if we find Λ1 ≥ 0 and yS ≥ 0 that satisfy the dual constraint for each edge, then
we can always set Λ2 to be the maximum of 0 and λ2 := maxS⊆V
[
|S | − (2∑T :T(S yT )]
so that we have a feasible dual solution. Suppose that we first set the value of
Λ1. The primal-dual subroutine uses this value to construct a full dual solution
and corresponding potential tours. These tours might or might not be feasible
with respect to the budget constraint. Therefore, we need to adjust Λ1 to find a
feasible solution with bounded approximation ratio.
7.3 Primal-Dual Subroutine
The primal-dual subroutine for a fixed Λ1 is similar to the 2-approximation
algorithm for the prize-collecting traveling salesman problem without a budget
constraint presented by Goemans and Williamson [1995]. Similar to Goemans
and Williamson, we define a potential of a set S as a function of the dual variables
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of the strict subsets of S .
Definition 15. For any subset S ⊆ V , we define the potential of S to be
pi(S ) := |S | − (2
∑
T :T(S
yT ).
Definition 16. A subset S ⊆ V is neutral if 2
∑
T :T⊆S
yT = |S |. In other words, if
yS = 12pi(S ).
At the beginning of the primal-dual subroutine, we set each yS to be 0 and set
the collection of active sets to be all singleton nodes. Further, we set T = ∅. Then,
in each iteration, we increase yS corresponding to each S ⊆ V in the collection of
active sets until either a dual constraint for an edge between two sets becomes
tight, or a set becomes neutral. If an edge becomes tight between two subsets
S 1 and S 2, we add the edge to T and replace both S 1 and S 2 in the collection of
active sets by S 1 ∪ S 2. We remark that the potential of this new set S is then equal
to
pi(S ) = pi(S 1) + pi(S 2) − 2yS 1 − 2yS 2 .
If instead a set becomes neutral, we mark it inactive and remove it from the
collection of active sets. Once there are no more active sets, we prune inactive
sets of degree 1 (cf. Algorithm 1).
Since sets are removed from the set of active subsets when an incident edge
becomes tight, the dual constraint for every edge will remain satisfied throughout
the subroutine. Thus, λ1 and the yS satisfy the dual constraints for every edge and
we can extend them to a feasible dual solution (y, λ1, λ2). Further, by construction,
the dual constraint of every e ∈ T is tight and the edges in the set T , and thus also
those in T ′, form a forest throughout the subroutine. Finally, beyond being part of
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a feasible solution, the construction of y also guarantees that S = {S : yS > 0}, the
collection of all sets active at some point throughout the subroutine, is laminar.
Indeed, each set in S, other than singletons, is the union of two disjoint other
sets in S. We denote by S+ = S ∪ {V}, which is also laminar.2
Algorithm 1: Primal-Dual Algorithm (PD(λ1))
1: ∀S ⊆ VyS ← 0, Λ1 ← λ1, T ← {}.
2: mark each i ∈ V as active.
3: while there exists an active subset do
4: raise yS uniformly for all active subsets S until either
5: if an active set S becomes neutral then
6: mark S as inactive.
7: else if the dual constraint for edge e between S 1 and S 2 becomes tight
then
8: T ← T ∪ {e}.
9: mark S = S 1 ∪ S 2 as active, remove S 1 and S 2 from the active subsets.
10: end if
11: end while
12: T ′ ← T .
13: while there exists a set S marked inactive such that |δ(S ) ∩ T ′| = 1 do
14: remove all edges with at least one endpoint in S from T ′.
15: end while
16: return two of each edge in T ′.
2A collection of sets is called laminar if any two sets in the collection are either disjoint or
subsets of each other.
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7.4 Main Result
In this section, we give an outline of how the parameterized primal-dual al-
gorithm uses the primal-dual subroutine described in the previous section to
construct a feasible tour with bounded approximation guarantee. Assume that
we have run the primal-dual subroutine with Λ1 = λ1 to find a feasible dual
solution (y, λ1, λ2), where we may not know the actual value of λ2, along with an
accompanying forest of tight edges. The corresponding potentials will help us
give an upper bound on the size of an optimal solution and a lower bound on
the size of our returned solution in order to provide an overall approximation
guarantee. Let O? be the subset of vertices visited by an optimal tour and F?
be the edges in that tour. Further, let O be the minimal set in S+ that contains
O?. Since V ∈ S+, such a set always exists. In Section 7.5 we prove the following
bound on the size of O?.
Theorem 17.
|O?| ≤ λ1D + pi(O).
Next, we show how to set λ1 so that we can construct a tree TA of tight edges
on a subset S A with cost
∑
e∈TA ce ≤ 12D. Doubling the edges in TA and shortcutting
produces a tour on S A that has length at most D. Further, if the cost of TA is < 12D,
we show that we can find an incident edge e¯ such that adding e¯ to TA creates a
tree T¯ on a subset S¯ with cost
∑
e∈T¯ ce > 12D. In other words, adding one more
edge to TA makes doubling it infeasible. If instead the cost of TA is equal to 12D,
then we simply let T¯ = TA and S¯ = S A. Let Q be the maximum potential set in S+
containing S¯ . Then, we prove the following bound on |S A|.
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Theorem 18.
|S A| > 12λ1D + pi(Q) − 1.
Thus, the parameterized primal-dual algorithm can find a feasible tour on
a subset S A where |S A| is bounded using the potential pi(Q). If pi(Q) is large, this
implies that we have found a large subset our tour can visit. In particular, if
pi(Q) ≥ pi(O), then
|S A| + 1 > 12[λ1D + pi(O)] ≥
1
2
|O?|.
We may assume without loss of generality that |O?| is even, since we can always
make a copy of each vertex that has an edge of cost zero incident to the original.
Hence, the above implies that if pi(Q) ≥ pi(O), then |S A| ≥ 12 |O?|.
However, it may be that pi(Q) < pi(O). Therefore, the parameterized primal-
dual algorithm finds all maximal sets in S+ with potential strictly greater than
pi(Q) and recurses on the graph induced by each such set, returning the largest
feasible tour found. If pi(Q) < pi(O), then O must be a subset of one of the sets on
which we recurse. In other words, one of the subgraphs we recurse on contains
the optimal solution. Since none of the subsets on which we recurse contains S¯ ,
by definition of Q as the maximum potential set containing S¯ , we recurse only on
strict subgraphs of G, implying that we eventually reach the case that pi(O) ≤ pi(Q)
and |S A| ≥ 12O?, yielding the 2-approximation guarantee.
Finally, since S is a laminar family, we recurse on disjoint sets of vertices, so
the set of graphs on which we recurse is also a laminar family and we call the
subroutine O(n) times.
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Theorem 19. The parameterized primal-dual algorithm is a 2-approximation for the
budgeted prize-collecting traveling salesman problem.
7.5 Upper Bound
In this section, we provide the proof of Theorem 17. Recall that O is the minimal
set in S+ that contains the optimal subset O? and F? is an optimal tour on O?.
Assume that we have run the primal-dual subroutine with Λ1 = λ1 to obtain a
dual solution (y, λ1, λ2). Theorem 17 states that |O∗| ≤ λ1D + pi(O). The proof relies
on the feasibility of the dual solution along with the following lemma.
Lemma 20. For each S ⊆ V , (2
∑
T :T⊆S
yT ) ≤ |S |.
Proof. Any set S can be partitioned into maximal disjoint laminar subsets
S 1, S 2, . . . , S c ∈ S. Therefore,
2
∑
T :T⊆S
yT = 2
c∑
i=1
∑
T :T⊆S i
yT ≤
c∑
i=1
|S i| = |S |,
where the inequality holds since neutral subsets are marked inactive.
Proof of Theorem 17. We first note that we can partition the powerset of O into
subsets of O − O? and subsets that contain vertices in O?.
2
∑
T :T(O
yT = 2
∑
T :T⊆O−O?
yT + 2
∑
T :T(O
T∩O?,∅
yT . (7.1)
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Thus,
|O| = 2
∑
T :T(O
yT + pi(O)
= 2
∑
T :T⊆O−O?
yT + 2
∑
T :T(O
T∩O?,∅
yT + pi(O)
≤ |O − O?| + 2
∑
T :T(O
T∩O?,∅
yT + pi(O),
where the first line holds by the definition of potentials, the second by Equa-
tion (7.1), and the last line by Lemma 20. Rearranging, we get
|O?| ≤ 2
∑
T :T(O
T∩O?,∅
yT + pi(O)
≤
∑
e∈F?
∑
T :e∈δ(T )
yT + pi(O)
≤ λ1
∑
e∈F?
ce + pi(O)
≤ λ1D + pi(O).
The second line holds since F? is a tour on O? and so, by the minimality of O,
each subset T with yT > 0 that contains a subset of O? has at least two edges in
its cut δ(T ). The third line holds by the dual feasibility of (y, λ1, λ2), and the last
line holds by the primal feasibility of F?.
Setting Λ1
We now turn our attention to finding λ1 and constructing a feasible tour. Our
goal is to set Λ1 for the primal-dual subroutine so as to find a tree with cost very
close to 12D and such that the set of spanned vertices has high potential. Note that
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Λ1 controls the cost of the edges, and as Λ1 increases, edges become more expen-
sive yielding smaller connected components in the primal-dual subroutine. In
particular, for Λ1 = 0 all edges go tight immediately and for Λ1 > n/(2mine:ce>0 ce)
all vertices go neutral before a single non-zero edge goes tight. When edges go
tight and subsets go neutral at the same time, we may assume that subset events
are considered first. Further, we assume that we break edge/subset ties using
some known ordering (e.g., lexicographical).
If a minimum spanning tree on G has cost ≤ 12D, then we double this tree to
get a feasible and optimal tour. Otherwise, suppose that we have found values l
and r (l < r) such that when we run PD(l+) the largest component in T ′ has cost
≥ 12D and when we run PD(r−) the largest component in T ′ has cost < 12D. Here,
x− = x − ε and x+ = x + ε, where ε is infinitesimally small.
Lemma 21. In polynomial time, we can find a threshold value λ1 such that when we
run PD(λ−1 ) the largest component in T
′ has cost ≥ 12D and when we run PD(λ+1 ) the
largest component in T ′ has cost < 12D.
Proof. We refer to an edge going tight during the primal-dual subroutine as an
edge event and we refer to a subset going neutral as a subset event. Assume
we have values l and r such that the first k events are the same when running
the subroutine for any Λ1 between l+ and r−. Further, assume that for each
subset S we can find values αS and βS such that at the end of the first k events
yS = Λ1αS + βS for any Λ1 between l+ and r−. Note that this is trivially true for
the base case with l and r defined above and k = 0 since all y values will be zero.
To find the next event to occur, we need to find the time after the kth event
that each subset will go neutral and each edge will go tight. Observe that an
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Figure 7.2: Finding the subintervals between l and r where the time of the
next event is in bold.
active set S will go neutral at time
1
2
|S | −
∑
T⊆S
yT =
1
2
|S | −
∑
T⊆S
[Λ1αT + βT ],
an edge with exactly one endpoint in an active component will go tight at time
Λ1ce −
∑
T :e∈δ(T )
yT = Λ1ce −
∑
T :e∈δ(T )
[Λ1αT + βT ],
and an edge with both endpoints in different active components will go tight
at time 12 the above amount. The minimum of these values determines the next
event to occur. Since all of these times are affine in Λ1, we can divide the interval
between l+ and r− into smaller subintervals such that the first k + 1 events are
identical on these subintervals. See Figure 7.2.
Considering these subintervals, we either identify a threshold point λ1 or we
identify a subinterval between l+new and r−new such that when we run PD(l+new) the
largest component in T ′ has cost ≥ 12D and when we run PD(r−new) the largest
component in T ′ has cost < 12D. Further, since the time of the (k + 1)th event is an
affine function in Λ1, we can add this function to the affine function y(S ) for each
active set S to get the new affine function for this y value, updating the α’s and
β’s accordingly. Thus, the inductive hypothesis holds and eventually we find a
threshold point λ1.
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We use this threshold point λ1 to understand the subroutine for PD(λ1). Con-
sider running the subroutine for λ+1 and λ
−
1 and comparing event by event. We let
y+ correspond to the y variables when running PD(λ+1 ) and let y
− correspond to
the y variables when running PD(λ−1 ).
Lemma 22. Throughout the two subroutines, the following two properties hold:
• All active components in (V,T ) are the same.
• For all S ⊆ V , the difference between y+S and y−S is infinitesimally small.
Proof. At the start of the subroutines this is true since all y+ and y− variables are
zero. Now assume that it is true at some time t into the subroutines. As argued
above, the next event to occur depends on the minimum of functions linear in Λ1.
Further, since the current active components are the same, the possible subset
and edge events are the same.
In particular, the time for each subset to go neutral in PD(λ+1 ) is
1
2 |S | −
∑
T⊆S y+T ,
which is infinitesimally different from the time for that subset to go neutral in
PD(λ−1 ). Similarly, the time for each edge to go tight is at most infinitesimally
different between the two subroutines. Therefore, the next event to occur is only
different between the two subroutines if two events occur at the same time for
PD(λ1).
If the next event is the same for the two subroutines, then the active compo-
nents remain the same and we raise all active components by amounts differing
by an infinitesimally different amount. Therefore, the inductive properties con-
tinues to hold. Otherwise, suppose the next event is different. We consider four
cases:
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1. Subset X goes neutral for PD(λ−1 ) and subset Y goes neutral for PD(λ
+
1 ).
2. Edge e goes tight for PD(λ−1 ) and edge f goes tight for PD(λ
+
1 ).
3. Edge e goes tight for PD(λ−1 ) and subset X goes neutral for PD(λ
+
1 ).
4. Subset X goes neutral for PD(λ−1 ) and edge e goes tight for PD(λ
+
1 ).
In the first case, the times for both X and Y to go neutral must be infinitesimally
different and the other subset goes neutral immediately after the first. Therefore,
once both X and Y are neutral, the difference of the amounts by which we have
raised the y variables in PD(λ−1 ) and in PD(λ
+
1 ) is infinitesimally small and the
current active components are the same. Thus, the two inductive properties
continue to hold.
Similarly for the second case, if e and f are not between the same two compo-
nents, the other edge goes tight immediately after, and the inductive properties
continue to hold. Otherwise, e and f are between the same components. Thus,
when e goes tight, f is no longer eligible to go tight but the newly merged active
component is the same for both subroutines. Again, the inductive properties
continue to hold.
In the third case, if edge e has an endpoint in an active component that is
not X, then e goes tight immediately after X goes neutral for PD(λ+1 ) and the
components remain the same, maintaining the inductive properties. Otherwise,
one endpoint of e must be in X and the other endpoint of e is in an inactive
component, and right after e goes tight for PD(λ−1 ), the newly merged subset
has infinitesimally little potential left and goes inactive immediately thereafter.
Again, this maintains the inductive properties.
Lastly, note that the time for a subset to go neutral has a negative slope in Λ1
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and the time for an edge to go tight has a positive slope in Λ1. Since λ+1 > λ
−
1 and
the y variables vary by an infinitesimally small amount, the fourth case cannot
occur. In all cases, the inductive properties continue to hold, which concludes
the proof of the lemma.
The proof of Lemma 22 exactly exhibits the differences between the two
subroutines. First, there may be subsets that are neutral and marked inactive
in PD(λ+1 ) but have infinitesimally small potential in PD(λ
−
1 ). Second, there may
be pairs of edges that went tight between the same components. Lastly, there
may be edges in PD(λ−1 ) that do not exist in PD(λ
+
1 ). However, these edges
are between inactive components and components with infinitesimally small
potential. Therefore, these edges are pruned in PD(λ−1 ) and do not contribute to
the component of size ≥ 12D.
Assume that we run PD(λ1) breaking event ties to behave the same as PD(λ+1 ).
Then, the largest component in T ′ when running PD(λ1) has cost < 12D. However,
we can think about reversing these ties one by one. In particular, consider
breaking the first i ties according to PD(λ−1 ) and then the rest by PD(λ
+
1 ). By the
analysis in Lemma 22, reversing these ties changes the y variables only by an
infinitesimally small amount and does not at all affect the active components.
The only difference occurs when entering the pruning phrase.
Thus, eventually we find the smallest k such that breaking the first k ties
according to PD(λ−1 ) yields a component of size ≥ 12D. In other words, we have
either identified a neutral subset S such that marking S active rather than inactive
changes the largest component to have size ≥ 12D or we have identified two edges
e and f that tie such that adding e instead of f changes the largest component to
have size ≥ 12D. From here on, we assume that we always run PD(λ1) according
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to these tie-breaking rules.
Constructing a Tour
Continuing from the previous section, let y be the dual variables at the end
of running PD(λ1), let T ′ be the set of edges after the pruning phase, and let
S = {S : yS > 0} be defined as before. Lastly, let pi(S ) be the potential of S ⊆ V
given y. By construction, the largest component returned by PD(λ1) has size ≥ 12D.
Recall that either
1. there exists a neutral subset X ∈ S such that if X is marked inactive then
the largest component in T ′ has cost < 12D or
2. there exist tight edges e ∈ T and f < T such that if we swap e with f in T
then the largest component has size < 12D.
In the first case, when X is marked inactive, then a path of neutral subsets
N1,N2, . . . ,Nr = X is pruned yielding a component S 1 with cost < 12D. Similarly,
in the second case, edge e prevented some neutral subsets N1,N2, . . . ,Nr from
being pruned that had degree > 1. However, by removing e and replacing it with
f , these subsets are pruned and we are left with component S 1 with cost < 12D.
See Figures 7.3 and 7.4.
For both cases, we use this threshold event to produce a tree TA on a subset of
vertices S A of cost ≤ 12D. In doing so, we also find another tree T¯ on a subset of
vertices S¯ of cost ≥ 12D such that |S A| ≥ |S¯ | − 1. Then, doubling TA yields a feasible
tour FA that visits at most one node less than there are in S¯ . The tree T¯ will be
helpful in obtaining a lower bound for |S A|.
146
2.5in
(a) b
S 1
N1 N2 Nr = X
. . .
Figure 7.3: Case 1: Marking X as inactive.
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Figure 7.4: Case 2: Replacing e with f .
Figure 7.5: Neutral subsets pruned in each case to yield component S 1 with
cost < 12D.
We start by setting TA to be the edges in T ′ that span S 1. By construction,
these edges have cost < 12D. We then try to grow TA as much as possible along the
path from S 1 to N1,N2, . . . ,Nr. First, suppose that we can add this full path and
the edges that span each Ni to TA without exceeding cost 12D. Then, we set TA to
be this expanded tree and S A = S 1∪N1∪ . . .∪Nr. Further, we set T¯ to be the edges
in T ′ in the corresponding component at the end of PD(λ1). By construction, the
cost of T¯ is ≥ 12D and |S A| ≥ |S¯ |.
Otherwise, we continue to add N1, N2, . . . to our tree until we reach a com-
ponent X¯ ∈ {N1,N2, . . . ,Nr} such that adding the edges that span X¯ to TA implies
that
∑
e∈TA ce >
1
2D. In other words, we cannot add this whole subset to our tree
without going over budget. Let e = (u, v) be the edge that connects X¯ to TA in
T ′. If adding e to TA already brings the cost of TA strictly over 12D, then we stop
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Figure 7.6: Illustration of the pick procedure.
growing TA and set T¯ = TA ∪ {e}. Otherwise, we add e to TA and run a procedure
pick(X¯, v,TA) that picks a subset of the edges spanning X¯ including v.
Specifically, the procedure pick(X,w,TA) adds to TA a set of edges in T ′ that
span a subset of component X including w. We denote by X1, X2 ∈ S the two
components that merged to form X and by e′ = (u, v) the edge that connects X1
and X2 in T ′. Without loss of generality, u ∈ X1, v ∈ X2. Further, let T ′1 and T ′2 be
the edges in T ′ with both endpoints in X1 and X2, respectively. See Figure 7.6.
If the total cost of edges in TA∪T ′1 is greater than 12D, then we know we should
only add edges in this subtree to TA and we recursively invoke pick(X1,w,TA). If
instead the total cost of edges in TA∪T ′1∪ {e′} is less than 12D, then we can feasibly
add e′ and all edges in T ′1 without violating the budget. Thus, the procedure adds
all these edges to TA and recursively invokes pick(X2, v,TA) to pick the remaining
edges in T ′2. Finally, if the cost of edges in TA ∪ T ′1 is less than or equal to 12D,
but greater than 12D − ce′ , then we cannot quite make it to T ′2 without going over
budget. In this case, the procedure adds all edges in T ′1 to TA and sets T¯ = TA∪{e′}.
At the end of the procedure, we produce a tree TA of cost ≤ 12D that spans a
subset S A along with a tree T¯ of cost ≥ 12D that spans a subset S¯ where |S¯ | ≤ |S A|+1.
Further, if |S¯ | = |S A| + 1, then T¯ has cost > 12D. We will use T¯ to prove a bound on
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|S¯ |, which in turn will give a bound on |S A|.
Let Q ∈ S+ be the maximum potential subset containing S¯ . Our goal is to
prove Theorem 18, which states that
|S A| ≥ 12λ1D + pi(Q) − 1.
Our proof relies, informally speaking, on the vertex v¯ at which the pick
routine stopped. We define v¯ as the (unique) vertex in S¯ that has fewer edges
incident in T¯ than it does in T ; though many vertices in the graph have fewer
incident edges in T¯ than in T , the definition of the pick routine, combined with
the characterization in Figures 7.3 and 7.4 guarantees that only one of them is
in S¯ . Further, if |S¯ | > |S A|, then v¯ is exactly the one node in S¯ that is not in S A.
Before proving Theorem 18, we first state the following useful lemma, the proof
of which we delay to the end of the section as it closely closely resembles that of
Goemans and Williamson [1995] for the Prize-Collecting Steiner Tree Problem.
Lemma 23. ∑
e∈T¯
∑
S :e∈δ(S )
yS ≤ 2
∑
T :T∩S¯,∅
v¯<T
yT . (7.2)
Proof of Theorem 18. By construction of T¯ , vertices in Q − S¯ are either (i) in a
single set N ⊂ Q− S¯ that denotes the union of pruned subsets and sets Ni in Q that
were not reached by the pick procedure or (ii) in the set X¯ ∈ {N1,N2, . . . ,Np} set on
which we started our pick routine. Thus, we may partition Q = N ∪ (X¯ − S¯ ) ∪ S¯ .
Notice that N is a union of neutral subsets and thus itself neutral, that is,
|N| = 2
∑
T :T∈SN
yT .
Similarly, let SX be all subsets in S that are subsets of X¯ and contain vertices
in X¯ − S¯ . We may partition the subsets of X¯ into sets that contain nodes in X¯ − S¯
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and sets that do not; we then find (since X¯ is neutral)
|X¯| = 2
∑
T :T∈SX
yT + 2
∑
T :T⊆X¯∩S¯
yT ≤ 2
∑
T :T∈SX
yT + |X¯ ∩ S¯ |
where the inequality follows by Lemma 20. Thus, |X¯ − S¯ | ≤ 2∑T :T∈SX yT .
The definition of v¯ guarantees that any subset in S that contains vertices in S¯
and X¯ − S¯ also contains v¯. Therefore, subsets T that intersect with S¯ but do not
contain v¯ are neither in SN nor in SX. It follows that
|Q| = 2
∑
T :T⊆Q
yT + pi(Q)
≥ 2
∑
T :T∩S¯,∅
v¯<T
yT + 2
∑
T :T∈SN
yT + 2
∑
T :T∈SX
yT + pi(Q)
≥ 2
∑
T :T∩S¯,∅
v¯<T
yT + |N| + |X¯ − S¯ | + pi(Q)
= 2
∑
T :T∩S¯,∅
v¯<T
yT + |Q − S¯ | + pi(Q)
Rearranging,
|S¯ | ≥ 2
∑
T :T∩S¯,∅
v¯<T
yT + pi(Q) ≥
∑
e∈T¯
∑
S :e∈δ(S )
yS + pi(Q) = λ1 ·
∑
e∈T¯
ce + pi(Q).
The second inequality follows from Lemma 23, whereas the final equality is
due to the fact that the dual constraints are tight for all edges obtained by the
primal-dual subroutine. If |S¯ | = |S A|, this completes the proof of the theorem.
Else, suppose that |S¯ | = |S A| + 1. Then, ∑e∈T¯ ce > 12D, and the asserted inequality
still holds.
Proof of Lemma 23. Consider a single iteration of the algorithm, and let C be the
current set of components C such that |δ(C)∩ T¯ | ≥ 1. In other words, these are the
components incident to edges in T¯ . We can partition C into active components
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CA and inactive components CI . Further, let Cv¯ be the component that contains v¯.
We first show that active components are not incident to too many edges in T¯ on
average.
Starting with the graph (V, T¯ ), we consider the graph obtained by shrink-
ing each component in C to a single vertex and removing all vertices not in a
component in C. The remaining edges are a subset of T¯ and form a tree on C.
Further, the degree of each vertex v in this tree is dv = |δ(C) ∩ T¯ |, where C is the
corresponding component. We set R to be the set of vertices corresponding to
components in CA and set B be the set of vertices corresponding to components
in CI . Since the edges in T¯ form a tree on C,∑
v∈R
dv +
∑
v∈B
dv ≤ 2|R| + 2|B| − 2.
LetC be an inactive component such that |δ(C)∩T¯ | = 1. Note that |δ(C)∩T ′| > 1,
where T ′ is the set of all tight edges returned by the subroutine, since otherwise C
would have been pruned. Therefore, the other component incident to C was not
chosen to be part of T¯ . This implies that either C is X¯ or C is some X1 encountered
during the picking procedure such that we only chose vertices in X1 and not X2.
In either case, v¯ ∈ C.
IfCv¯ ∈ CI , then this is the only component in B of degree 1 and ∑v∈B dv ≥ 2|B|−1.
In other words,
∑
C∈CA
|δ(C) ∩ T¯ | =
∑
v∈R
dv ≤ 2|R| − 1 = 2|CA| − 1 (7.3)
Otherwise,Cv¯ ∈ CA and all vertices in B have degree at least 2. Thus, ∑v∈B dv ≥ 2|B|.
This implies that ∑
C∈CA
|δ(C) ∩ T¯ | ≤ 2|R| − 2 = 2|CA| − 2. (7.4)
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We now prove the main claim in Equation (7.2) using a proof by induction.
At the start of the algorithm, the LHS and RHS are both equal to 0. On each
iteration, let CA be the set of active components C such that |δ(C) ∩ T¯ | ≥ 1 and let
Cv¯ be the component containing v¯. Suppose that we raise yCi by ε for every active
component Ci. The LHS of the claim is raised by
∑
C∈CA |δ(C) ∩ T¯ |ε. If Cv¯ ∈ CI,
then the RHS is raised by exactly 2|CA|ε. By Equation (7.3), the LHS < RHS. If,
on the other hand, Cv¯ ∈ CA, then the RHS is raised by exactly 2(|CA| − 1)ε. By
Equation (7.4), the LHS < RHS. In both cases, the inductive statement continues
to hold.
7.6 Extensions
In this section, we show that the parameterized primal-dual algorithm extends to
the weighted version and the minimum spanning tree problem. For the weighted
case, we assume that each vertex v is associated with an integer weight pv ≥ 0
and the goal is to find a feasible tour F that visits a subset S ⊆ V to maximize∑
v∈S pv. We can imagine transforming this problem to an equivalent unweighted
version by creating copies of each vertex v with zero cost edges to v. Then in the
primal-dual subroutine, all these added edges go tight instantaneously, yielding
a weighted “cluster” with potential equal to pv. Thus, we don’t even need to
perform the transformation and can actually just begin the algorithm with these
weighted clusters as our initial active sets with potential equal to the weight of v.
All proofs continue to hold through the equivalence to the unweighted version.
Theorem 24. The parameterized primal-dual algorithm is a 2-approximation for the
budgeted prize-collecting traveling salesman problem with weights.
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Second, we discuss the extension of the algorithm to the budgeted prize-
collecting minimum spanning tree problem. The corresponding linear pro-
gramming relaxation for the budgeted prize-collecting minimum spanning tree
problem is given below.
maximize
∑
S⊆V
|S |zS
subject to
∑
e:e∈δ(S )
xe ≥
∑
T :S(T
zT ∀S ( V
∑
e∈E
cexe ≤ D∑
S⊆V
zS ≤ 1
zS , xe ≥ 0
The only difference is the removal of the factor of 2 from the first constraint
which changes the dual constraint associated with each subset S to become
∑
T :T(S
yT + Λ2 ≥ |S | ∀S ⊆ V.
Based on this change, we redefine the potential of a set to be
pi(S ) = |S | −
∑
T :T(S
yT
and a set to be neutral if
∑
T :T⊆S yT = |S |. Given these new definitions, the primal-
dual subroutine runs exactly as it did before. Finally, we set the threshold value
λ1 such that the largest component in T ′ after running PD(λ−1 ) has cost ≥ D and
the largest component in T ′ after running PD(λ+1 ) has cost < D. We then run the
pick procedure to find a tree just within budget D. It is easily verified that all
proofs continue to hold for this variant.
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Theorem 25. The parameterized primal-dual algorithm is a 2-approximation for the
budgeted prize-collecting minimum spanning tree problem.
7.7 Computational Experiments
In this section, we complete computational experiments in order to better under-
stand the performance of our algorithm in practice. The primal-dual algorithm
as detailed in this section was implemented in C++11 using binary search to
find λ1. The experiments were conducted on a Dell R620 with two Intel 2.70GHz
8-core processors and 96GB of RAM.
The first set of graphs we used for the experiments are the 37 symmetric TSP
instances with at most 400 nodes in the TSPLIB data set (Reinelt [1991]). The
second set of graphs are 37 weighted instances constructed using the Citi Bike
network of bikesharing stations in New York City. Each instance corresponds to
a week of usage data at these stations, and the weight of a vertex corresponds
to the number of broken docks at that station during that week. The number of
broken docks was estimated from usage data with a probabilistic method similar
to that of Kaspi et al. [2016]. Details about both types of constructed instances
are given in Table 7.1.
For each test graph G, we first found an upper bound on the cost of a tour
by computing 2 times the cost of a minimum spanning tree in G. We then set
the budget for our tour to be f = 25%, 50%, or 75% of this upper bound. W
denotes the total weight of the vertices; for TSPLIB instances, this is the number
of vertices. After finding our solution of weight A, we compute an upper bound
on the weight of visited vertices U = min(λ1D + maxS∈S pi(S ),W) and record the
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Instance |V | |E| Total Vertex Weight
TSPLIB 158.14 15658.43 158.14
Bike 319.54 4634.77 1302.51
Table 7.1: Graph statistics for each group of graphs averaged over all in-
stances.
Instance f Time (s) Recursions % Opt. Gap % Weight % Budget
TSPLIB 0.25 74.16 0.59 46.67 33.06 77.38
TSPLIB 0.5 72.61 0.14 41.89 58.08 69.89
TSPLIB 0.75 71.24 0.22 18.62 81.38 68.80
Bike 0.25 25.15 0.28 45.74 43.37 66.90
Bike 0.5 33.21 0.28 25.89 74.01 67.13
Bike 0.75 30.46 0.05 8.29 91.68 67.37
Table 7.2: Computational results of the primal-dual algorithm for each
group of graphs and budget with results averaged over all in-
stances.
percent optimality gap as 100 × (U − A)/U. Results are given in Table 7.2. The
column headed % Weight gives the percentage of the total weight W captured by
the constructed tour, and the one headed % Budget gives the percentage of the
distance budget used after shortcutting the tree.
We report several interesting structural results. First, the average time seems
to be heavily influenced by the number of edges; the bike instances were quicker
to complete even though the average number of nodes was higher. However,
the average time does not seem to grow with the budget (and hence with the
size of the computed solution) since most of the time is spent finding λ1. The
average optimality gap, on the other hand, does improve with the budget. This
is likely due to the fact that for larger budgets the upper bound is given by W
rather than λ1D + maxS∈S pi(S ). Also of interest is that maxS∈S pi(S ) contributed
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f 0.25 0.5 0.75
% Opt. Gap without Virtual Budgets 45.74% 25.89% 8.29%
% Opt. Gap with Virtual Budgets 27.96% 11.87% 0.17%
Table 7.3: Improvement of Optimality Gap using Virtual Budgets.
little to our upper bound U. As a result, our optimality gaps depend mostly on
the value of λ1, rather than the potentials, and might be far from tight. However,
the fact that on average we only use around 2/3 of the distance budget implies
that the solutions could be improved as well. To ensure that we use a larger part
of the budget, we ran further experiments on the Citi Bike instances; in these, we
ran binary search over possible virtual budgets in the input until finding one for
which the resulting tour uses at least 90% of the actual budget. This significantly
reduced our optimality gaps as shown in Table 7.3.
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CHAPTER 8
INDUSTRY IMPACT
Will: How much of what you’re saying do you believe right now?
Charlie: 60%
Will: I thought it was in the mid-80s. You pulled it off.
Charlie: Experience.
The work in this part has seen widespread use in bike-sharing systems across
the United States. Here, we briefly summarize aspects that have been imple-
mented and ones that have not – for the latter, we highlight some of the obstacles
we faced in implementing them.
Allocation of Capacity. The analysis we introduced in Chapter 4 has affected
the design of several BSSs operated by Motivate. As described in Section 4.5, a
pilot in New York City involved the movement of 34 docks. Since then, the Divvy
system in Chicago moved a total of 200 docks. Further, all systems operated
by Motivate, including D.C. and Boston, now run the analyses biannually to
ensure they capture the potential of underutilized docks as a sustainable way
to improve service delivery. Motivate’s own analysis, based on the cost of
reallocating capacity, the cost of rebalancing bikes, and the reduction in out-of-
stock events due to reallocated capacity, indicates that the cost of reallocating
amortizes within just 2 weeks! It thereby exemplifies the value of a data-driven
system design in practice.
Incentive Scheme. The scope of the Bike Angels program in New York City
has continuously increased since we first piloted it in October 2015. As of early
2017 it accounted for 10% of Citi Bike’s rebalancing (Grabar [2017]) at a much
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lower cost than other forms of rebalancing. In fact, its success has since also led
to its adoption by Ford GoBike in the San Francisco Bay Area. In practice, the
program is more complicated than the focus of Chapter 5, allowing participants to
earn duplicate points etc. Nevertheless, the UDFs drive the underlying analytics
based on essentially the exact logic described in the chapter. Furthermore, it was
our analysis that drove the decision to adopt a dynamic incentive scheme.
Rebalancing. In chapter 6, we provided models and solutions for three
different optimization problems that arise when rebalancing bike-share systems.
Of the three methods discussed, only the corral plan was implemented in its
entirety:it was in place during the summer of 2016. The trailer formulation was
never fully implemented, but it did identify pairs of stations that had trailers
added after discussions with Citi Bike. Furthermore, our corral analysis demon-
strated that even just a few corrals can have significant improvement for users’
ability to access the system. The overnight rebalancing failed to become a part of
Citi Bike’s operations (beyond the pilots), mostly due to the complexity of the
real-world operations discussed in Section 6.2. In a subsequent research project,
two Cornell undergraduates (Shangdi Yu and Ellen Chen) built a web-tool that
might yet be adopted for operations. The main reason this has not yet occurred
is due to the existing decision aid, based on O’Mahony [2015] that is already
in place. In this case, one could claim that good was the enemy of great: the
existence of a well-working decision aid hindered the adoption of a more sophis-
ticated routing tool. This is despite the routing formulation improving 20% on
average.
Maintenance. The contribution of Chapter 7 is mostly of theoretical nature.
In practice, maintenance scheduling involves more than one repairman and
158
would require solving a rooted version for each one; also, rather than only
focusing on dissatisfied users, service-level agreements between operators and
cities force high priority on docks that have been explicitly reported by customers.
That being said, the model was originally inspired by the development of the
analytics we developed for Citi Bike to identify broken docks (cf. Figure 1.4).
These are still in use with an accuracy of more than 90% in identifying docks that
are either defective or about to break.
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Part II
Queuing Network Models for
Shared Vehicle Systems
160
Far outpacing bike-sharing systems, ride-sharing systems, such as Uber and
Lyft, are fast becoming essential components of the urban transit infrastructure.
In such systems, passengers can request rides (subject to vehicle availability)
between a large number of source-destination locations. In contrast to bike-
sharing systems, vehicles in ride-sharing systems are operated by independent
drivers (units).
Similar to bike-sharing systems, ride-sharing systems experience inefficiencies
due to limited supply (drivers) and demand heterogeneity across time and space.
These inefficiencies, however, can often be greatly reduced through operational
controls. Pricing has traditionally been the main tool to balance demand and
supply in settings with limited supply and heterogeneous demand: for instance,
in limited-item auctions or airplane/hotel reservations, see Hartline [2016] and
Gallego and Van Ryzin [1994]. In contrast to bike-sharing systems, ride-sharing
platforms have also long utilized dynamic pricing. Ride-sharing systems can
also balance demand and supply through other controls, such as repositioning
empty vehicles (idle drivers), or redirecting customers to nearby locations (cf.
Sections 9.1, 10.1). Moreover, these tools can be used towards achieving different
objectives – examples include revenue/welfare/throughput maximization, and
multi-objective settings such as Ramsey pricing.
In contrast to other limited supply settings, however, shared vehicle settings
are more challenging due to two unique features. The first is the presence of spa-
tial and temporal supply externalities: whenever a customer engages a vehicle, this
not only decreases the instantaneous availability at the source location, but also
affects the future availability at all other locations in the system. The other dis-
tinguishing feature is the high frequency of events (passenger arrivals/rides) in
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such settings: in New York City, 10017 Citi Bikes were used for an average 62,605
trips/day in September 2017 (NYCBS [2017c]), whereas in October 2016, Uber av-
eraged 226,046 rides per day delivered by 46,000 drivers (Hu [2017]) – with each
driver working at most 12 consecutive hours (Hawkins [2016]). These distinc-
tions necessitate treating the problem as an infinite-horizon control problem, as
opposed to finite-horizon dynamic programming approaches used in traditional
transportation and revenue management settings (Gallego and Van Ryzin [1994],
Adelman [2007]). The high frequency of events tends to drive such systems into
operating under a dynamic equilibrium state, jointly determined by the demand
and supply characteristics as well as the chosen controls; the performance of any
pricing/control policy is determined by this equilibrium.
All the above features (limited supply, demand heterogeneity, supply ex-
ternalities and fast operational timescales) are well captured by closed queueing
network models (cf. Serfozo [1999], Kelly [2011]), which are thus widely adopted
in recent research on ride-sharing systems (George [2012], Zhang and Pavone
[2016], Waserhole and Jost [2014], Braverman et al. [2016], Ozkan and Ward
[2016]). These models use a Markov chain to track the number of vehicles across
locations. Each location experiences a stream of arriving customers, who engage
available vehicles and take them to their desired destination. For example, in-
creasing the price for a ride between a pair of stations decreases the number of
customers willing to take that ride, which over time affects the distribution of
vehicles across all stations. Even though such models can be well-calibrated,
based on demand rates and price elasticities estimated from historical data, the
problem of designing good pricing/control policies under such a model is com-
plex due to a combination of high dimensionality and intrinsic non-concavity
of the optimization problem (cf. Section 9.2.1). Consequently, previous work
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has focused only on a narrow set of objectives (typically, weighted throughput)
and is largely based on heuristics or simulation/numerical techniques, with few
provable guarantees (cf. Section 9.1 for a discussion). Algorithms for other objec-
tives (e.g. revenue and welfare) as well as more complex constrained settings,
have yet to be addressed.
In this context, our work develops the first efficient algorithms for designing
pricing and control policies in closed queueing networks, with approximation guarantees
for a large class of objectives. More generally, we provide a unified framework
for designing rebalancing policies, which can incorporate a variety of controls
and constraints, including multi-objective settings and incorporating travel time
distributions. In all settings, we obtain parameterized performance guarantees,
which improve with the number of vehicles in the system, and are near-optimal in
the parameter regimes of real systems. Moreover, our guarantees also provide an
elementary proof of the asymptotic optimality of our policies under the so-called
large-market scaling (see Braverman et al. [2016] and Ozkan and Ward [2016]),
without necessitating the derivation of the associated fluid limits. Our main
guarantee (cf. Section 9.3) leverages techniques from convex optimization and
approximation algorithms, and combines these with a novel infinite projection
and pullback technique. Given the widespread use of closed queueing models
for a variety of other applications, we anticipate that our framework will prove
useful in other areas as well.
Outline
In Section 9.1 we begin with a detailed review of recent research involving
stochastic models of ride-sharing systems. Next, we formally define the basic
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version of our model in Section 9.2: there, pricing is the only control available and
rides experience no transit delays. As a primary example, we focus in Section 9.3
on this basic version with the objective given by throughput; this allows us to
highlight our main technical contribution (cf. Section 9.3).
Throughout, we model a shared vehicle system with m vehicles and n stations
as a continuous-time finite-state Markov chain (CTMC) that tracks the number
of drivers (units) at each station (node), and use this to study a variety of pricing
and control problems. A high-level description of our most basic model is as
follows (cf. Section 9.2 for details). Each station in the system observes a Poisson
arrival of customers. Arriving customers draw a value and a destination from
some known distribution. Upon arrival at a station, the customer is quoted a
price and one of three scenarios occurs: i) the customer is not willing to pay
the price, i.e., the price exceeds her value, and she leaves the system; ii) the
customer is willing to pay the price, but no unit is available at the node; therefore
she again leaves the system; or iii) the customer is willing to pay the price,
and a vehicle is available. A ride occurs only in the final case with the vehicle
moving to the customer’s destination; the number of vehicles at the origin is
decremented instantaneously, while the state at the destination is incremented
either instantaneously (cf. Section 9.3), or more generally, after some random time
interval (cf. Section 10.2). This describes the basic dynamics under which we aim
to maximize the long-run average performance, measured by the throughput,
the social welfare, or the revenue obtained in steady-state. The prices can, in
general, depend on the instantaneous state of the system. Thus, the resulting
optimization problem is high-dimensional, and moreover, it is non-convex even
in basic settings (cf. Section 9.2.1).
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In Section 9.3, we propose a simple pricing policy, based on optimizing over a
novel convex relaxation, which we term the elevated flow relaxation. We adapt the
objective by identifying a concave pointwise upper bound which we call elevated
objective. Furthermore, we introduce additional flow-conservation constraints to
capture the network externalities. As the elevated objective is bounded below by
the original objective, optimal solutions in the elevated optimization problem
are bounded below in value by optimal solutions in the original optimization
problem.
In Section 9.3.2, we present our approximation guarantee: we show that
the elevated flow relaxation can be efficiently solved to derive a pricing policy
which has an approximation ratio of 1 + (n − 1)/m. Even though we consider
general state-dependent pricing policies, the policy that achieves our guarantee
surprisingly turns out to be state-independent, i.e. the prices do not differ based
on the configuration of units across nodes. The idea of the proof is based on the
following three steps:
1. First, we notice that, for any state-dependent policy in the m-unit system
(and therefore also for the optimal policy), there exists a feasible solution in
our relaxation that upper bounds its value. Hence, the elevated value of our
policy upper bounds the original objective of the optimal state-dependent
policy in the m-unit system.
2. Next, we observe that the elevated objective of our policy is equal to the
original objective under an appropriately defined infinite-supply setting. In
particular, we consider a restricted subset of state-independent pricing policies,
under which the resulting CTMC has the structure of a so-called closed
Jackson network, and prove that as the number of vehicles grows to infinity,
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the elevated objective collapses to the original objective.
3. Last, we show that the performance of any policy in the m-unit setting
approximates its performance in the infinite-supply setting within a factor
of 1 + (n − 1)/m. Though the intuition behind this pull-back step can be
seen via simple stochastic coupling arguments, we provide a fully algebraic
proof based on a combinatorial construction of a biregular graph that relates
the state spaces of the m- and (m − 1)-unit systems.
After formalizing these ideas for the simplest of settings in Section 9.3.2, we
show in Chapter 10 how the above framework, comprising of a policy derived
via an appropriate elevated flow relaxation, and the three-step process to prove
its guarantees, can be applied in a number of related settings:
• We first turn our attention to objectives beyond throughput like social
welfare and revenue. Next, we consider multiobjective settings in which
the goal is to maximize one objective subject to a lower bound on another,
the so-called Ramsey pricing problem (Ramsey [1927]): designing a pricing
policy to maximize system revenue subject to a lower bound on the system
welfare. This is particularly relevant when systems are operated by private
companies in close partnership with city governments. For instance, the
Citi Bike system in New York City is run by Motivate, a private company,
under service-level agreements with the NYC Department of Transporta-
tion. Note that the complementary problem (maximizing welfare subject
to revenue constraints) is of interest when such systems are managed by
non-profit organizations and is considered in other paradigms such as
the FCC spectrum auction (Milgrom and Segal [2014]). In this context we
demonstrate how our approach can be used to obtain a (γ, γ) bicriteria
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approximation guarantee with γ = (1 + n−1m ).
• Next, we study two other rebalancing controls considered in the literature,
and obtain 1 + (n − 1)/m approximation guarantees for the respective op-
timization problems. In the first, units can be directed to a new location
after ending a trip; in the second, customers can be matched to units at
neighboring nodes. In both cases, we recover and strengthen the previous
results.
• We conclude Chapter 10 with the study of settings in which rides do not
occur instantaneously but instead require some delay (travel time). Our
results in this section provide an elementary proof of the so-called large-
market optimality (Braverman et al. [2016]) of our algorithms. Further, they
characterize an interesting dichotomy between settings in which conver-
gence can happen at a rate no more than the square-root of the vehicles on
the one hand and settings in which convergence happens can happen at a
linear rate.
This part is based on Banerjee, Freund, and Lykouris 2017; our results recover
and unify many existing results in this area, and provide a general framework
for deriving approximation algorithms for many other settings. Moreover, the
guarantees we obtain are close to 1 for realistic system parameters. For instance,
for the parameters (m = 10000, n = 600) of New York City’s Citi Bike system in
summer 2016, we obtain an approximation ratio of 1.06.
167
CHAPTER 9
A BASIC MODEL
”I left my purse up at the office. And I’ll need some cash for the cab.
And for the cab tomorrow morning.” — MacKenzie McHale
9.1 Related work
There is a large literature on characterizing open and closed queueing network
models, building on seminal work of Jackson [1963], Gordon and Newell [1967],
and al. Baskett et al. [1975]; the books by Kelly [2011] and Serfozo [1999] provide
an excellent summary. Optimal resource allocation in open queueing networks
also has a long history, going back to the work of Whittle [1985]. However,
there is much less work for closed networks, in part due to the presence of a
normalization constant for which there is no closed-form (though it is computable
in O(nm) time via iterative techniques Buzen [1973], Reiser and Lavenberg [1980]).
Most existing work on optimizing closed queueing networks use heuristics, with
limited or no guarantees. In contrast, our work focuses on obtaining algorithms
with provable guarantees for a wide range of problems.
Three popular approaches for closed queueing network optimization in the
literature are: (i) using open queueing network approximations, (ii) heuristically
imposing a ‘fairness’ property, which we refer to as the demand circulation
constraint (cf. Section 9.3.1), and (iii) characterizing the fluid limits of closed
queueing networks, and obtaining solutions that are optimal in these scaling
regimes. We now briefly describe each approach.
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The first approach was formalized by Whitt [1984], via the fixed-population-
mean (FPM) method, where exogenous arrival rates are chosen to ensure the
mean population is m. It has since been used in many applications; for example,
Brooks et al. [2013] use it to derive policies for matching debris removal vehicles
to routes following natural disasters. Performance guarantees however are
available only in restricted settings.
Another line of work is based on heuristics that enforce the demand circu-
lation property (variously referred to as the demand rebalancing, the fairness,
or the bottleneck property). In transportation settings, George [2012] used these
to optimize weighted throughput, Zhang and Pavone [2016] to minimize rebal-
ancing costs . Most works typically only provide asymptotic guarantees (George
et al. [2012]).
More recently, Ozkan and Ward [2016] and Braverman et al. [2016] charac-
terized appropriate fluid (or large-market) limits for closed queueing networks,
and used it to study the operations of ride-sharing systems. In contrast to our
work, which focuses on optimizing a given finite-m system, these works consider
a regime where m and the arrival rates of passengers together scale to ∞, and
characterize the optimal policy in the limit. Within this limit, the former studied
the assignment of customers to nearby drivers, whereas the latter considered
directing drivers at the end of each trip to under-served locations. Our exten-
sions to settings beyond pricing (cf. Section 10.1) are inspired by these works;
in particular, we show that similar scaling results can be derived within our
framework. Moreover, our work provides guarantees for the resulting policies in
the finite case (i.e., before taking the limit), and also against a much more general
class of state-dependent policies.
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The closest work to ours is that of Waserhole and Jost [2014], who provide
a pricing policy for maximizing throughput in closed queueing networks, with
the same approximation ratio we obtain. They do this via a different argument
wherein they observe that, under the demand circulation property, the Markov
chain is doubly stochastic, and hence has a uniform distribution (this was also
noted earlier by Whitt [1984]). A simple counting argument then implies that
the probability of a station having a vehicle is m/(m + n − 1). Moreover, since the
maximum throughput under any policy is bounded by the maximum demand
circulation, the maximum throughput under demand circulation is within a
m/(m+n−1) factor of the optimum. This argument is finely tuned to this particular
setting (maximizing throughput via pricing with no delays). In contrast, our
approach can accommodate several objectives and rebalancing controls as well
as delays.
Finally, we note that there is a parallel line of work which tackles settings
with dynamic arrivals and pricing, using techniques from approximate dynamic
programming (Adelman [2007], Hampshire et al. [2009]). These typically can deal
only with small systems, as their dimensionality scales rapidly with the number
of stations; moreover, many of the techniques have no provable guarantees.
In contrast, the flavor of results of Levi and Radovanovic [2010] are somewhat
similar to ours: they study a setting in which a knapsack constraint exists on used
resources, contrasting our network constraints. Similar to our results, they also
use a LP relaxation to obtain approximation guarantees for parameter regimes of
interest and optimal results for asymptotic regimes.
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9.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first formally define our model of shared vehicle systems
and formulate the optimal pricing problem. To capture the complex network
externalities of the system, we define a probabilistic model of customer arrivals,
which we analyze in steady state. Subsequently, we introduce known results
from the queuing literature that provide the technical background upon which
our analysis relies. Finally, we present an example that shows that even in
the restricted sets of pricing policies, that are independent of the configuration
of vehicles across the system, the optimization problems we consider are non-
convex.
9.2.1 Basic setting
We consider a system with m units (corresponding to vehicles) and n nodes
(corresponding to stations). Customers traveling between nodes i and j arrive at
node i according to a Poisson process of rate φi j. Each customer traveling from
i to j has a value drawn independently from a distribution Fi j(·). We assume
that Fi j has a density and that all values are positive with some probability, i.e.
Fi j(0) < 1. Upon arrival at i, a customer is quoted a price pi j, and engages a unit
if her value exceeds this price, i.e. with probability 1 − Fi j(pi j), and at least one
unit is available at node i; else she leaves the system.
As is common with pricing, the related optimization problems are often more
easily framed in terms of the inverse demand (or quantile) function associated
with the user as qi j = 1 − Fi j(pi j). For ease of presentation we assume that the
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density of Fi j is positive everywhere in its domain, implying that there is a 1-1
mapping between prices and quantiles. As Fi j is therefore invertible, we can
write pi j = F−1i j (1 − qi j). This allows us to abuse notation throughout the paper by
using prices and quantiles interchangeably.
A continuous-time Markov chain tracks the number of units across nodes.
At time t ≥ 0, the state of the Markov chain X(t) = (X1(t), . . . , Xn(t)) contains the
number of units Xi(t) present at each node i. The state space of the system is
denoted by Sn,m =
{
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Nn0|
∑
i xi = m
}
. Throughout the paper we use
X(t), Xi(t) to indicate random variables, and x, xi to denote specific elements of
the state space. Note that the state-space is finite; moreover, |Sn,m| =
(
m+n−1
n−1
)
=
Ω(mn). Since our focus is on the long-run average performance, i.e. system
performance under the steady state of the Markov chain, we henceforth suppress
the dependence on t for ease of notation.
For ease of presentation, we assume that rides between nodes occur without
delay. In the context of our model, this translates into an instantaneous state
transition from X to X− ei + e j when a customer engages a unit to travel from i to
j (where ei denotes the ith canonical unit vector). We relax this assumption in
Section 10.2.
Pricing Policies and Objectives
We consider pricing policies that select point-to-point prices pi j as a function of
the overall state X. Formally, given arrival rates and demand elasticities {φi j, Fi j(·)},
we want to design a pricing policy p(·) = {pi j(·)}, where each pi j : Sn,m → R∪{±∞}
maps the state to a price for a ride between i and j. Equivalently, we want to
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select quantiles q(·) = {qi j} where each qi j : Sn,m → [0, 1]. For a fixed pricing
policy p with corresponding quantiles q, the effective demand stream from i to j
(i.e. customers traveling from node i to j with value exceeding pi j) thus follows
a state-dependent Poisson process with rate φi jqi j(X). This follows from the
notion of probabilistic thinning of a Poisson process – the rate of customers
wanting to travel from i to j is a Poisson process of rate φi j, and each customer
is independently willing to pay pi j with probability qi j = 1 − Fi j(pi j). State-
dependent prices also allow us to capture unavailability by defining qi j(x) =
0 if xi = 0 (i.e. a customer with origin i is always turned away if there are
no units at that station; recall we defined Fi j(∞) = 1). Thus, a pricing policy
p, along with arrival rates and demand elasticities {φi j, Fi j(·)}, determines the
transitions of the Markov chain. Note that this is a finite-state Markov chain,
and furthermore, is irreducible under weak assumptions on the prices and the
demand (cf. Appendix 13.1); hence, it has a unique steady-state distribution pi(·)
with pi(x) ≥ 0∀ x ∈ Sn,m and ∑x∈Sn,m pi(x) = 1.
Our goal is to design a pricing policy p to maximize the steady-state perfor-
mance under various objectives. In particular, we consider objective functions
that decompose into per-ride reward functions Ii j : R→ R, which correspond to
the reward obtained from a customer engaging a ride between stations i and j
at price p. The per-ride rewards corresponding to the three canonical objective
functions are:
• Throughput: the total rate of rides in the system; for this, we set ITi j(p) = 1.
• Social welfare: the per-ride contribution to welfare is given by IWi j (p) =
EV∼Fi j
[
V |V ≥ p].
• Revenue: to find the system’s revenue rate, we can set IRi j(p) = p.
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We abuse notation to define Ii j(q) , Ii j(F−1i j (1 − q)) as a function of the quantile
instead of the price. We also define the reward curves Ri j(q) B q·Ii j(q) (analogous to
the notion of revenue curves; cf. Hartline [2016]). Our results require the technical
condition that Ri j(q) are concave in q, which implies that Ii j(q) are non-increasing
in q (equivalently Ii j(p) are non-decreasing in p). We note that this assumption
holds for throughput and welfare under all considered distributions, and revenue
for regular distributions. For completeness, we prove these observations in
Appendix 13.2.
For a given objective, our aim is to select a pricing policy p, equivalently
quantiles q, that maximizes the steady-state rate of reward accumulation, given
by
OBJm(q) =
∑
x∈Sn,m
pi(x)·
(∑
i, j
φi j·qi j(x)·Ii j(qi j(x))) = ∑
x∈Sn,m
pi(x)·
(∑
i, j
φi j·Ri j(qi j(x))). (9.1)
Intuitively, Equation (9.1) captures that at any node i, customers destined for j
arrive via a Poisson process with rate φi j, and find the system in state x ∈ Sn,m
with probability pi(x). They are then quoted a price pi j(x) (corresponding to
quantile qi j(x)), and engage a ride with probability qi j(x). The resulting ride
then contributes in expectation Ii j(qi j(x)) to the objective function. Recall that
unavailability of units is captured by our assumption that qi j(x) = 0 whenever
xi = 0.
State-Independent Pricing and Closed Queueing Models
The Markov chain described in Section 9.2.1 has the structure of a closed queueing
network (cf. Serfozo [1999], Kelly [2011]), a well-studied class of models in applied
probability (closed refers to the fact that the number of units remains constant;
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in open networks, units may arrive and depart from the system). Our analysis
crucially relies on some classical results from the queuing theory literature, which
we review in this section. Our presentation here closely resembles that of Serfozo
Serfozo [1999]. One particular class of pricing policies is that of state-independent
policies, wherein we set point-to-point prices {pi j} which do not react to the state
of the system. As a consequence, the rate of units departing from any node i at
any time t when Xi(t) > 0 is a constant, independent of the state of the network.
The resulting model is a special case of a closed queueing model proposed by
Gordon and Newell [1967].
Definition 26. A Gordon-Newell network is a continuous-time Markov chain on
states x ∈ Sn,m, in which for any state x and any i, j ∈ [n], the chain transitions from x
to x − ei + e j at a rate λi jµi1{xi(t)>0}, where µi > 0 is referred to as the service rate at node
i, and λi j ≥ 0 as the routing probabilities satisfying ∑ j λi j = 1.
In other words, if units are present at a node i in state x, then departures from
that node occur according to a Poisson distribution with rate µi > 0; conditioning
on a departure, the destination j is chosen according to state-independent routing
probabilities λi j.
The Markovian dynamics resulting from state-independent pricing policies
fulfill the conditions of Gordon-Newell networks: fixing a price pi j (with corre-
sponding qi j) results in a Poisson process with rate φi jqi j of arriving customers
willing to pay price pi j. These customers engage a unit only if one is available, else
leave the system. Thus, given quantiles q, the time to a departure from node i
is distributed exponentially with rate µi =
∑
j φi jqi j when Xi > 0 and with rate 0
otherwise. Further, conditioned on an arriving customer having value at least
equal to the quoted price, the probability that the customer’s destination is j, is
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λi j = φi jqi j/
∑
k φikqik, independent of system state.
One advantage of considering state-independent policies (and drawing con-
nections with Gordon-Newell networks) is that the resulting steady-state dis-
tribution
{
pip,m(x)
}
x∈Sn,m can be expressed in product form, as established by the
Gordon-Newell theorem.
Theorem 27 (Gordon-Newell Theorem 1967 ). Consider an m-unit n-node Gordon-
Newell network with transition rates µi and routing probabilities λi j. Let {wi}i∈[n] denote
the invariant distribution associated with the routing probability matrix
{
λi j
}
i, j∈[n], and
define the traffic intensity at node i as ri = wi/
∑
j φi j. Then the stationary distribution
is given by:
pi(x) =
1
Gm
n∏
j=1
(
r j
)x j
, (9.2)
where the Gordon-Newell normalization constant is given by Gm =
∑
x∈Sn,m
∏n
j=1
(
r j
)x j
.
We now show how the Gordon-Newell theorem can be used to simplify
the objective function in Equation (9.1). Recall that for an m-unit system
with state-independent policy p (with corresponding quantiles q), we obtain
a Gordon-Newell network with service rate
∑
j φi jqi j and routing probabilities
φi jqi j/
∑
k φikqik at node i. Let {pi(x)}x∈Sn,m be the corresponding steady-state distri-
bution. Since q is no longer a function of the system state, we can no longer set
qi = 0 when Xi = 0. Instead, we define Ai,m(q) =
∑
x∈Sn,m pi(x)1{xi>0} as the steady-
state availability of units at node i (i.e. the probability in steady-state that at least
one unit is present at node i), and fi j,m(q) = Ai,m(q) · φi jqi j to be the steady-state rate
of units moving from node i to j. Then, from Equation (9.2), one can derive (see
e.g. Proposition 1.33 and Equation 1.31 in Serfozo [1999])
Ai,m(q) = (Gm−1(q)/Gm(q)) · ri(q). (9.3)
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Notice that ri(q) denotes the traffic intensity as defined above. Now, the objective
in Equation (9.1) can be written as
OBJm(q) =
∑
i
Ai,m(q) ·
∑
j
φi jqi j · Ii j(qi j)
 = ∑
i
fi j,m(q)Ii j(q). (9.4)
For ease of notation, we omit the explicit dependence on m when clear from
context.
The infinite-unit limit: The stationary distribution described above (for state-
independent pricing policies) holds for any finite m; moreover, it can also be used
to obtain the limiting distribution when the number of units tends to infinity.
This infinite-unit limit is described in detail in Section 3.7 in Serfozo [1999] (and
we provide more details in Appendix 13.3). For the purposes of our results, we
rely on one particular fact, which we state in the proposition below. Recall first
that given p = {pi j}, the quantities wi(p) and ri(p) are independent of m.
Proposition 28. Given a policy with quantiles q, in the infinite-unit limit, the steady-
state availability of each node i is given by ri(q)/max j r j(q); in particular, there exists at
least one node i with Ai(q) = 1.
The existence of a node with availability 1 essentially captures the fact that in
an infinite-unit system, at least one node must have an infinite number of units.
For a formal proof of this result, cf. Section 3.7 in Serfozo [1999].
Non-concavity of objective under state-independent pricing
Directly optimizing the finite-unit system is non-trivial as the objective function
is not concave in prices (or quantiles); we now demonstrate this in a simple
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network (m = 1 and n = 3), using throughput as the objective. Our example is
presented in Figure 9.1. The network comprises of three nodes (A, B,C); the labels
on the edges show the effective demand rate φi j(q) with which people wanting to
move from node i to node j arrive for the corresponding pricing policies p (and
corresponding quantiles q). In particular, the first figure corresponds to setting
all prices to 0 (quantiles to 1), while in the second and third figures, we increase
the price between B and C to set quantile qBC = (1 + )/2 in figure II, and qBC = 
in figure III. Note that the demand in network II is the average of the demands in
networks I and III. To prove that this is non-concave with respect to the demand
rates we now demonstrate that the throughput in network II is less than half of
the sum of its value in networks I and III. To compute the throughput in each
network, note that the expected waiting time at a node is inversely proportional
to the total effective demand at each node. Furthermore, the unit makes exactly
two rides between consecutive visits to node B. Thus, the expected throughput is
twice the expected rate of return to node B. This holds because, starting from
node B, the expected time for the first 2k rides (for any positive integer k) is k
times the expected return time to node B. The expected return-time to B in the
three networks can be computed as follows, where we use that the total expected
waiting time can be computed as the sum of the expected waiting time at B, the
probability of waiting at A times the expected waiting time at A (1), plus the
probability of waiting at C times the expected waiting time at C ().
Network I : 1 · 1
2
+
1
2
· 1 + 1
2
· 1

=
1 + 2
2
= Ω
(
1

)
Network II : 1 · 1
1 + 1+2
+
(
2
3 + 
)
· 1 + 1 + 
3 + 
· 1

=
5 + 1
 · (3 + ) = Ω
(
1

)
Network III : 1 · 1
1 + 
+
(
1
1 + 
)
· 1 +
(

1 + 
)
· 1

=
3
1 + 
= O(1).
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I II III
A
B
C
A
B
C
A
B
C
1
1 
1 1
1+
2 
1 1
 
1
Figure 9.1: Example for non-concavity of throughput for finite units (m =
1, n = 3)
Thus, the throughput in I and II is O(), whereas it is constant in III, so the
throughput is non-concave in the demand-rates (quantiles).
9.3 Pricing in the Vanilla Case
In this section, we present our algorithm for the simplest pricing problem in
which the objective is throughput, i.e., ITi j(p) = 1∀p. Section 9.2.1 demonstrates
that the state-independent pricing problem is non-convex; moreover, this non-
convexity appears in both the objective and the constraints. We circumvent
this via a novel convex relaxation, based on two separate interventions, that
alleviates the technical hurdles. Surprisingly, the resulting pricing policy, which
we derive in Section 9.3.1, has strong performance guarantees even with respect
to state-dependent policies, as we prove in Section 9.3.2.
We develop our pricing policy in this section by first dealing with the non-
convexity in the objective, then with ones in the constraints. Then, at the end of
the section, we formally state the algorithm.
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Elevated Objective Function
Recall from Equation (9.4) that our objective can be written as
OBJm(q) =
∑
i, j
(
fi j,m(q) · Ii j(qi j)
)
.
Let q̂i j = fi j,m(q)/φi j = Ai,m(q) · qi j; note that q̂i j ≤ qi j, and moreover, unlike
the quantiles qi j which are in one-to-one correspondence to prices, there is no
straightforward way to derive q̂i j from prices. Since we assume that the per-ride
rewards Ii j(·) are non-increasing on the quantile space, we have Ii j(qi j) ≤ Ii j(̂qi j).
We now define the elevated objective function as
ÔBJ(̂q) =
∑
i, j
φi ĵqi jIi j(̂qi j) =
∑
i, j
φi jRi j(̂qi j). (9.5)
The elevated objective has two useful properties: i) for all m and q, the elevated
objective upper bounds the true objective function, i.e. ÔBJ(q) ≥ OBJm(q), and
ii) it is a concave function of q̂ (since we focus on objectives corresponding to
concave reward curves Ri j(·)).
The Flow Polytope
We now turn our attention to the constraints of our pricing problem. As we
discussed above, each pricing policy (with corresponding quantiles q) realizes
steady-state flows (steady-state rates of units) fi j,m(q) = Ai,m(q)φi jqi j. As before,
we define the change of variables q̂i j = fi j,m(q)/φi j. Note that while it is not the
case that all flows obeying natural flow constraints can be realized as steady-
state flows
{
fi j,m(q)
}
under some policy q, all realized flows do have to obey flow
conservation and capacity constraints. This motivates the following relaxation
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{̂
qi j
}
of the set of possible steady-state flows under any policy q and for any
number of units m.
A natural capacity constraint arises since prices only decrease demand; the
steady-state flow of units between a pair of nodes is thus bounded above by the
rate of customers wanting to travel between the nodes. We refer to this constraint
as demand bounding. Formally, for every pair (i, j), we have fi j,m(q) ≤ φi j and hence
q̂i j ∈ [0, 1].
Next, any steady-state flow must obey a natural flow conservation constraint,
wherein the rate of incoming units at each node must equal the rate of outgoing
units. We refer to this constraint as supply circulation. Formally, at any node i, we
have
∑
k fki,m(q) =
∑
j fi j,m(q), and hence∑
k
φkîqki =
∑
j
φi ĵqi j.
Note that the above two constraints hold for every finite m and every q; indeed,
if they did not hold and the rate of incoming units to node i was larger than
the rate of outgoing units then after letting the system run in steady-state for
long enough, the number of units in i would be larger than m. Moreover, the
constraints are also true for the infinite-unit limit (cf. Appendix 13.3). We refer to
the set of flows defined by the above (linear) constraints as the flow polytope.
9.3.1 Pricing via the Elevated Flow Relaxation
Combining the elevated objective and the flow polytope, we obtain the elevated
flow relaxation program (cf. Algorithm 2). Note that this is a convex optimization
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problem since the objective function is concave while the polytope is linear; hence
it can be efficiently maximized.
Algorithm 2: The Elevated Flow Relaxation Program
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi j, reward curves Ri j.
1: Find
{
qi j
}
that solves the following relaxation:
Maximize
∑
(i, j) φi jRi j(̂qi j)∑
k φkîqki =
∑
j φi ĵqi j ∀ i
q̂i j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j.
2: Output state-independent prices pi j = F−1i j (1 − qi j).
Note that the prices (quantiles) returned by Algorithm 2 impose the flow
conservation not only on the units (supply) but also on the customers (demand);
we henceforth refer to this property as demand circulation.
9.3.2 Approximation Framework
In this section, we provide the main approximation framework of the paper
to bounds the performance of Algorithm 2 with respect to the optimal state-
dependent pricing policy. This is formalized in the following theorem
Theorem 29. Consider optimizing throughput for the m-unit system and let p˜ be the
pricing policy returned by Algorithm 2 and OPTm be the value of the objective of the
optimal state-dependent pricing policy in the m-unit system. Then
OBJm(˜p) ≥ mm + n − 1OPTm. (9.6)
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The proof is based on the following three lemmas. First (Lemma 30), we show
that the objective of the optimal state-independent policy is upper bounded by
the elevated objective of the policy p˜ returned by the Elevated Flow relaxation
(Algorithm 2). Next (Lemma 31), we show that the elevated objective of p˜ is
equal to its objective in the infinite-unit system. Finally (Lemma 32), we show
that for any pricing policy (and so in particular for p˜), the objective in the m-unit
system is within a factor of mm+n−1 of the objective in the infinite-unit system.
Lemma 30. For throughput, the value of the objective function of the optimal state-
dependent policy is upper bounded by the value of the elevated objective function of the
pricing policy p˜ returned by Algorithm 2
ÔBJ(˜p) ≥ OPTm.
Lemma 31. The value of the elevated objective function of the pricing policy p˜ returned
by Algorithm 2 is equal to the value of its objective function in the infinite-unit system
OBJ∞(˜p) = ÔBJ(˜p).
Lemma 32. For any state-independent pricing policy p, the value of the objective of the
policy p in the m-unit system is at least m/(m + n − 1) times the value of the objective of
the same policy in the infinite-unit system.
OBJm(p) ≥ mm + n − 1OBJ∞(p).
We remark that one could prove Theorem 29 more easily by showing that Lemma
32 holds when p is a demand circulation. This has been known since the 1980s
Whitt [1984] and, in fact, this is exactly the main theorem (and proof) of Waserhole
and Jost [2014]. However, in later section we consider scenarios under which
no demand circulation is optimal/feasible. For these, the stronger statement of
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Lemma 32 is required. In the remainder of this section, we prove these three
lemmas.
From finite-unit state-dependent to the elevated flow relaxation
Lemma 33 (Lemma 30 restated). For throughput, the value of the objective function of
the optimal state-dependent policy is upper bounded by the value of the elevated objective
function of the pricing policy p˜ returned by Algorithm 2
ÔBJ(˜p) ≥ OPTm.
Proof. Let q?(X) denote the quantiles of the optimal state dependent policy and
pi?(X) denote the steady-state distribution it induces. Then, since throughput is
our objective, OPTm can be written as∑
X∈Sn,m
pi?(X)
∑
i, j
φi jq?i j(X).
We define q̂ via
q̂i j =
∑
X∈Sn,m
pi?(X)q?i j(X).
Then OPTm =
∑
i, j φi ĵqi j.Note that, by definition, q?i j(X) = 0 when Xi = 0. Therefore,
q̂ satisfies the demand circulation and demand bounding constraints in the
elevated flow relaxation program; this is due to (i) the state-dependent supply
circulation property and (ii) q?i j(X) ≤ 1∀X, i, j. Hence q̂ is a feasible solution to the
elevated flow relaxation program and the result follows.
From the elevated flow relaxation to infinite-unit state-independent
Lemma 34 (Lemma 31 restated). The value of the elevated objective function of the
pricing policy p˜ returned by Algorithm 2 is equal to the value of its objective function in
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the infinite-unit system
OBJ∞(˜p) = ÔBJ(˜p).
Proof. The pricing policy p˜ satisfies the demand circulation property since it is
a feasible solution to the elevated flow relaxation program. By Lemmas 35 and
Proposition 28, the availabilities at all nodes is equal to 1. This means that (i)
the value of the objective function in the infinite-unit limit for pricing policy p˜
is equal to its elevated value (since no term was increased), and (ii) the flow of
customers on each edge is equal to φi jq˜i j.
Lemma 35. For any m (including ∞) if state-independent quantiles q satisfies the
demand circulation property then, at all nodes i, the availabilities Ai,m(q) are equal.
Proof. Consider i∗ ∈ argmax Ai,m(q). Then the demand circulation and supply
circulation properties imply
Ai∗,m(q)
∑
j
φ ji∗q ji∗ = Ai∗,m(q)
∑
j
φi∗ jqi∗ j =
∑
j
A j,m(q)φ ji∗q ji∗
and thus
∑
j
(
Ai∗,m(q) − A j,m(q))φ ji∗q ji∗ = 0. By choice of i∗, each summand is
nonnegative, so for each j such that φ ji∗ > 0 we obtain A j,m(q) = Ai∗,m(q). All
availabilities being equal then follows inductively using connectivity of the
underlying graph.
From finite-unit to infinite-unit state-independent
Lemma 36 (Lemma 32 restated). For any state-independent pricing policy p, the
value of the objective of the policy p in the m-unit system is at least m/(m + n − 1) times
the value of the objective of the same policy in the infinite-unit system.
OBJm(p) ≥ mm + n − 1OBJ∞(p).
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Proof. By Lemma 37, we have:
OBJm(p)
OBJ∞(p)
= rmax(p) · Gm−1(p)Gm(p) .
In order to uniformly bound the above expression, the essential ingredient is
the construction of a particular weighted biregular graph between the states in
Sn,m−1 and the states in Sn,m. In this graph, non-zero edges only exist between
neighboring states, i.e. between states y ∈ Sn,m−1 and y+ei ∈ Sn,m; further, the total
weight of edges incident to any state in Sn,m is equal to 1, and the total weight of
edges incident to any state in Sn,m−1 is equal to m+n−1m . We construct such a graph
in Lemma 38.
Throughout this proof, we use s for a state in Sn,m−1 and t for one in Sn,m.
The weight of the edge (s, t) in the bipartite graph constructed in Lemma 38 is
denoted by ωst.
OBJm(p)
OBJ∞(p)
= rmax(p) · Gm−1(p)Gm(p) = rmax(p)
∑
s∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)s j
∑
t∈Sn,m
∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)t j
= rmax(p) ·
∑
s∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)s j
∑
t∈Sn,m
(∑
s∈Sn,m−1 ωst
)∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)t j
= rmax(p) ·
∑
s∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)s j
∑
(s,t)∈Sn,m−1×Sn,m ωst
∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)s j+(t j−s j)
≥
∑
s∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)s j∑
s∈Sn,m−1
(∑
t∈Sn,m ωst
)∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)s j
=
∑
s∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)s j(
m+n−1
m
)∑
s∈Sn,m−1
∏n
j=1
(
r j(p)
)s j = mm + n − 1
The third equality holds as
∑
s ωst = 1, while the second-to-last follows from∑
t ωst =
m+n−1
m . Crucially, ωst > 0 only holds for neighboring states s and t, which
implies the inequality.
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Lemma 37. For any state-independent pricing policy p, let Am(p) = maxi
(
Ai,m(p)
)
denote the maximum steady-state availability across all nodes. Then the objective function
of p in the m-unit system is related to the infinite-limit objective as
OBJm(p)
OBJ∞(p)
= rmax(p) · Gm−1(p)Gm(p) = Am(p).
Proof. Let Bi(p) =
∑
j φi jqi j · Ii j(qi j) denote the contribution of node i to the
objective per unit of time in which station i is available. By substituting
Ai,m(p) = (Gm−1(p)/Gm(p)) · ri(p), Ai,∞(p) = ri(p)/rmax(p), and Bi into the definition
of the objectives in Equation 9.4, we obtain
OBJm(p)
OBJ∞(p)
=
∑
i Ai,m(p)Bi(p)∑
i Ai,∞(p)Bi(p)
=
Gm−1(p)
Gm(p)
·∑i ri(p)Bi(p)
1
rmax(p)
·∑i ri(p)Bi(p) = rmax(p) · Gm−1(p)Gm(p) = Am(p),
where the last equality follows from the characterization of the availabilities in
Equation (9.3). Note that the argument relies on OBJ∞(p) > 0 which is the case
for all policies/settings we consider.
Lemma 38. We call y ∈ Sn,m−1 a neighbor of y + ei ∈ Sn,m∀i. There exists a weighted
biregular graph on Sn,m−1 ∪ Sn,m such that i) an edge has non-zero weight only if it is
connecting neighboring states, ii) for any vertex corresponding to a state in Sn,m−1 the
total weight of incident edges is equal to m+n−1m , and iii) for any vertex corresponding to a
state in Sn,m the total weight of incident edges is equal to 1.
Proof. Our construction is shown in figure 9.2. Each state x ∈ Sn,m is adjacent to
x − ei ∈ Sn,m−1 for all i with xi > 0. On these edges, the weight is xim . Thus, the
total weight incident to x is
∑
i
xi
m = 1. On the other hand, each state y ∈ Sn,m−1
is adjacent to the states y + ei ∀i ∈ [n]. The respective weight on these edges is∑
i
yi+1
m =
m−1+n
m . Finally, there is only weight on edges between neighboring states.
This concludes the proof of the lemma.
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(a) Graph between S2,3,S2,2 and
S2,1
(b) Construction for general n,m
Figure 9.2: Biregular graph construction as described in Lemma 38. Fig.
9.2(a) shows the construction for (S2,3,S2,2) and (S2,2,S2,1). Fig.
9.2(b) shows the general construction. Note that the sum of
weights of incident edges for any node on the left (i.e. any state
in Sn,m) is 1, while it is (m + n − 1)/m for nodes on the right (i.e.
states in Sn,m−1).
9.3.3 Multi-objective Pricing
We begin this Section by extending the result of Theorem 29 to objectives other
than throughput.
Theorem 39. Consider optimizing any objective with concave reward curves Ri j(·) for
the m-unit system and let p˜ be the pricing policy returned by Algorithm 2 and OPTm
be the value of the objective of the optimal state-dependent pricing policy in the m-unit
system. Then
OBJm(˜p) ≥ mm + n − 1OPTm. (9.7)
The proof only requires replacing Lemma 30 by a Lemma that holds for all
objectives with concave reward curves.
Lemma 40. For objectives with concave reward curves Ri j(·), the value of the objective
function of the optimal state-dependent policy is upper bounded by the value of the
elevated objective function of the pricing policy p˜ returned by Algorithm 2
ÔBJ(˜p) ≥ OPTm.
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Proof. Our proof applies Jensen’s inequality to show that OPTm is bounded above
by the elevated objective value of some quantiles q̂ that form a feasible solution
of the elevated flow relaxation program. Since the pricing policy p˜ maximizes
this mathematical program, the lemma follows.
Let q?(X) denote the quantiles of the optimal state dependent policy and
pi?(X) denote the steady-state distribution it induces. Then OPTm can be written
as ∑
X∈Sn,m
pi?(X)
∑
i, j
φi jRi j
(
q?i j(X)
)
.
We define q̂ via
q̂i j =
∑
X∈Sn,m
pi?(X)q?i j(X).
Since the price-setting reward curve is concave, Jensen’s inequality implies that
OPTm ≤
∑
i, j
φi jRi j
(̂
qi j
)
.
By the same argument as in Lemma 30, q̂ is a feasible solution to the elevated
flow relaxation program and the result follows.
Bicriterion Approximations
We now discuss how to derive bicriterion approximations in multi-objective
optimization settings, in which one objective is maximized subject to a lower
bound on another. For ease of presentation, we restrict ourselves to pricing.
Formally, the problem is as follows: we are given a m-unit system, a requirement
c ≥ 0, and objectives Φm(·) and Ψm(·); the goal is to maximize Φm(q) subject to
Ψm(q) ≥ c. We again assume that both objectives can be decomposed into per-ride
rewards with associated concave reward curves
{
RΨi j
}
and
{
RΦi j
}
.
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Similarly to Equation (9.5), we first elevate both objectives to obtain Φ̂(̂q) =∑
i, j φi jRΦi j (̂qi j) and Ψ̂(̂q) =
∑
i, j φi jRΨi j (̂qi j). Since per-ride rewards are non-increasing
on the quantiles, this can only increase the values of the objectives. We then
impose the supply circulation and demand bounding constraints to create the
flow polytope constraints. This mathematical program (Algorithm 3) is the
elevated flow relaxation for our multi-objective setting; we argue below that
this is indeed a relaxation. It can be efficiently optimized since the objective
is concave while the polytope is convex: the convex combination of any two
feasible quantiles is feasible since Ψ̂(·) is concave.
Algorithm 3: The Elevated Flow Relaxation for the Multi-objective Pricing
Problem
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi j, reward curves RΦi j and R
Ψ
i j,
requirement c.
1: Find
{
qi j
}
that solves the following relaxation:
Maximize Φ̂(̂q)∑
k φkîqki =
∑
j φi ĵqi j ∀ i
q̂i j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j.
Ψ̂(̂q) ≥ c
2: Output state-independent prices pi j = F−1i j (1 − qi j).
Theorem 41. Let Φm and Ψm be objectives for the m-unit system with concave reward
curves. Then the solution q˜ returned by Algorithm 3 is a (γ, γ) bicriterion approximation
for the multi-objective pricing problem where γ = m/(m + n − 1), i.e. Φm(q?) ≥ γOPTm
and Ψm(q?) ≥ γ · c.
Proof. Let q′ denote the optimal solution of an auxiliary program where we only
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elevate objective Φ, i.e. we maximize Φ̂(·) subject to Ψm(·) ≥ c as well as the
demand circulation and demand bounding constraints. Moreover, let q? denote
the optimal solution of the original (non-elevated) program. Then, for the first
guarantee, we have:
Φm(˜q) ≥ γΦ̂(˜q) ≥ γΦ̂(q′) ≥ γΦ̂(q?) ≥ γΦ(q?) = γOPTm
The first inequality is a simple application of Theorem 39. The second inequality
holds since any solution of the auxiliary program is a feasible solution of the
elevated flow relaxation. In particular, since the elevated objective Ψ̂m(·) is point-
wise no less than the original objective Ψm(·), the corresponding constraint in
the auxiliary program is tighter. The third inequality holds as q′ is the optimal
solution for the auxiliary program. The last inequality holds as the elevated
objective Φ̂(·) is pointwise no less than the original objective Φ(·).
Regarding the second guarantee, we have:
Ψm(˜q) ≥ γΨ̂(˜q) ≥ γc
The first inequality is again a simple application of Theorem 39 while the second
holds since q˜ is a feasible solution of the elevated flow relaxation and therefore
satisfies its last constraint.
We note that the same approach yields multicriterion approximation algo-
rithms for settings in which more than one constraint of the form Ψm(·) ≥ c is
given.
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CHAPTER 10
ADVANCED EXTENSIONS
In this chapter, we relax the restrictions we previously imposed. All of the algo-
rithms and proofs for these extensions make use of our elevated flow relaxation
framework of Section 9.3, demonstrating its generality. First, in Section 10.1, we
allow the designer to have additional rebalancing controls beyond pricing by
redirecting supply and demand. Next, in Section 10.2, we relax our assumption
that changes in the state should be instantaneous by allowing travel-times for the
trips. Last, in Section 10.3, we consider settings where prices can only depend
on the source and where the prices are constrained to come from a discrete set.
For all of these results, the proof follows from the same three steps as in Section
9.3.2.
10.1 Other Controls
Pricing is just one of several control levers in shared vehicle systems for balancing
supply and demand; we now investigate two other levers, which we refer to
as supply redirection and demand redirection, and show how they fit into our
approximation framework. In the former we make a decision at the end of every
trip on whether the unit remains at the destination of the trip or moves elsewhere
whilst incurring a cost. In the latter, we redirect passengers arriving at a node
to take units from nearby nodes. In practice, this would be achieved by pulling
units from nearby nodes; for example in ridesharing services, the platform can
dispatch a driver from a nearby node. Mathematically, the two are equivalent.
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Supply Redirection
We consider a state-dependent policy r(X) which, for each trip ending at a node
i, chooses to redirect the unit to some other node j (leading to state X − ei + e j),
else allows the unit to stay at i. For a state-independent policy, let ri j ∈ [0, 1]
be the probability that an arriving unit at i is redirected to j. We assume that
each redirection from i to j has associated cost ci j, and that units arriving empty
(redirected) are not redirected again.
With m units, a fixed pricing policy p (with corresponding quantiles q), and
a fixed redirection policy r, we observe a rate fi j,m(q, r) of customers traveling
from i to j, and a rate of redirected vehicles zi j,m(q, r) from i to j, i.e. trips with
destination i which are redirected to j. For a state-independent policy, since each
unit arriving at i is redirected to j with probability ri j, it holds that
zi j,m(q, r) = ri j
∑
k
fki,m(q, r).
Similarly to the correspondence between qi j and fi j,m, we observe a correspon-
dence between ri j and zi j,m, wherein the former are the controls and induce the
latter in the objective via the steady-state dynamics. As a result, the objective can
be written as
OBJm(q, r) =
∑
i, j
fi j,m(q, r)Ii j(q) − ci jzi j,m(q, r).
In order to define the constraints of the elevated flow relaxation, we write (as in
Section 9.3) q̂i j = fi j,m(q, r)/φi j and ẑi j = zi j,m(q, r). We can now write the following
relaxed flow polytope:
(1) q̂i j ∈ [0, 1], (2)
∑
k
(
φkîqki + ẑki
)
=
∑
j
(
φi ĵqi j + ẑi j
)
, (3)
∑
k
ẑik ≤
∑
j
φ jîq ji ∀ i.
The first constraint is demand bounding, exactly as explained in Section 9.3.
The second is a variant of the supply circulation in Section 9.3 to incorporate
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redirected vehicles. Finally, the third reflects that only units that are dropping
off customers at a node, but not empty ones, can be redirected. Note that these
constraints hold for any state-dependent policy as any policy induces such rates
fi j,m and zi j,m.
Using the reward curves Ri j(·) defined in Section 9.3, we obtain an upper
bound ÔBJ(q, r) on our desired objective via the Elevated Flow Relaxation with
the above constraints; through this, we obtain prices and redirection probabil-
ities in Algorithm 4. Note that the redirection probabilities ri j returned by the
algorithm correspond to the rate of redirected units zi j returned by the relaxation
over the total incoming rate of (non-empty) units at node i, i.e.
∑
k φk jqk j. We now
derive the equivalent of Theorem 39 to bound the performance of this algorithm.
Theorem 42. Consider any objective function OBJm for the m-unit system with concave
reward curves Ri j(·). Let p˜ and r˜ be the pricing and redirection policies returned by
Algorithm 4, and OPTm be the objective of the optimal state-dependent policies in the
m-unit system. Then
OBJm(˜p, r˜) ≥ mm + n − 1OPTm.
Proof. The proof closely resembles that of Theorem 39. As before, we show the
inequality through three intermediate steps: (i) ÔBJ(˜p, r˜) ≥ OPTm, (ii) ÔBJ(˜p, r˜) =
OBJ∞(˜p, r˜), and (iii) OBJm(˜p, r˜) ≥ mm+n−1OBJ∞(˜p, r˜). The proof of the first inequality
is the same as in Lemma 40, with the relaxation defined in Algorithm 2 replaced
by the relaxation defined in Algorithm 4. The second step relies on Lemma 43,
which uses Lemma 35 to prove that in the infinite-unit system all availabilities
are 1. Based on this claim, similarly to the proof of Lemma 31, we observe that
the flow of customers on each edge is φi jq˜i j. The definition of the redirection
probabilities in Algorithm 4 then immediately implies that zi j,∞(˜p, r˜) = zi j, i.e. the
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Algorithm 4: The Elevated Flow Relaxation Program with Supply Redirec-
tion
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi j, reward curves Ri j, rerouting
costs ci j.
1: Find {qi j, zi j} that solves the the following relaxation:
Maximize
∑
i, j
(
φi jRi j(̂qi j) − ci ĵzi j
)
∑
k
(
φkîqki + ẑki
)
=
∑
j
(
φi ĵqi j + ẑi j
)
∀i∑
k ẑik ≤ ∑ j φ jîq ji ∀i
q̂i j ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j
2: Output state-independent prices pi j = F−1i j (1 − qi j) and redirection probabilities
ri j = zi j/
∑
k φkiqki
flow of redirected units from i to j is also equal to the value of zi j in the solution of
the relaxation. Finally, for the third step, we apply the same proof as in Lemma 32
with just one small modification. In Lemma 32, Bi(p) denotes the contribution of
node i per unit of time in which a unit is present at i. Previously, this just captured
rides leaving node i. Now, we also charge Bi(p) for the cost incurred through
the possible redirection of vehicles traveling from i to j that are redirected to k.
Replacing Bi(p) by
∑
j φi jqi j
(
Ii j
(
qi j
)
−∑k r jkp jk) formalizes this charging argument
– the remainder of the proof is equivalent to that of the Lemma 32. This concludes
the proof of the theorem.
Lemma 43. With p˜ and r˜ as returned by Algorithm 2, all availabilities are equal to one
in the infinite-unit system.
Proof. Denote by q˜ the quantiles corresponding to p˜. We consider a closed
queueing network with the same transition probabilities between states as the one
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resulting from q˜ and r˜. In our hypothetical network, quantiles are all one, there is
no redirection, and the demand circulation property holds. Since the hypothetical
network does not have redirection and satisfies the demand circulation property,
Lemma 35 implies that there the availabilities at all nodes are equal. However, the
two networks have the same transition probabilities so they also have the same
steady-state distribution. As a result, in the original network all availabilities are
also equal and thus, equal to 1 in the infinite-unit limit. We define the demand in
the hypothetical network as
φ¯i j = φi jq˜i j(1 −
∑
k
r˜ jk) +
∑
k
φikq˜ik˜rk j.
Observe that transitions occur at the same rate in this network as in the one with
q˜ and r˜. Since quantiles are equal to 1, the demand circulation property says that∑
j φ¯i j =
∑
k φ¯ki. To show this property, notice first that the demand at node i is∑
j
φ¯i j =
∑
j
φi jq˜i j −
∑
j
φi jq˜i j
∑
k
r˜ jk
 + ∑
j
∑
k
φikq˜ik˜rk j =
∑
j
φi jq˜i j.
On the other hand, due to the definition of φ¯i j (first equality), the definition
of r˜i j in Algorithm 4 (third equality), and the supply circulation constraint in
Algorithm 4 (last equality), the demand of customers traveling to i is
∑
k
φ¯ki =
∑
k
φkiq˜ki −
∑
j,k
φkiq˜ki˜ri j +
∑
j,k
φk jq˜k j˜r ji
=
∑
k
φkiq˜ki −
∑
j
r˜i j
(∑
k
φkiq˜ki
)
+
∑
j
r˜ ji
(∑
k
φk jq˜k j
)
=
∑
k
φkiq˜ki −
∑
j
zi j∑
k φkiq˜ki
(∑
k
φkiq˜ki
)
+
∑
j
z ji∑
k φk jq˜k j
(∑
k
φk jq˜k j
)
=
∑
k
φkiq˜ki +
∑
j
(
z ji − zi j
)
=
∑
j
φi jq˜i j.
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Demand Redirection
For the control defined in this section, we assume that there exists a graph
G = (V, E) on the set of nodes with edges between nodes that are so close that a
customer arriving at one node can be served through a vehicle at an adjacent
node. We consider a state-dependent policy µ(X) which, for each customer
arriving at node i willing to pay the price quoted, decides from which node in
{i} ∪ { j : (i, j) ∈ E}, the customer is served. With m units, fixed quantiles q(X), and
a fixed matching policy µ(X), we observe a rate fi j,m(q, µ) of customers arriving at
i that travel to j, potentially after being matched to a unit at k, and a rate zik,m(q, µ)
of customers that arrived to travel from i but have been matched to a unit at k.
We can write the objective in this setting as OBJm(q, µ) =
∑
i, j fi j,m(q, µ)Ii j(q). We
again write q̂i j = fi j,m(q, r)/φi j and ẑi j = zi j,m(q, r) to define the following relaxed
flow polytope:
(1) q̂i j ∈ [0, 1], (2)
∑
k
q̂kiφki+̂zik =
∑
j
q̂i jφi j+̂z ji ∀ i, (3)
∑
k
ẑki ≤
∑
j
q̂ jiφ ji ∀ i.
The first constraint is again demand bounding. The second is a variant of the
supply circulation to incorporate matchings to nearby nodes. In particular, the
left hand side accounts for the total number of units arriving at node i, which
equals all users arriving at i together with all units arriving due to matching from
nearby nodes k. Similarly, the right hand side accounts for the total number of
units leaving i, which are the users leaving from i together with users from other
nodes j that use supply at i. Finally, the third ensures that customers are matched
only to units arriving at nearby nodes. Maximizing the elevated objectives over
these constraints again yields a m/(m + n − 1) approximation algorithm. We omit
the proof, because of its similarity to the one of Theorem 42.
Theorem 44. Solving for the elevated objective under the constraints defined above
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Algorithm 5: The Elevated Flow Relaxation Program With Matching
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi j, reward-curves Ri j, edges E.
1: Find {qi j, zi j} that solves the the following relaxation:
Maximize
∑
i, j φi jRi j(̂qi j)∑
k
(
φkîqki + ẑik
)
=
∑
j
(
φi ĵqi j + ẑ ji
)
∀i ∈ [n]∑
k ẑki ≤ ∑ j φ jîq ji ∀i ∈ [n]
q̂i j ∈ [0, 1] ∀i, j ∈ [n]
ẑi j = 0 ∀(i, j) < E
2: Output state-independent prices pi j = F−1i j (1 − qi j) and matching probabilities
µi j = zi j/
∑
k φikqik
yields a m/(m + n − 1) approximation algorithm for pricing and matching.
In Appendix 13.4 we show that the results obtained in this section continue to
hold in settings, in which matching and/or redirecting is allowed, but pricing is
not. In such scenarios, the optimal solution may not have the demand circulation
property. Nevertheless, the same techniques yield m/(m + n − 1) approximation
algorithms.
10.2 Incorporating travel-times between nodes
We now discuss how to remove the assumption that units move instantaneously
by adding travel-times between nodes. We state our result only for pricing;
however, our arguments below only depend on properties of the Markov chain,
and hence can incorporate the other controls we consider.
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A standard way to model travel-times is to assume that each unit takes an i.i.d.
random time to travel from node i to j. Formally, we expand the network state
to X =
{
Xi(t), Xi j(t)
}
, where node queues Xi(t) track the number of available units
at node i, and link queues Xi j(t) track the number of units in transition between
nodes i and j. When a customer engages a unit to travel from i to j, the state
changes to X − ei + ei j (i.e., Xi → Xi − 1 and Xi j → Xi j + 1). The unit remains in
transit for an i.i.d. random time, distributed exponentially with mean τi j (this is
primarily for ease of notation; our results extend if the travel time is distributed
according to some general Gi j(·)). When the unit reaches its destination, the state
changes to X−ei j +e j. Finally, we assume that pricing policies and passenger-side
dynamics remain the same as before; in particular, we assume that the demand
characteristics
{
φi j, Fi j
}
and reward-functions
{
Ii j
}
are independent of the actual
transit times (dependence on average transit times τi j can be embedded in the
functions).
The system described above is a generalization of the Gordon-Newell network
(Definition 26) referred to as a BCMP network (introduced by Baskett et al. [1975];
cf. Serfozo [1999], Section 3.3; also see Zhang and Pavone [2016] for the use of
such a model for vehicle sharing). It is also a special case of a closed migration
process; our presentation here follows Kelly and Yudovina Kelly and Yudovina
[2014] (Chapter 2).
Definition 45. A closed migration process on states Sn2,m is a continuous-time Markov
chain in which transitions from state X to state X − ei + e j occur at rate λi jµi(Xi)
when Xi > 0 and at rate 0 otherwise. The λi j again form routing probabilities with∑
k λik = 1, λi j ≥ 0 ∀i, j. Notice that µi(Xi) is a function of Xi only, whereas λi j are
independent of the state alltogether.
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Given quantiles q, the above-described process is a closed migration process
with λi,i j = φi jqi j/
∑
k φikqik and λi j, j = 1 for every i and j. Further, the service
rate µi(Xi) =
∑
k φikqik when Xi > 0 for node queues and µi j(Xi j) = Xi j/τi j for link
queues. Intuitively, the latter captures the idea that each of the Xi j units has an
exponential rate of 1/τi j and therefore the rate until the first is removed from the
link queue is Xi j/τi j. The stationary distribution can then be obtained as follows.
Theorem 46 (Theorem 2.4 in Kelly and Yudovina [2014]). For a closed migration
process as described in Definition 45, let {wi}i∈[n2] denote the invariant distribution asso-
ciated with the routing probability matrix
{
λi j
}
i, j∈[n]. Then the equilibrium distribution
for a closed migration process is
pi(x) =
1
Gm
n2∏
i=1
wxii∏xi
y=1 φi(y)
,
where Gm =
∑
x
∏n2
i=1
wxii∏xi
y=1 φi(y)
is a normalizing constant.
This implies for our setting, with w denoting again the invariant distribution
of the routing matrix.
pix,m(q) =
1
Gm(q)
∏
i∈[n]
(
wi(q)∑
k φikqik
)xi
 ∏
i, j∈[n]2
(
τi jwi j(q)
)xi j
xi j!
. (10.1)
We remark that in comparison to the invariant distribution wI when rides
occur instantaneously, wD with delays would be wDi = w
I
i/2 for node queues and
wDi j =
wDi φi jqi j∑
k φikqik
for link queues.
One consequence of the above characterization is that the resulting flows
fi j,m(q) continue to satisfy demand bounding and supply circulation – conse-
quently, the Elevated Flow Relaxation (cf. Algorithm 2) continues to provide an
upper bound. Moreover, adding link queues does not affect the optimization
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problems we consider in the infinite-unit system; in particular, Lemma 31 also
continues to hold in this setting. Finally, from Lemma 37, we know that the
ratio of objectives between the infinite-unit system and the finite-unit system
equals the maximum availability, among all nodes, in the finite-unit system, i.e.
OBJm(q)
OBJ∞(q)
= maxi Ai,m(q). In order to obtain an approximation ratio, we now need to
understand how maxi Ai,m(q) changes when link queues are added.
Let M denote the random variable corresponding to the steady-state number
of available (i.e. not in transit) units across all nodes, and define Am(q|M) ,
maxi∈[n] P
[
1{Xi>0}|M
]
, Am(q) = maxi∈[n] Ai,m(q). Now we have the following
Lemma 47. Conditioned on M, the distribution of {Xi}i∈[n] in the network with travel-
times is identical to an n-node M-unit Gordon-Newell network with the same quantiles
and arrival rates.
This follows directly from the product-form nature of the steady-state distri-
bution in Equation (10.1). Using this, we now obtain the following bound for the
m-unit system availability.
Lemma 48. For any network with parameters
{
φi j, Fi j(·), τi j
}
if m ≥ 100 and quantiles
q satisfy
∑
i j φi jτi jqi j ≤ m − 2
√
m ln(m) then
Am(q) ≥
(
1 − 3√
m
) √m lnm√
m lnm + n − 1
.
Note that the above converges to 1 as m→ ∞.
Proof. First, for any given policy q, as before we have the realized flows fi j,m(q) =
qi jφi jAi,m(q); moreover, this is the expected rate of units entering link queue Xi j.
Let D = m − M be the number of units which are in transit. Now, by Little’s law
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(cf. Kelly [2011] or Serfozo [1999]), we have that the expected number of units in
link queues is given by
∑
i, j Ai,m(q)φi jqi jτi j.
Note that the link queues {Xi j} are stochastically dominated by independent
M/M/∞ queues with input rate φi jqi j and average transition time τi j. This follows
from a simple coupling argument, where incoming customers follow an inde-
pendent Poisson process of rate φi jqi j and enter the link queue with a virtual unit,
irrespective of whether the customer engages a unit or not in the real system.
Thus D is stochastically dominated by D˜ = Poi(
∑
i, j φi jqi jτi j). Further, since D is
bounded above by m, D is also stochastically dominated by D̂ = min{D˜,m}.
Next, from Lemma 47, we know that conditioned on there being M avail-
able units in the steady-state system, the distribution of units in node queues
is identical to that of an n-node M-unit Gordon-Newell network; moreover,
from Lemma 32, we have that for any n-node, m-unit Gordon-Newell network,
Am(q|M) ≥ M/(M+ n− 1). Since M = m−D and (m− x)/(m+ n− 1− x) is decreasing
in x for x ≤ m, it follows that
Am(q) ≥ E
[ m − D
m + n − 1 − D
]
≥ E
 m − D̂
m + n − 1 − D̂
 . (10.2)
Further, by definition of D̂ we observe that P
[
D̂ > m
(
1 −
√
lnm
m
)]
=
P
[
D˜ > m
(
1 −
√
lnm
m
)]
. We can now apply a standard Chernoff bound for the
Poisson random variable D˜ (cf. from Lemma 70 in Appendix 13.6), using the
assumption that m−2√m ln(m) ≥ ∑i j φi jτi jqi j = E[D˜]. In particular, we may bound
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P
[
D̂ > m
(
1 −
√
lnm
m
)]
by
P
D˜ > m1 −
√
lnm
m
 ≤ exp
−m lnm
(
m − 3√m lnm
)
2(m − 2√m lnm)2
 (10.3)
= exp
 − lnm ·
(
1 − 3√lnm/m
)
2
(
1 − 4√lnm/m
(
1 − √lnm/m
))
≤ exp
− lnm
(
1 − 3√lnm/m
)
2
(
1 − 1.5√lnm/m
)  (10.4)
= exp
− lnm2
1 − 3√lnm/m(2 − 3√lnm/m)


(Since lnm/m ≤ 1/e, and 4 · (1 − 1/√e) > 1.5)
=
1√
m
exp
(
3 lnm
4
√
m/ lnm − 6
)
≤ 3√
m
for m ≥ 100.
We can use the above to bound the availability in Inequality (10.2) as
Am(q) ≥
(
1 − 3√
m
) m − (m − √m lnm)
m − (m − √m lnm) + n − 1
 + 3√
m
· 0.
Simplifying, we obtain the result.
We are now ready to extend our pricing/control policies to the setting with
transit delays. In order to do so, we need to first extend the elevated flow
relaxation by adding an extra constraint. The main observation is that in an
m-unit system with transit delays, there is an additional conservation constraint
induced by the fact that the number of units in the link queue can not exceed
m. As before, let f mi j (q) = q̂i jφi j denote the expected rate of units entering link
queue Xi j; then by Little’s law (cf. Kelly [2011] or Serfozo [1999]), we have that
the expected number of units in link queues is given by
∑
i, j φi ĵqi jτi j, which, in
an m-unit system, must be bounded by m. To incorporate this, we need to add
an additional rate-limiting constraint to the elevated flow relaxation wherein we
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ensure that
∑
i, j φi ĵqi jτi j ≤ m. This gives us the Rate-Limited Elevated Flow Relaxation
Program in Algorithm 6.
Algorithm 6: The Rate-Limited Elevated Flow Relaxation Program
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi j, reward curves Ri j, scaling
parameter εm, travel-times τi j.
1: Find
{
qi j
}
that solves the following relaxation:
Maximize
∑
(i, j) φi jRi j(̂qi j)∑
k φkîqki =
∑
j φi ĵqi j ∀ i∑
i, j φi jτi ĵqi j ≤ m
q̂i j ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i, j.
2: Set q˜i j = qi j · (1 − εm)
3: Output state-independent prices p˜i j = F−1i j (1 − q˜i j).
Theorem 49. For any objective function OBJm with concave reward curves Ri j(·) in the
m-unit system, let quantiles q˜ be the output of Algorithm 6 with input εm B 2
√
lnm/m,
OPTm be the value of the objective function for the optimal state-dependent pricing policy,
and m ≥ 100. Then
OBJm(˜q)
OPTm
≥ (1 − εm)
 √m lnm√
m lnm + n − 1 −
3√
m lnm
.
Proof. The proof follows a similar roadmap as that of Theorem 39. In particular,
we argue that
1. the rate-limited elevated flow relaxation provides an upper bound for any
state-dependent policy,
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2. the rate-limited elevated flow relaxation solution is achieved by a state-
independent policy in the infinite-unit system, and
3. the ratio of the performance of any state-independent policy q in the infinite-
unit and m-unit system is equal to the maximum availability Am(q).
First, similar to Lemma 40, note that since the realized flows in the m unit
system must obey the conservation laws encoded by the rate-limited elevated
flow relaxation, hence OPTm is bounded by the solution to the rate-limited ele-
vated flow relaxation
∑
(i, j) φi jRi j(qi j). Moreover, since per-ride rewards Ii j(·) are
non-increasing in q, therefore scaling the qi j by (1 − εm) results in an elevated
objective value that obeys
(1 − εm)
∑
(i, j)
φi jRi j(qi j) ≤
∑
(i, j)
φi jRi j(˜qi j),
and moreover,
∑
i, j φi jq˜i jτi j ≤ m · (1 − εm). Now, using similar arguments as in
Lemma 31, we can show that using a state-independent policy q˜ in the infinite-
unit limit gives OBJ∞(˜q) =
∑
(i, j) φi jRi j(˜qi j) (note that we use the same q˜ as derived
from the m unit rate-limited elevated flow relaxation in the infinite unit limit; in
other words, we scale the number of units to infinite, but retain the constraint∑
i, j φi jτi ĵqi j ≤ m for a fixed m). Next, from Lemma 37, we get that OBJm(˜q) =
Am(˜q)OBJ∞(˜q). Finally, using Lemma 48, we get the desired bound
OBJm(˜q)
OPTm
≥ (1 − εm)
 √m lnm√
m lnm + n − 1 −
3√
m
.
Note that for any fixed n, the theorem shows that the policy returned by the
rate-limited elevated flow relaxation is asymptotically optimal as m→ ∞ for any
demand rates and transit delays
{
φi j, τi j
}
. In Appendix 13.4 we use this to recover
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and give a finite-m characterization for the asymptotic results in Braverman et al.
[2016], Ozkan and Ward [2016].
It is now natural to wonder whether the guarantee in Theorem 49 is tight. In
particular, the rate of convergence is only in the square-root of m and as such
it converges an order of magnitude slower than our guarantees without travel-
times. It turns out that there are two answers to that question: in general, it
is not possible to converge to the upper bound provided by the elevated flow
relaxation faster than in the square-root of m – this holds for any policy. On the
other hand, if the optimal solution ~q found in Algorithm 6 is not constrained
by the rate-limitation, that is, it fulfills
∑
i j φi jτi ĵqi j = (1 − c)m for some c > 0,
then an asymptotically linear rate of convergence is recovered. We now first
give an example in which no solution achieves a convergence faster than in the
square-root of the number of vehicles and then prove that if the rate constraint is
not tight, a linear rate of convergence is recovered.
Example 50. Consider a system consisting of just a single node i, in which customers
travel from i to itself and τii = 1. Suppose our objective is to maximize throughput; in
this case, it is easy to see that setting qii = 1 is the optimal policy. Further, suppose that
φii = m, i.e., the rate of demand is exactly equal to, and scales with, the supply available.
In fact, using Equation 10.1 we can write the objective as follows:
OBJm = mAi,m(q) = m
1 −

(
1
2
m
)0( ( 12 )m
m!
)
∑m
xi=0
(
1
2
m
)xi( ( 12 )m−xi
(m−xi)!
)

 = m
1 −

(
1
m!
)
∑m
xi=0
(
1
m
)xi( 1
(m−xi)!
).

In order to prove our claim that no policy can obtain a rate of convergence that is
faster than in the square-root of m, we need to bound the subtrahend by Ω( 1√m ):(
1
m!
)
∑m
xi=0
(
1
m
)xi−m( 1
(m−xi)!
) 1
mm
=
mm
m!
1∑m
i=0
mxi
xi!
≥ m
m
m!
1∑∞
i=0
mxi
xi!
=
e−mmm
m!
∈ Ω
(
1√
m
)
.
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Here, the final bound follows from Sterling’s approximation since m! scales as mm+
1
2 e−m.
Corollary 51. Suppose that the optimal solution q? to the flow relaxation in Algorithm 6
is not constrained by the rate-limited constraint, that is,
∑
i j φi jτi jq?i j = (1 − 2c)m for
some c > 0. Then, the rate of convergence to the upper bound is linear. Specifically, for
m ≥ 100,
OBJm(q?)
OPTm
≥
(
1 − e− c22 m
)( cm
cm + n − 1
)
.
Proof. By Lemma 70, we know that, with D̂ and D˜ defined as in the proof of
Lemma 48, we have
P
[
D̂ > m(1 − c)m
]
= P
[
D˜ > m(1 − c)m
]
≤ e
(
− (cm)22(1−2c)m
(
1− cm(1−2c)m
))
= e
(
− c2m2(1−c) (1− c1−2c )
)
Simplifying, we find that
(
c2
2(1−c)
(
1 − c1−2c
))
≥ c22 . Thus, with probability at least(
1 − e− c22 m
)
, there are at least cm units not in transit. The rest of the proof is
equivalent to that in Lemma 48 and Theorem 49.
10.3 Constrained point pricing
In this section, we focus on a special case of the vanilla pricing problem wherein
the platform is only allowed to set point prices, i.e. prices based on the origin
node, and the value distributions of all customers arriving at a node are identical
(i.e. pi j = pi, respectively qi j = qi, and Fi j(·) = Fi(·) for all i, j). We provide
a simple optimal pricing policy for the infinite-unit system, which involves
just one eigenvector computation (for throughput/social welfare) or a concave
maximization over a single variable (for revenue).
We then consider the additional constraint that prices are only allowed to
come from a discrete price set. Using our infinite-to-finite unit reduction, all
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our results are then translated back to the finite unit setting. We emphasize that
in the latter restricted settings, there may not be a feasible solution satisfying
demand circulation.
Unrestricted price set: We begin by providing the point pricing equivalent to
Algorithm 2 and Theorem 39.
Algorithm 7: The Point Pricing Elevated Flow Relaxation Program
Require: arrival rates φi j, value distributions Fi, reward curves Ri j.
1: Find {qi} that solves the following point price relaxation:
Maximize
∑
(i, j) φi jRi j(̂qi)∑
k φkîqk =
∑
j φi ĵqi ∀ i
q̂i ∈ [0, 1] ∀ i.
2: Output state-independent prices pi = F−1i (1 − qi).
Theorem 52. Consider any objective function OBJm for the m-unit system with concave
reward curves Ri j(·). Let p˜ be the pricing policy returned by Algorithm 7, OPTm be the
value of the objective function for the optimal state-dependent point pricing policy in the
m-unit system. Then
OBJm(˜p) ≥ mm + n − 1OPTm (10.5)
Proof. The proof is again based on three steps that compare OBJm(˜p) with OBJ∞(˜p),
OBJ∞(˜p) with ÔBJ(˜p), and ÔBJ(˜p) with OPTm. The application of Jensen’s inequal-
ity to prove ÔBJ(˜p) ≥ OPTm is the same as in Lemma 40, with the polytope in
Algorithm 2 replaced by the one in Algorithm 7. Lemma 31 applies since its
proof only relies on p˜ fulfilling the demand circulation property, which it does
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(cf. Algorithm 7). Thus, OBJ∞(˜p) ≥ ÔBJ(˜p). Finally, Lemma 32 implies that
OBJm(˜p) ≥ mm+n−1OBJ∞(˜p), which concludes the proof of the theorem.
Notice that the optimization problem in Algorithm 7 has the demand cir-
culation property as a constraint; thus, with the resulting pricing policy, the
availability is equal at every node (cf. Lemma 35). Recall from Section 9.2.1 that
the availability at each node in the infinite-unit system depends on the traffic
intensity at that particular node and the maximum traffic intensity among all
nodes. Further, the traffic intensity at each node i depends on (i) the ith coordi-
nate of the eigenvector w(q) of the routing matrix {φi j(qi)/∑k φik(qi)}i, j∈[n]2 , and (ii)
the rate of arrivals
∑
k φik at i. In particular, ri(q) = wi(q)/
∑
j φi jqi j. In the setting of
point prices however, w is unaffected by the prices and ri(q) = r j(q)∀i, j implies
that wi
∑
k φ jkq j = w j
∑
k φikqi for all i, j. Substituting in the optimization problem
for every j
q j = w j
∑
k φikqi/wi
∑
k φ jk,
we find that the convex optimization problem can actually be written in just one
variable. Further, in the case of social welfare, and revenue, it is always the case
that maxi qi = 1 for an optimal solution in the infinite-unit system. Hence, in
these cases only one eigenvector computation is needed.
Discrete price set: We now show how the pricing policy from Algorithm 7 can
be modified when there is a discrete set of available prices for each node. We
handle this case with an extra loss in the objective that depends on how well the
prices represent each part of the distribution. In particular, we obtain the pricing
policy p̂ by solving for the unconstrained case as in Algorithm 7 to obtain prices
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p and then setting each p̂i to be the lowest available price greater or equal to pi.
We now prove the performance guarantee for p̂.
Theorem 53. Let
{
p1i , . . . , p
ki
i
}
be the set of available prices for node i in increasing order,{
q1i , . . . , q
ki
i
}
be the corresponding quantiles (in decreasing order), and p, p̂ be defined as
above. Suppose that for all i there exists an available price p`i such that q
`
i ≤ qi, and that
there exists α such that for all i and all s, α · qsi ≥ qs+1i . Then,
αOBJm(̂p) ≥ mm + n − 1OPTm,
where OPTm is the objective of the optimal state-dependent policy for discrete prices in
the m-unit system.
Proof. Since ÔBJ(p) is an upper bound on the unrestricted point pricing problem
(cf. Theorem 52), it is also an upper bound on OPTm. Lemma 31 implies that
ÔBJ(p) = OBJ∞(p), since p fulfills the demand circulation property (cf. Algorithm
7). Further, by Lemma 32, OBJm(̂p) ≥ mm+n−1OBJ∞(̂p). Thus, what remains is to
bound OBJ∞(̂p) with respect to OBJ∞(p). Since q̂i ≤ qi for all i and the per-ride
rewards Ii j(·) are assumed to be non-decreasing in the quantiles, we only need
to bound the changes in the availabilities of the infinite-unit system for each i.
Since the wi are constant under point-pricing, the availabilities are only affected
by prices in the denominator, where the change is equal to q̂i/qi. Thus, no traffic
intensity changes by more than a factor of α and the result follows.
The assumption that the value distributions at each node are identical may
seem too restrictive. Notice though that the same analysis also applies to the fol-
lowing setting: for each i, j there exists a base price di j (e.g., based on geographic
distance). This price is multiplied by the (state-dependent) control pi, which is
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the same for all j. The behavioral assumption is now that customers react the
same way to the control, regardless of their destination.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION
”What’s Next?” – President Bartlet
This thesis began with a description of revolutionary changes that the per-
sonal transportation space has experienced in recent years. Associated with this
revolution is a plethora of interesting operations research problems related to
(i) new kinds of operational requirements and (ii) new opportunities enabled
by data that previously had not been available. A few of these problems were
tackled in this thesis, but many others are yet unsolved. Below, we list a number
of open questions, some of theoretical interest, some of practical interest, that
remain unanswered.
11.1 Open Questions
Dock Allocation. The optimization problem tackled in Chapter 4 relies on the
user dissatisfaction functions (cf. Chapter 3) and their underlying assumption
that demand is exogenous. Though our analysis in Section 4.5 partially moves
beyond that assumption, we have yet to develop a formally sufficient condition
that guarantees good solutions. Such a condition would provide interesting
theoretical underpinnings for our optimization.
Further on the theoretical side, the construction we propose in Appendix 12.2
(to prove that our constrained optimization problem is not multimodular) poses
an interesting question about constrained optimization for discrete convex sets.
It turns out that, for this particular example, a relabeling of the stations (make
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the first station the third and vice versa in ~¯z) yields a multimodular problem
even with the proposed constraints. Given that one would (intuitively) expect
convexity properties to be invariant under a permutation of the ordering of the
coordinates, this exhibits a fascinating property of the constrained set; further
investigations of these properties, along the lines of Moriguchi and Murota [2018],
will likely give rise to fascinating results.
Incentives. The use of incentives to rebalance bike-sharing system is a
novel way of rebalancing that has shown great promise in New York City and
San Francisco. Our results investigated, in a data-driven fashion, the tradeoffs
between online and offline decision-making for such schemes, but many related
questions remain. In the context of loyalty programs, there is a long line of
research in the operations management literature studying the optimal reward
structure of rewards: given the somewhat orthogonal goals of incentives in
bike-sharing systems, it would be of interest to investigate whether the reward
structure should be designed in a similar or an orthogonal fashion. A similar
connection to the operations management literature on loyalty programs may
exist in the context of cannibalization: given that Bike Angels are awarded either
1 or 2 points for rentals/returns at incentivized stations, it is natural to ask how
stations with 2 points should be chosen and what the downside is of an approach
that treats stations as independent of each other (as the user dissatisfaction
functions do).
Rebalancing. There has been a tremendous amount of work on motorized
rebalancing in the last several years. Nevertheless, it seems like none of the
dock-based bike-sharing systems make use of specialized routing software that
include demand characteristics in a non-trivial fashion (cf. de Chardon et al.
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[2016]). This begs the question: what would it take to develop a tool that really
works?
Budgeted Prize-Collecting TSP. In Chapter 7 we provided a 2-
approximation algorithm for the budgeted prize-collecting traveling salesman
problem that has at its base a classic primal-dual approach. An obvious open
question seeks to improve the approximation guarantee or prove the current
guarantee is the best possible. Another interesting extension asks to what extend
our approach extends to the rooted case; since Paul et al. [2017] appeared, the
authors have extended the same algorithm/analysis to the rooted case, in which
a feasible solution is forced to include a particular (root) vertex. Compared to
the orienteering literature, this would be the special case of the s − s orienteering
problem; an interesting question is whether a similar technique can also be used
for the s − t orienteering problem.
Queueing Models. The use of the elevated flow relaxation poses interest-
ing questions about the relationship between combinatorial optimization and
stochastic control; though we show how to obtain parameterized approximation
guarantees (and thereby asymptotic optimality) for a large class of controls in
closed queueing networks, it may be possible to apply similar techniques in
other stochastic models.
11.2 Thoughts on Industry and Academia
This thesis would have been a very different document if it had not been for
the longstanding collaboration between Cornell’s bike-sharing research group
and Motivate. Having such a collaboration allowed us to be certain that the
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questions we were asking were not only of theoretical interest, but also of practi-
cal relevance. While not all research needs to fill both of these boxes, the data
and the transportation revolutions that we currently experience provide plenty
of problems that do; for academia, this yields a huge opportunity to play an
important role in shaping the societal changes caused by these new technologies.
215
Part III
Appendices
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CHAPTER 12
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
12.1 Connections to M-Convex Functions
In this appendix we first provide the definitions of M-convex sets and functions,
and then show that our objective with budget constraints is not M-convex. For
the definitions, it is useful to denote supp+(~x − ~y) = {i : xi > yi}, supp−(~x − ~y) = {i :
xi < yi}, and ~ei as the canonical unit vector.
Definition 54 (M-convex set). A nonempty set of integer points B ⊆ Z2n is defined
to be an M-convex set if it satisfies ∀~x, ~y ∈ B, i ∈ supp+(~x − ~y),∃ j ∈ supp−(~x − ~y) :
~x − ~ei + ~e j ∈ B.
Definition 55 (M-convex function). A function f is M-convex if for all x, y ∈
dom( f ), i ∈ supp+(x− y),∃ j ∈ supp−(x− y) : f (x)+ f (y) ≥ f (x− ei + e j)+ f (y+ ei− e j).
Kaspi et al. [2017] prove a statement equivalent to c(·, ·) being M-convex.
Murota [2004] characterized the minimum of a M convex function as follows to
show that Algorithm 8 minimizes M-convex functions:
Lemma 56. Murota [2003] For an M-convex function f and x ∈ dom( f ) we have
f (x) ≤ f (y) ∀y if and only if f (x) ≤ f (x − ei + e j)∀i, j.
As our example shows, the restriction of c to the feasible set (with budget
constraints) does not guarantee M-convexity, despite both the set and c being
M-convex.
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Algorithm 8: M-convex function minimization, cf. Murota [2004]
0: Find a vector x ∈ dom( f )
1: Find i, j that minimize f (x − ei + e j)
2: If f (x) > f (x − ei + e j), set x := x − ei + e j and go to 2
3: Else, return x
Example 57. Our example consists of three stations i, j, and k with demand-profiles:
pi(−1) = 12 , pi(+1,−1) =
1
2
; p j(+1) = 12 ; pk(+1,−1,−1) = 1.
We consider two solutions. In the first, i, j, and k each have a dock allocated
with i also having a bike allocated, i.e., b′i = d
′
j = d
′
k = 1, whereas d
′
i = b
′
j = b
′
k = 0
and our budget constraint is D = 2, B = 1. Then ci(d′i , b
′
i) =
1
2 , c j(d
′
j, b
′
j) = 0, and
ck(d′k, b
′
k) = 1. In the second solution, d
∗
i = b
∗
k = d
∗
k = 1, whereas b
∗
i = d
∗
j = b
∗
j = 0.
Thus, we have ci(d∗i , b
∗
i ) =
1
2 , c j(d
∗
j , b
∗
j) =
1
2 , and ck(d
∗
k , b
∗
k) = 0, giving that 1 =
c(~d∗, ~b∗) < c(~d′, ~b′) = 32 . But then the statement of Lemma 56 with y = (~d
∗, ~b∗) and
x = (~d, ~b) implies that, if c is M-convex one of c((~d′−i, d
′
i +1), c(~d
′, (~b′−i,−k, b
′
i−1, b′k+1)),
or c((~d′−i,− j, d
′
i + 1, d
′
j − 1), ~b′) must be strictly smaller than c(~d′, ~b′). Since this is not
the case, we find that c restricted to the feasible set is not M-convex, even though
the underlying feasible set is M-convex.
12.2 Connections to Discrete Midpoint Convex Functions
In this appendix we show that the constrained optimization problem formulated
in Section 4.1 is not multimodular. To do so, we apply an equivalence proven
in Murota [2005] that characterizes a function f as multimodular if and only if
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there exists a L-natural convex function g such that f (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = g(x1, x1 +
x2, . . . ,
∑n
i=1 xi). While we do not state the explicit definition of L-natural convex
functions here, it was shown by Fujishige and Murota [2000] that L-natural
convex functions fulfill the following discrete midpoint convexity property.
Definition 58. A function g : Zn → Rn ∪ {+∞} is called discrete midpoint convex if
g(x) + g(y) ≥ g(d x + y
2
e) + g(b x + y
2
c).
Here, the floor and ceiling refer to component-wise floor and ceiling.
We now argue that the function g corresponding to our (constrained) objective
c is not discrete midpoint convex. Consider the current allocation (cf. Section
4.1) ~¯d = (0, 1, 0, 1) and ~¯b = (0, 0, 0, 0). As all values for ~b are 0 throughout this
construction, we do not restate it from now on. Suppose z = 1, that is, only
one dock is allowed to be moved. Then the vector ~¯d = (1, 0, 1, 0) is not feasible
given the constraint (as it would involve moving 2 docks). Now, if g was discrete
midpoint convex, then the inequality would state that:
f (1, 0, 0, 1) + f (0, 1, 1, 0) = g(1, 1, 1, 2) + g(0, 1, 2, 2) ≥
g(1, 1, 2, 2) + g(0, 1, 1, 2) = f (1, 0, 1, 0) + f (0, 1, 0, 1).
However, both terms on the left-hand side are feasible whereas the first term on
the right-hand side is not. Thus, the inequality does not hold, g is not discrete
midpoint convex, and therefore f is not multimodular.
12.3 Tradeoff between number of reallocated and new docks
In this appendix, we show that the discrete gradient-descent algorithm can be
applied, with little overhead, to solve the following adaptation of the earlier
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optimization problem: rather than having fixed budgets D + B and 2z, we have
a parameter M that bounds (via an additional parameter k > 1) the joint cost of
reallocating docks and acquiring new docks.
minimize(~d,~b),z,D¯ c(~d, ~b)
s.t.
∑
i di + bi ≤ D + B + D¯,∑
i bi ≤ B,∑
i |(d¯i + b¯i) − (di + bi)| ≤ 2z + D¯,
∀i ∈ [n] : li ≤ di + bi ≤ ui
z + kD¯ ≤ M.
For each fixed pair of values of z and D¯, the discrete-gradient descent algo-
rithm finds an optimal solution by the analysis in Section 4.2. Furthermore, it is
easily observed that for each value of D¯, it is optimal to set z = M − kD¯. Hence,
one way of finding an optimal solution would be to try all bMk c feasible values of
D¯ (and corresponding values of z) and solve optimally with the corresponding
value of z.
A better algorithm to find the optimal solution is based on the following
observation: by Theorem 10, the dock-move distance between the optimal alloca-
tion for D¯ and z = M − kD¯ on the one hand and the one for D¯ and z = M − k(D¯+ 1)
on the other is at most D¯. Hence, we only need to bound the distance to an
optimal solution that has an additional empty dock at its disposal. It is a simple
corollary of the analysis in Section 4.2.4 that the dock-move distance from an
optimal solution for a given budget to an optimal solution with one additional
dock available is in fact bounded by 1.
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The reasoning above implies that the gradient-descent algorithm with a
minimal adaptation can be used to solve the optimization problem that includes
a tradeoff between the cost of new docks and the cost of reallocating docks;
however, in practice this tradeoff barely ever arises, since the relative cost of new
inventory greatly outweighs that of reallocating existing industry.
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CHAPTER 13
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
13.1 Irreducibility of the Priced System
We justify here our assumption from Section 9.2 that the infinite-unit solutions
we obtain induce a connected graph; to do so, we first need to assume that the
graph created by edges (i, j) on which φi j > 0 is strongly connected. We then
prove that given any solution to the infinite-unit pricing problem, there exists
a solution with arbitrarily close objective that also induces a connected graph.
Throughout this section we work with the flow fi j,∞(p) induced by the demands
in the infinite-unit system, but suppress all dependencies on∞ in the notation.
Theorem 59. Let  > 0. For any non-decreasing objective and any pricing policy p that
induces a supply circulation fi j on k components in the infinite-unit system, there exists
a policy p′ inducing a supply circulation f ′i j in the infinite-unit system such that the
graph with edge-set E = {(i, j) : f ′i j > 0} is strongly connected and the objective with p′
is at least (1 − ) times that of p.
Proof. To prove the theorem we repeatedly add flow to edges (i, j) with fi j = 0,
but also take flow away from edges (i¯, j¯) with fi¯ j¯ > 0. To ensure that edges of the
second kind do not have their flow reduced by too much, we set
δ =

k
×min
{
min
i, j
{
fi j : fi j > 0
}
,min
i, j
{
φi j : φi j > 0
}}
.
Whenever we decrease flow on an edge, this is done by an additive δ amount.
Reducing flow at most k times to obtain f ′i j we guarantee that f
′
i j ≥ (1− ) fi j holds.
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As we assume our underlying graph with edge-set {(i, j) : φi j > 0} to be
strongly connected, it must be the case that there exists a minimal sequence of
components C1,C2, . . . ,Cd = C1, d > 2, and nodes u`, v` ∈ C` such that λu`v`+1 > 0,
but fu`v`+1 = 0. In particular, it being minimal implies that no component other
than the first appears repeatedly.
Since each u`, v` are in the same strongly connected component of the graph
with edge-set E, we know that for each ` there exists a simple path from u` to v`
with positive flow on it. We change flows as follows: for all pairs (u`, v`+1) we
increase flow by δ and for each edge along the path from u` to v` we decrease
flow by δ. At all other edges the flow remains unchanged.
We need to first argue that the new circulation is feasible. Each node along a
path within a component has its in-flow and out-flow reduced by δ, whereas at
the nodes ui, vi both the sum of in-flows and the sum of out-flows has remained
the same. At all other nodes, nothing is altered. Thus, flow conservation contin-
ues to hold. By choice of δ none of the edge-capacities are violated. Thus, the
resulting flow is a circulation with at most k − 1 distinct components. Applying
this procedure k − 1 times, we obtain a single strongly connected component.
Finally, since Ii j(·) are nondecreasing with price and decreasing flow is equiv-
alent to increasing prices, the choice of δ guarantees that the objective on paths
from u` to v` has been reduced by at most a factor of (1 − ). Since Ii j(·) are
non-negative, the additional flow on edges from u` to v`+1 only increases the
total objective. Thus, the pricing policy p′ that induces the circulation f ′i j has the
desired properties.
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13.2 Concave Reward Curves
In this section, we investigate conditions under which throughput, social welfare
and revenue satisfy the conditions of theorem 39. In particular, we first show
that the respective reward curves R(q) = qI(q) are concave. We then prove that
the concave reward curves assumption implies the non-increasing (quantiles)
per-ride rewards assumption.
Lemma 60. Revenue (i) satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 39 under regular value
distributions, Throughput (ii) and Social Welfare (iii) satisfy the assumptions under any
value distribution.
Proof. We drop the subscripts throughout this proof to simplify notation. We
begin by considering (i) revenue, for which the result holds due to the fact that the
reward curve is concave if and only if the distribution is regular (cf. Proposition
3.10 in Hartline [2016]). For (ii) throughput, R(q) = q · I(q) = q is a linear function
of q for any value distribution and thus concave.
Lastly, for (iii) social welfare, we use the so-called hazard rate h(y) = f (y)1−F(y) of
a distribution F with density f . Given F, denote by p(q) and q(p) a price as a
function of its corresponding quantile and vice-versa. Then, by the definition of
hazard rate:
q(p) = exp
(
−
∫ p(q)
0
h(y)dy
)
(13.1)
Taking logarithms and differentiating, we obtain:
− 1
q(p)
= h(p(q))
dp(q)
dq
(13.2)
Hence, as R(q(p)) = q(p) · I(q(p)) and f (p) = (1 − F(p))h(p) = q(p)h(p) we have
R(q) =
∫ ∞
p(q)
v f (v)dv =
∫ ∞
p(q)
vh(v) exp
(
−
∫ v
0
h(y)dy
)
dv
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The first derivative dR(q)dq of R(q) is equal to
−p(q)h(p(q)) exp
(
−
∫ p(q)
y=0
h(y)dy
)
dp(q)
dq
=
p(q) exp
(
− ∫ p(q)
y=0
h(y)dy
)
q(p)
= p(q),
where the first equality comes from Equation (13.2), the second from (13.1).
The second derivative is then given by
d2R(q)
dq2
=
dp(q)
dq
= − 1
qh(p(q))
= −1 − F(p(q))
f (p(q))q(p)
< 0,
which concludes the proof of the Lemma.
Lemma 61. If some objective satisfies the concave reward curves assumption, it also
satisfies the non-increasing (in quantiles) per-ride rewards assumption.
Proof. Suppose an objective has concave reward curves, but does not have non-
increasing (in quantiles) per-ride reards. Then there must exist i, j, q1, q2 with
0 < q1 < q2 such that Ii j(q1) < Ii j(q2). Let A =
q1
q2
. Then
q1Ii j(q2) = A · q2Ii j(q2) = A · q2Ii j(q2) + (1 − A) · 0 · Ii j(0)
≤ (A · q2 + (1 − A) · 0)I(A · q2 + (1 − A) · 0) = q1Ii j(q1),
where the inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality on since the rewards curve
qIi j(q) is a concave function. As q1 > 0, it follows that Ii j(q2) ≤ Ii j(q1) and we
therefore arrive at a contradiction.
13.3 Infinite-unit Limit
In Section 9.2.1 we briefly introduced the infinite-unit limit of the Gordon-Newell
network, i.e., the characterization of the limiting Markov chain wherein we
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keep all system parameters (φi j, Fi j, etc.) constant, and scale m → ∞. We also
mentioned that the primary result we use from this characterization is that the
steady-state availability of each node i is given by Aii,∞(p) = ri(p)/max j r j(p),
and that there exists at least one node i with Ai,∞(p) = 1 (cf. Proposition 28). We
now describe this limit in a little more detail. Our presentation follows closely
that of Serfozo [1999], Section 3.7, which we refer the reader to for more details.
Recall first that given p = {pi j}, we can compute quantities wi(p) and ri(p),
which are independent of m. We define rmax = maxi ri(p) and r̂i(p) = ri(p)/rmax. We
also define J = {i ∈ [n] | r̂i(p) = 1} to be the set of bottleneck nodes in the network
(note that J has at least one element), and K = [n] \ J be the remaining nodes.
Then as m → ∞, the stationary distribution of the m-unit system (as specified
in Equation (9.2)) converges to a limiting distribution (cf. Serfozo [1999] for the
specific technical sense in which the steady-state distributions converge to the
limit) as m→ ∞, with the following properties:
• The bottleneck nodes, i.e., nodes in set J with r̂i(p) = 1, all have Ai(p) = 1.
• The bottleneck nodes feed the non-bottleneck nodes in set K, which together
form an open Jackson network, with each node behaving as a stable M/M/1
queue.
• For all i ∈ K, we have Ai(p) = r̂i(p) < 1.
The above description has the following physical interpretation: in the infinite-
unit limit, the bottleneck nodes have an infinite queue of units, and hence always
have availability 1. Moreover, the rate of units traveling from one of these nodes
i to a non-bottleneck node j is exactly φi j(p). Thus from the perspective of a
non-bottleneck node j, it appears as if a steady-stream of units (with total rate
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< φ j(p)) arrive from (and depart to), an external node; the number of units in
node j therefore behaves according to the dynamics of a stable M/M/1 queue.
Lemma 62. The objective of the elevated flow relaxation for the policy returned by
Algorithm 2 upper bounds the objective of any state-independent policy p in the infinite-
unit system.
Proof. This follows if we show that the flows in the infinite-unit limit satisfy
supply circulation and demand bounding. The latter is clear from the dynamics of
the system (the flow out of a node can not exceed the rate of arriving customers).
To see that the former follows from the above listed properties, note that wi(p) is
defined to be the leading left eigenvector of {λi j(p)}i, j, where λi j(p) = φi j(p)/φi(p).
From this we get for all i:
∑
j
w j
φ ji(p)
φ j(p)
= wi = wi
∑
k
φik(p)
φi(p)
⇒∑
j
r j(p)φ ji(p) =
∑
k
ri(p)φik(p)
Dividing both sides by rmax(p) we get that for all nodes i, we have
∑
j r̂ j(p)φ ji(p) =∑
k r̂i(p)φik(p). However, as we noted above, Ai,∞(p) = r̂i(p), and hence f∞i j (p) =
r̂i(p)φi j(p). Thus the f∞i j (p) satisfy flow conservation.
Combining with Lemma 31, we get that the elevated flow relaxation solution
is tight in the infinite-unit limit.
Lemma 63. The objective of the elevated flow relaxation for the policy returned by
Algorithm 2 is equal to the objective of the optimal state-independent policy in the
infinite-unit system.
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13.4 Settings without Prices
In Section 10.1 we discussed how two control levers, redirection of supply and
of demand, can be combined with pricing to obtain the same guarantees we
obtain for the pure pricing problem. We now show that our technique extends to
settings in which only redirection of supply/demand is allowed, but pricing is
not. Because demand cannot be modulated in these settings, one may assume
that Ii j is constant for each i and j, because Ii j is not a function of prices. Thus,
the elevated objective, defined analogously to Section 9.3, is always equal to the
objective now. Further, the interpretation of our results changes slightly.
Similarly to Algorithm 7, we introduce quantiles qi; unlike Section 10.3 how-
ever, we cannot change prices to modulate demand according to these quantiles.
We adopt the same notation as in Section 10.1, with the exception that we do not
allow for pricing policies and thus everything is just a function of r. The quantiles
q now correspond to the induced availabilities, i.e., qi = Ai,m(r). Observe that the
resulting flows are within the following polytope (as in Sections 10.1 and 10.3):
(1) q̂i ∈ [0, 1], (2)
∑
k
(
φkîqk + ẑki
)
=
∑
j
(
φi ĵqi + ẑi j
)
, (3)
∑
k
ẑik ≤
∑
j
φ jîq j ∀ i.
As in Section 10.1, these constraints stem from demand bounding, supply circula-
tion, and the limitation that only non-empty arriving vehicles may be rebalanced.
Optimizing the elevated objective over the polytope given by these constraints is
a linear program and yields an upper bound on the objective. Consider the redi-
rection policy r˜ obtained from the solution of the linear program (cf. Algorithm
9). In the next Lemma, we bound the infinite unit performance of this policy
compared to the value of the elevated flow relaxation.
Lemma 64. Denote by q̂ the quantiles solved for in the relaxation of Algorithm 9 and
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Algorithm 9: The Elevated Flow Relaxation Program for Redirection with-
out Prices
Require: arrival rates φi j, per-ride rewards Ii j, rerouting costs ci j.
1: Find {qi, zi j} that solves the the following relaxation:
Maximize
∑
i, j
(
φi ĵqiIi j − ci ĵzi j
)
∑
k
(
φkîqk + ẑki
)
=
∑
j
(
φi ĵqi + ẑi j
)
∀i∑
k ẑik ≤ ∑ j φ jîq j ∀i
q̂i ∈ [0, 1] ∀i
2: Output redirection probabilities ri j = zi j/
∑
k φkiqki
by r˜ the redirection probabilities returned. Then OBJ∞(˜r) ≥ ÔBJ(̂q, r˜).
Proof. Consider first OBJ∞(̂q, r˜), the objective obtained when implementing both
the redirection policy r˜ and the quantiles q̂ that Algorithm 9 solves for. By the
same argument as in Lemma 43, all availabilities are equal to 1 (and all traffic
intensities are equal) in this system, and thus its objective matches ÔBJ(̂q, r˜). In
order for us to compare OBJ∞(̂q, r˜) with OBJ∞(˜r), consider a node v ∈ argmax j q̂ j.
Increasing each quantile by a factor of 1/̂qv, we obtain quantiles q¯. Notice that in
the system with quantiles q¯, the traffic intensity at each node is changed by the
same factor, so the traffic intensities are still equal and the availabilities are still
equal at every node. In fact, for the relaxation in Algorithm 9, there exists at least
one i such that qi = 1, so no quantile changes. Allowing for delays and scaling
demand with the number of units, this would not necessarily be the case. Thus,
OBJ∞(q¯, r˜) ≥ ÔBJ(̂q, r˜). Thereafter, for each node j , v, we increase its quantile
to 1. Notice that each such change only decreases the traffic intensity at j, so
the maximum traffic intensity remains unchanged. The lemma follows because
the decrease in the traffic intensity (and thus availability) at each node j , v is
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exactly balanced by the increased rate of arrivals at j. Formally, we have that
f jk,∞(q¯, r˜) remains unchanged when the jth coordinate of the quantiles is set to 1.
Therefore, OBJ∞(˜r) = OBJ∞(q¯, r˜) ≥ ÔBJ(̂q, r˜).
Now, using Lemma 64 in place of Lemma 43 in the proof of Theorem 42, we
get the following.
Theorem 65. With r˜ defined as above, OBJm(˜r) ≥ mm+n−1OPTm.
13.4.1 Delays without prices
Accommodating settings in which we are not allowed pricing, but do have delays,
requires an additional idea. This is because the argument in Section 10.2 explicitly
relied on pricing to ensure that (on average) not too many units are in transit
simultaneously, thereby enabling a lower bound on the maximum availability.
Without prices to regulate demand, we can no longer control the maximum
availability. Instead, we use the following stochastic dominance characterization
for closed-queueing networks.
Lemma 66 (cf. Theorem 3.8 in Chen and Yao Chen and Yao [2013]). In a closed Jack-
son network, with state-independent service rates, increasing the service rate functions,
in a pointwise sense, at any subset of nodes will increase throughput.
In our context, this is equivalent to saying that increasing quantiles at a subset
of nodes only increases throughput. In fact, one can show that throughput also
increases locally, i.e., increasing quantiles at one node (which we henceforth refer
to as point quantiles) does not decrease the rate of units on any edge.
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Lemma 67. Let q = {qi} be a vector of point quantiles, and q˜ be a vector of point
quantiles with q˜k ≥ qk ∀ k. Then for any pair (i, j), we have fi j,m(q) ≤ fi j,m(˜q), i.e. the
rate of realized trips from i to j does not decrease when point quantiles are increased.
Proof. The proof relies on two observations. Note first for q and q˜, we have
φi jqi∑
k φikqi
=
φi jq˜i∑
k φikq˜i
∀ i, j,
and therefore, letting w(q′) denote the eigenvector of the routing matrix
{φi j(q′i)/
∑
k φik(q′i)}i, j∈[n]2 (cf. Section 10.3), we obtain wi(˜q) = wi(q). Define
Γm(q) , Gm(q)/Gm−1(q). We now have that the ratio of the rates fi j,m(q)/ fi j,m(˜q) is
equal to
fi j,m(q)
fi j,m(˜q)
=
Ai,m(q)qiφi j
Ai,m(˜q)˜qiφi j
=
Γm(q)ri(q)qi
Γm(˜q)ri(˜q)˜qi
=
Γm(q) wi(q)∑
k φikqi
qi
Γm(˜q) wi (˜q)∑
k φik q˜i
q˜i
=
Γm(q)
Γm(˜q)
.
Note that the ratio of fi j,m(q) and fi j,m(˜q) does not depend on i and j. Moreover,
from Theorem 66 we have
∑
i, j fi j,m(q) ≤ ∑i, j fi j,m(˜q). Combining the two, we get
fi j,m(q) ≤ fi j,m(˜q).
This allows us to prove the guarantee of Theorem 49 for settings in which
prices cannot be used to provide a lower on the maximum availability within the
system.
Theorem 68. Let r˜ denote the output of Algorithm 10 with εm B 2
√
lnm/m, OPTm be
the value of the objective function for the optimal state-dependent pricing policy, and
m ≥ 100. Then
OBJm(˜r)
OPTm
≥ (1 − εm)
 √m lnm√
m lnm + n − 1 −
3√
m lnm
.
Proof. The same proof as in Theorem 49 guarantees that using point prices as
given by q(1−m), where q comes from the solution of the relaxation in Algorithm
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Algorithm 10: The Rate-Limited Elevated Flow Relaxation Program for
Redirection w/o Prices
Require: scaling paramter m, arrival rates φi j, rewards Ii j, rerouting costs ci j,
travel-times τi j.
1: Find {qi, zi j} that solves the the following relaxation:
Maximize
∑
i, j
(
φi ĵqiIi j − ci ĵzi j
)
∑
i, j φi jτi jqi + ẑi j ≤ m∑
k
(
φkiqk + ẑki
)
=
∑
j
(
φi ĵqi + ẑi j
)
∀i∑
k ẑik ≤ ∑ j φ jîq j ∀i
q̂i ∈ [0, 1] ∀i
2: Output redirection probabilities ri j = zi j/
∑
k φkiqki
10 yields the required guarantee. Lemma 67 then guarantees that increasing all
quantiles to one yields a solution no worse.
We remark that with m→ ∞, the above theorem recovers the result of Braverman
et al Braverman et al. [2016].
Finally, we note that Lemma 67 also yields an alternate proof of Lemma 32:
given quantiles q that do not induce a demand circulation, we consider a system
with rates φ˜i j = φi j
maxk rk(q)
ri(q)
. We observe that (i) the objectives with rates φ˜i j and
rates φi j are the same in an infinite unit system and (ii) that the system with rates
φ˜i j obeys the demand circulation property. Thus, the counting argument of Whitt
[1984] guarantees an objective within m/(m + n − 1) of the infinite unit system
in a system with rates φ˜i j. However, by (i) the latter was equal to the upper
bound on OPTm. Since Lemma 67 implies that the m-unit system with rates φi j
has objective no worse than the m-unit system with rates φ˜i j, the statement of the
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lemma follows.
13.5 Tightness Of Our Guarantees
In this section, we discuss an example of Waserhole and Jost [2014], that proves
that the guarantees we prove for our algorithms are tight. Interestingly, this
does not require the distinction between state-dependent and state-independent
policies, i.e. the objectives obtained through our algorithms can be as far away
from the optimal state-independent policy as from the optimal state-dependent
polcy.
Proposition 69. (Waserhole and Jost [2014]) For any number m of units and n of nodes,
the objective of the solution returned in Algorithm 2 and the optimal objective may be
arbitrarily close to the approximation guarantee mm+n−1 .
Proof. Consider a system of n nodes {1, . . . , n} with demand only occurring from
nodes i to i + 1 and from node n to node 1. In particular, suppose that for some
k that is yet to be set, we have φ12 = φ23 = . . . = φn−1 n = k, and φn1 = 1. Further,
suppose we are maximizing throughput, though the same construction works
for revenue and social welfare. The policy returned by Algorithm 2 sets quantiles
q12 = q23 = . . . = qn−1 n = 1k and qn1 = 1. Given that the availability of each node is
then mm+n−1 (cf. Lemma 32 with all inequalities holding tightly) and that there are
n nodes from which a ride can occur (at rate 1), the throughput is nmm+n−1 . On the
other hand, for the solution that sets all quantiles to 1, the throughput converges
to n as k → ∞. Intuitively, this is because the expected time between an arrival at
node n (triggering that unit to move to node 1) and the expected return time of
that unit to node n converges to 0. Thus, for each arrival at node n, occurring at
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rate 1, the system observes m rides. The details of this argument can be found in
Proposition 3 of Waserhole and Jost [2014].
13.6 Auxiliary lemma
We present a basic Chernoff tail bound for Poisson random variables, which we
use in Section 10.2
Lemma 70. For X ∼Poisson(λ), we have for any 0 ≤ x ≤ λ:
P[X > λ + x] ≤ exp
(
− x
2
2λ
(
1 − x
λ
))
Proof. Using a standard Chernoff bound argument, we have for any θ ≥ 0:
P[X > λ + x] = P[eθX > eθ(λ+x)] ≤ e−θ(λ+x)E
[
eθX
]
= e−θ(λ+x) · eλ(eθ−1)
Now, optimizing over the choice of θ, we get
P[X > λ + x] ≤ exp
(
inf
θ
(
λ
(
eθ − 1 − θ
)
− xθ
))
= exp
(
x − (x + λ) log(1 + x/λ)) (Setting θ = log(1 + x/λ))
≤ exp
(
x − (x + λ)
(
x
λ
− x
2
2λ2
))
= exp
(
− x
2
2λ
(
1 − x
λ
))
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